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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, Ronald Coase blazed forth with what his University of
Chicago colleague called “an insight more fundamental than we can
use.”1 His radical idea was that the electromagnetic frequencies that
carry our wireless communications should be treated like any other finite
natural resource. That is, they should be allocated to users through
market exchanges, with the government simply defining and enforcing
private property rights in the resource.2 In the ensuing decades, a
number of economists and legal scholars have followed Ronald Coase in
1. Harry Kalven, Jr., Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L.
& ECON. 15, 30 (1967).
2. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25–
26, 35–38 (1959).
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advocating a property rights regime for spectrum.3 These theorists
accept the premise of government spectrum regulation: Because radio
signals transmitted on the same or adjacent frequencies in the same area
tend to interfere with each other, usable spectrum is a scarce resource
whose exploitation must be controlled. What they reject is the notion
that the control should lie with the government.
As the demand for wireless devices has accelerated, along with
pressures on the government to reform its management of spectrum,
Coase’s insight has traveled from the fringe to the core of current policy
debates. It has come to be accepted in the past several years, even by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), that comprehensive
governmental control over radio signal transmission is no longer
appropriate. For each year that the speed of technological innovation
outpaces administrative decisionmaking, the chances increase that there
will be significant change in the way that spectrum is managed.
Over the past decade, scholars and engineers who are deeply
influenced by the open architecture of the Internet have challenged the
Coasian critique of spectrum policy.4 These theorists too would liberate
3. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, In re Promoting Efficient
Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary
Markets, WT Docket No. 00-230, at 3–4 (F.C.C. filed Feb. 7, 2001); Arthur S. De Vany
et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A
Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969); Thomas W. Hazlett,
The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas,
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation
Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001) [hereinafter Hazlett, The Wireless Craze]; Jora
R. Minasian, Property Rights in Radiation: An Alternative Approach to Radio Frequency
Allocation, 18 J.L. & ECON. 221 (1975); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg,
Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM.
L.J. 87, 93 (1997); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights
Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1999); Lawrence J.
White, “Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s Important, and How to
Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 19 (2000); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property
Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41
J.L. & ECON. 529, 534 (1998) [hereinafter Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights] (listing
proposals to privatize spectrum). Others have advocated property rights in the context of
specific spectrum applications. See, e.g., Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 211–12 (1982).
4. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 221–22 (2001); Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless
Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 82–83 (2002); Stuart Buck, Replacing
Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 26, at
http://stlr.stanford.edu/stlr/articles/02_stlr_2; David P. Reed, When Less Is More, at http://
futurepositive.synearth.net/2002/05/21 (May 21, 2002); KEVIN WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM:
THE NEW WIRELESS PARADIGM 1–3 (New Am. Found., Spectrum Series Working Paper No.
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spectrum from absolute administrative control, but not to deliver it to
absolute private control. Instead, they advocate a sort of spectrum
commons in which spectrum is largely uncontrolled. In this environment,
those who wish to transmit radio signals would be free to do so, provided
that they used devices that minimized signal interference.5 According to
the commons theorists, spectrum is not like physical property susceptible
to division into parcels.6 Rather, like air—indeed as air—spectrum is a
medium for communications that is theoretically limitless, depending on
the capabilities of the systems that use it.7 As the capabilities of radio
systems improve, commons theorists assert, the carrying capacity of the
airwaves will dramatically expand and, conversely, the scarcity value of
spectrum used to justify private property rights will dramatically
decline.8
The proponents of each of these models—private and common
property—make bold claims for the future telecosm.9 The private
6, 2002) [hereinafter WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM], http://www.newamerica.net/Download_
Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_1001_1.pdf; Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory
of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Werbach,
Supercommons]. Although not a fellow traveler, Stuart Benjamin investigates the argument
of the commons theorists with particular rigor throughout Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum
Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007
(2003).
5. Interference is the manifestation of radio frequency energy in a radio
communication system as a “performance degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of
information which could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy.” 47
C.F.R. § 2.1 (2002). It can occur when undesired energy, either generated by another
transmitter or generated within the receiver itself, is present in a receiver. See
Interference Immunity Performance Specifications for Radio Receivers, 18 F.C.C.R.
6039, 6040 (2003).
6. The degree to which the private property theorists conceptualize spectrum as
land-like can be overstated. Certainly, analogies to land are freely used. Coase, for
example, analogized spectrum uses to “growing a crop” and “build[ing] a house.”
Coase, supra note 2, at 14; see also PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE:
ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 29 (1997) (arguing that
courts should have created “property rights in the ether, much as the common law had
created property rights in the land beneath it”); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of
U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 148–52 (1990)
(arguing that common law principles of land use should have been allowed to define and
enforce property rights in spectrum). However, Coase also noted that what would be
sold in a spectrum market “is the right to use a piece of equipment to transmit signals in
a particular way. . . . [I]t is unnecessary to think in terms of ownership of frequencies or
the ether.” Coase, supra note 2, at 33.
7. I take this analogy to air from the commons theorists themselves. See, e.g.,
WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM, supra note 4, at 5–6, 9. One must note, however, that even
air is a congestible resource. Air, or more precisely, the right to use the clean air
resource, has been propertized to some degree under the Clean Air Act emissions trading
program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7651–7651o (2000). Congress, however, made it clear
that the emissions allowance “does not constitute a property right.” Id. § 7651b(f).
8. See infra Part V.A.
9. George Gilder appears to have coined the word “telecosm” in the early 1990s to
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property theorists describe a future in which spectrum use migrates to its
highest and best use without the distortions of government involvement.10
The productive capabilities of the communications industries will then
be unleashed, resulting in welfare gains for consumers. The claims of
the commons theorists are even bigger. Technological advances, they
say, provide a unique opportunity to liberate communications from
centralized control altogether, private or state. For commons theorists, a
system of spectrum that is truly decentralized will not only increase
consumer welfare, but will benefit human welfare by enlarging citizens’
expressive capacity.11
refer to the web of electronic communications that course through our telecommunications
networks and among our myriad computing devices. See GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM:
HOW INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE OUR WORLD 2 (2000); George Gilder,
Into the Telecosm, 69 HARV. BUS. REV. 150, 150 (1991). I use it with specific reference
to that part of the communications web that is wireless.
10. See infra Part III.A. In the tradition of Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350–57 (1967) (writing that private property
rights in scarce resources are desirable when technological or population pressures
misalign individual gain and social cost), property rights theorists claim that ownership
of spectrum would internalize to owners the benefits of efficient spectrum use, as well as
the costs of waste. By removing the existing restraints on alienability, the government
would allow spectrum to pass to the owners who value it most. See generally Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972) (discussing the
inefficiency of restraints on alienation). By contrast, a spectrum commons would result
in the tragedy of overuse forecast by H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 124, 135 (1954), and
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy,
Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 84 (2001) [hereinafter Benkler, Siren
Songs] (discussing the implications of bureaucratic or commercial control over the
means of communications for individual autonomy). “Only access to communications
infrastructure that is equally privileged to all users can eliminate the autonomy deficit of
property entirely.” Id. This liberationist thread of the commons argument partakes of
the democratic theory that is now so prominent in the fields of intellectual property and
cyberspace law, where we see similar claims about the impact of open architecture and
liberal access rights on human communicative capacities and democratic flourishing.
See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 112–13; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354, 358–39 (1999) (arguing that continued and extensive enforcement of property
rights in information will harm democratic processes by compromising a robust public
domain); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 217 (1996)
(suggesting that laws regulating the flow of information in cyberspace should be based
on democratic principles); Lawrence Lessig, Commons and Code, 9 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 405, 411, 416 (1999) (asserting that a “commons is a critical
feature of a well-functioning liberal society”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a
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It is an article of faith for each school of spectrum policy reform that
the changes it proposes will correct a central problem of communications
law: government mediation among conflicting demands for spectrum in
the “public interest.” Regime change, we are told, will put an end to the
top-down balancing of contending interests, allowing a balance to
emerge from the self-executing principles of markets. For the property
theorists, this would be a market in spectrum parcels.12 For the
commons theorists, it would be a market in smart wireless devices that
function well in the rough and tumble of a relatively unregulated
spectrum commons.13
So focused has been the exchange between the private and common
property theorists on the question of which system is a better substitute
for the existing administrative regime that neither side has examined
with any degree of specificity how its proposed model of spectrum
management would actually function. Interference is the eight hundred
pound gorilla in the spectrum policy debate.14 The existence of
interference between spectrum users was the rationale for government
regulation of spectrum in the first place. Far from receding in
importance, we can expect interference-related conflict to increase along
with intensifying demand for the resource and multiplying techniques
for its exploitation.15 Yet, despite the centrality of interference to the
current administrative system, and to any legal regime in the future,
surprisingly little thought has been given to the variety of interference
scenarios and their relevance to the law.
Unanswered is the question of how judicial or extrajudicial mechanisms
should be used to resolve conflicts over spectrum, considering the
distributional and efficiency-related implications. Today, government
resolves spectrum conflicts by trading off interests among service
providers according to vaguely and variously defined public interest
values and the commands of political power.16 Tomorrow, it has been
suggested, the common law will replace those administrative judgments
wherever communicators are vested with private property rights.17
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) (discussing how copyright law
chills discourse and cultural development if it extends too broadly).
12. See infra Part III.A.
13. See infra Part V.A.
14. As the FCC has put it, “At the heart of all spectrum concerns lies the question
of interference.” KENNETH R. CARTER ET AL., UNLICENSED AND UNSHACKLED: A JOINT
OSP-OET WHITE PAPER ON UNLICENSED DEVICES AND THEIR REGULATORY ISSUES 45
(OSP Working Paper No. 39, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-234741A1.pdf.
15. See infra Part II.B.3.
16. See infra Parts II.C, IV.C.
17. See infra Part III.B.
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Conflicts in the commons will be prevented ex ante through agreements
on open protocols that insist upon interference-reducing technologies.18
That is about all that has been written on the subject.
This Article reflects on the spectrum conflicts that will arise after the
hypothesized sunset of command and control regulation. Yochai
Benkler has tantalizingly suggested that a system of property rights in
spectrum, lacking the benefits conferred by centuries of gradual
development, is “likely to involve more explicit regulatory choices,
[requiring] . . . well-designed governmental planning in the initial creation
of the property rights and a well-functioning dispute resolution system to
fine tune the rights when reality teaches us the limitations of the original
design.”19 That is undoubtedly true, but what should the government’s
role be in this creating, planning, and resolving? What principles might
guide spectrum dispute resolution, and what legal work should be done
now to achieve the promise of regime change after a revolution in
spectrum management?
In pursuing these questions, I arrive at both a caution and a proposal.
The caution is that conflict resolution will be neither self-executing nor
straightforward. It will require technical prowess that not even an
administrative agency can easily summon, the development of liability
standards and remedies that involve difficult cost assessments never
before made, and tradeoffs between communications services that will
embroil decisionmakers in delicate policy choices infused with public
interest considerations.
In short, those who allocate spectrum
entitlements in the future telecosm, be it defined by private or common
spectrum rights, will have to grapple with many of the same questions
that confront the government today.
Given this complexity, neither commons nor property theorists should
be quick to throw over the administrative role in spectrum management.
A regulatory agency can improve the efficiency and fairness of applying
tort law to private property disputes, on the one hand, and technical
controls to forestall common property disputes, on the other. If we take
seriously the hybrid nature of the spectrum resource—a mix of
something like scarce land and abundant air—we see more clearly the
importance of retaining a regulatory role in spectrum management. Like
air, spectrum is not only (potentially) abundant, but it has a limited
18.
19.

See infra Part V.B.
Benkler, supra note 4, at 66–67.
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carrying capacity to absorb the “pollutants” of commerce—in this case
electronic communication. Purely private arrangements even in a
commons are ill-suited to manage the amount of spectral pollution users
experience as noise. This is the traditional province of a regulatory
agency. Indeed, perhaps counterintuitively, the use of regulatory powers
in conjunction with private control might reduce the ad hoc public
interest decisionmaking that has been a more lamentable feature of FCC
regulation.
Part II reviews the basic characteristics of the spectrum resource, as
well as the current spectrum management regime and its troubles. It
offers a framework for understanding the variety of spectrum conflicts
and shows how these conflicts will worsen as wireless technology
develops. It also systematically analyzes the public interest values that
have been brought to bear in resolving spectrum disputes. Part III
proceeds to show how private property theorists would upend the current
command and control model of spectrum management. In its place, they
would install a spectrum market in which interference disputes are
treated like real property trespasses or nuisances and resolved by
common law courts.
The notion that the common law should be used to resolve spectrum
disputes is an idea frequently expressed but never developed. Part IV
unpacks this idea by using FCC resolution of a variety of spectrum
conflicts as precedent for the would-be common law of spectrum. Given
the nature of rights in spectrum and spectrum uses, nuisance is a more
natural model for spectrum dispute resolution than is trespass.20 Yet
common law nuisance is hardly a cause of action renowned for its clarity
or ease of resolution. The changes to nuisance law over the last century,
responding to intensifying uses of land that throw neighbors into more
frequent and complex conflict, have plagued the law with high levels of
“ad hocery,” to use Thomas Merrill’s apt term.21 Ad hocery is the
20. Nuisance law is, of course, a common law cause of action that applies only to
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. As such, it is inapplicable to radio
interference disputes. In referring to nuisance law in the context of spectrum disputes, I
use this term, as others have used it, to refer to a nuisance-like cause of action that might
apply to spectrum, setting aside the question of whether the substantive law for such an
action would be state or federal common law, although this Article comments on the
relevance of federal administrative law to such actions. See infra Parts IV.C, VI.B.
21. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 47 (1985); see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987) (holding that “nuisance standards often are ‘vague’ and
‘indeterminate’”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 86, at 616–17 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (writing that “[t]here is perhaps no
more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word
‘nuisance’”); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 49 (1979) (writing that “[i]t is not uncommon for
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natural product of a judicial test that “balances the utilities” of
competing land uses in assigning privileges and obligations to
landowners. Spectrum use, as it grows more varied and intensive, is
undergoing precisely the same kind of “industrialization” that muddied
nuisance law in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not surprisingly,
then, what we see as we look ahead to a nuisance law of spectrum is a
muddle: courts balancing the utilities of competing spectrum uses in
assigning privileges and obligations to wireless services. In doing so,
courts would displace the FCC as guardians of the public interest. The
concept of the public interest would not disappear, but would be
elaborated through judicial rather than administrative balancing. Such a
common law public interest standard could influence the shape of the
future telecosm as markedly as the regulatory standard has influenced
the past, affecting the types of wireless services that are deployed, by
whom and for whom.
The imperfections of common law resolution of spectrum disputes
might seem to bolster the commons theorists’ approach to spectrum
management reform. Yet, as Part V shows, a commons regime does not
eradicate or even substantially simplify today’s public interest model of
spectrum dispute resolution. Choices of technical protocols, the design
of enforcement mechanisms, and the policing of the boundaries between
common and private spectrum property would themselves require some
vision of the public interest.
Given the failure of either private or common property theorists to
articulate a self-executing method of interference control, how should
dispute resolution figure in with the reform of spectrum management? The
model outlined in Part VI is one possibility. It is a model that
accommodates commonly and privately owned spectrum, as well as
technical and judicial solutions to interference conflicts. It also reserves a
role for regulation in the implementation of both kinds of regime change.
This Article shows how a regulatory agency can make both the
avoidance and resolution of nuisance disputes easier by defining a class
of per se nuisances. Applying learning from the Cathedral literature on
liability and property rules to spectrum disputes, I also discuss how an
agency can begin the process today of providing a menu of appropriate

commentators to describe [nuisance law] as the least systematic area of the tort law or to
note that all too often it serves as the dumping ground for many disparate wrongs that do
not neatly fit into any recognized doctrinal niche”).
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remedies for classes of spectrum conflict tomorrow.22 Not all conflict
will be amenable to adjudication, whether because property rights are
weak or because interference is diffuse. For these cases, regulatory
authority will remain necessary to reduce levels of spectral pollution not
easily controlled through nuisance law and to oversee systems of private
coercion in the commons.
Far from residing exclusively within the academic domain, the
spectrum policy debate is very much alive in Washington. In recent
years, the government has implemented changes in spectrum management
that head in the precise directions (indeed, in both directions) of reform
that have been urged by private property and commons advocates. As
this reform progresses, we need to be more attentive to the costs of
interference dispute resolution, the regulators’ continuing role in
reducing these costs, and the policy choices that will have to be made
under any system of private spectrum management. The way in which
spectrum conflicts are resolved by governing institutions, whether they
are courts, administrative agencies, or private standard setting bodies,
and the values that are brought to bear could be as important for the
wireless telecosm of the future as is the choice of initial property regime.
II. RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN SPECTRUM
I begin where radio regulation began—with conflicts over the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum to communicate. Section A briefly describes
how it came to be that the federal government asserted control over the
use of radio spectrum when radio was young and commercial
exploitation still fragile. Government regulation was, and still is,
justified by a conception of spectrum as a scarce natural resource, like
land. And yet, unlike land, spectrum has never been owned, and its
management recognizes that the resource is renewable and sometimes
plentiful, like air. Section B shows how these two conceptions of
spectrum—one terrestrial and one aerial—are evident in spectrum use
conflicts. This Part concludes with an examination of the public interest
factors regulators have used to resolve these spectrum use conflicts and
the critique of the administrative system of spectrum management.
A. Radio Basics
1. The Spectrum Resource
Radio communication starts with the emission of electromagnetic
22. The Cathedral refers to Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, and subsequent
literature. See infra notes 209–16 and accompanying text.
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waves into the atmosphere over radio frequencies, otherwise known as
radio spectrum. Information can be encoded into these radio waves by
varying the amplitude or the frequency of the wave.23 There are almost
300 billion frequencies in the radio spectrum, ranging from the
extremely low frequencies at three kilohertz to the extremely high
frequencies at 300 gigahertz (GHz).24 Depending on the frequency
range (that is, whether the sound waves are low and long or short and
high), radio waves have different propagation characteristics and are
more or less vulnerable to refraction when they hit such obstacles as
hills, buildings, trees, or rain drops. The lower and longer the radio
wave, the farther along the surface of the earth it can travel. Their
different characteristics make some frequencies better for particular
kinds of communications. Lower frequencies not only have longer
reach, but can penetrate water, enabling submarine communications, and
penetrate buildings, enabling cellular telephone conversations.25
23. See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
25–28 (2001).
24. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2002) (defining “radio” or “Herzian” waves). The
Congressional Budget Office has offered this useful definition of radio spectrum:
The radio spectrum . . . is a conceptual tool used to organize and map a set of
physical phenomena. Electric and magnetic fields produce waves that move
through space at different frequencies, and the set of all possible frequencies is
called the electromagnetic spectrum. The subset of frequencies from 3,000 cycles
per second to 300 billion cycles per second . . . is known as the radio spectrum.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE FCC AUCTIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 2 (1997), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/
0xx/doc9/fccauct.pdf. Communications systems can operate on wavelengths smaller than
300 GHz using optical technologies. See, e.g., Hughes Communications, Inc.: Application
for Authority to Construct, Launch, and Operate a Ka-Band Satellite System in the FixedSatellite Service , 16 F.C.C.R. 14,310, 14,316 (2001).
25. At higher frequencies, radio waves propagate more like light waves and tend to
be obstructed by buildings or natural barriers. They are also attenuated by air and water
in the atmosphere. At lower frequencies, the waves are able to penetrate barriers. As a
result, extremely short-range communications are better suited for higher frequencies
(often defined as those above 3–6 GHz). Mobile communications typically require
frequencies below 3 GHz. Services designed to cover large distances (at least fifty miles
for TV broadcasting and hundreds of miles for AM radio) or operate under the water
typically require frequencies below 1 GHz. These needs are reflected in the FCC’s
Table of Frequency Allocations. 47 C.F.R. § 2.106; see also BENJAMIN ET AL., supra
note 23, at 28–31; JERRY KANG, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 13–15 (2001);
JENNIFER A. MANNER, SPECTRUM WARS: THE POLICY AND TECHNOLOGY DEBATE 34–37
(2003). It is because of these characteristics of radio waves that the signals of television
stations on the VHF band can round the horizon and reach much farther than the signals
of stations on UHF television channels. Because UHF waves head off into space rather
than following the curvature of the earth, their range is limited to line of sight.
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Because of the historic advantage of lower frequencies over higher
frequencies, ninety percent of spectrum use is concentrated in the one
percent of frequencies below 3.1 GHz—those frequencies best suited for
contemporary mobile phone, broadcasting, and satellite systems.26
Radio communication ends with the receiver. Once emitted into the
atmosphere, a radio signal will interact with any receiving antenna in its
path that is tuned to the relevant frequency range. Ideally, only those
receivers that are designed to respond to the given radio signal will accept
it, and the rest will reject the signal as unwanted noise. Unfortunately,
radio signals cannot be contained within a target band of frequencies.
The power radiated by a transmitter will attenuate over a range of
frequencies, inevitably spilling over into adjacent bands. Many
receivers will be unable to reject the unwanted signals as noise without
the use of expensive filters and digital processing devices, and even with
these devices, many receivers will be unable to eliminate unwanted
signals entirely. Instead, users will experience the unwanted signals as
interference, which either interrupts or disrupts the desired service.
Thus, radio signals transmitted on the same or adjacent frequencies,
within the same general area, and at the same time tend to interfere with
one another. It is the allocation of entitlements to cause this interference,
or the obligation to bear or avoid it, that is at the core of spectrum law.
2. Federal Control of the Resource: Spectrum as Land
It was because of signal interference observed in the early days of
radio communication that the U.S. government, like other governments
around the world, assumed responsibility for defining and distributing
access rights to what Congress calls the “public spectrum resource.”27 In
both the language and structure of the law, spectrum is treated as a
quasi-physical substance to which access must be limited, just as access
is limited to public forests and the ocean commons.
As with forests and ocean riches, the government limited access to
spectrum as a response to increased pressure on the resource.28 The
exercise of federal control over radio waves started with the 1912 Act to
Regulate Radio Communication,29 passed only four months after the
26. See History and Current Issues Related to Radio Spectrum Management:
Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th
Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C) (2000).
28. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY LAW 12–
13 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 399, 2002) (describing the relationship
between increasing scarcity and decreasing access to natural resources), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center.
29. Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed 1927).
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Titanic disaster, which many at the time believed to have been the tragic
result of interference to critical radio communications.30 In the Titanic’s
wake, any private party using a radio transmitter (then primarily for
ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communication) was required to have a
license. To issue such licenses, the federal government established
permissible uses of different frequency bands and limited both power
emissions and the geographic scope of transmissions.31 In other words,
it was government that defined usable parcels of the spectrum resource
and controlled access to those parcels.
Concern for interference and the associated reach of governmental
control over spectrum continued after World War I with the shift in radio
use from person-to-person communications to person-to-community, or
broadcast, transmissions. By 1927, more than 700 broadcast stations were
operating fairly chaotically, changing frequencies and increasing power at
will.32 Even though the federal government had asserted dominion over
the spectrum, the administrative apparatus was not up to the task of
regulating so many chimerical broadcasts, and the brash new technology
produced a tangle of sound that listeners were challenged to unravel.33
This sonic disorder provided the impetus, or at least the excuse, for more
complete federal control over the airwaves as Congress concluded that
“Radio Communication is a public utility and as such should be regulated

30. The military claimed that rescue efforts had been hampered by interfering
signals emitted by amateur radio operators. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 5–6 (1994).
31. See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (1996) (noting that the 1912 Act
first asserted the principle of federal limitations on spectrum access and characterized
radio transmissions as a privilege sanctioned by the government).
32. See Arthur Martin, Comment, Which Public, Whose Interest? The FCC, the
Public Interest, and Low-Power Radio, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2001).
33. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). “[N]ew stations used
any frequencies they desired, regardless of the interference thereby caused to others.
Existing stations changed to other frequencies and increased their power and hours of
operation at will. The result was confusion and chaos. With everybody on the air,
nobody could be heard.” Id. The reason radio transmissions were so poorly controlled,
notwithstanding enactment of the 1912 Act, was that courts had interpreted the law to
deny then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover the power to regulate conflicting
broadcasts. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
(holding that the Secretary of Commerce may not deny applications for radio licenses);
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926) (holding that the
Secretary of Commerce may not place restrictions on the uses of radio licenses). See
generally KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 30, at 9–12.
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and controlled by the Federal Government in the public interest.”34
The result was that the federal control first exerted over spectrum in
1912 became more thoroughgoing. The Radio Act of 1927 created an
administrative agency to regulate “all the channels of interstate and
foreign radio transmission” and “to provide for the use of such channels,
but not the ownership thereof, by individuals, firms, or corporations,
for limited periods of time.”35 The FCC assumed these obligations in
1934.36 In the view of the agency itself and the courts, the FCC’s central
statutory duties are to “license radio stations, prevent chaos, and ensure
public safety.”37
In this way, it has fallen to the FCC to determine what kinds of private
and local government uses can be made of hundreds of different
frequency bands.38 The allocation of spectrum is much like the zoning
of land. Like a zoning board, the FCC sets aside blocks of frequencies
for compatible services and tries to keep incompatible services at some
spectral distance to reduce interference.39 Such zoned services of course
34. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 30, at 9 (quoting To Amend the Radio Act
of 1912: Hearings on H.R. 11964 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, 67th Cong. 32 (1923) (statement of Hon. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
Commerce)). Yochai Benkler refers to this history of radio regulation, which justifies
governmental control of spectrum as the necessary response to conflicting uses, as the
“official history.” Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of
the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 298 (1998). He
contrasts this with the revisionist history told by the private property rights theorists.
This revision attributes government control not to necessity, but to the coinciding
interests of government, which wanted control, and incumbent broadcasters, who wanted
protection from competition. See id. at 299–300. For an example of this revisionist
history, see Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 366–73; Hazlett, Assigning
Property Rights, supra note 3, at 529, 531, 541–45. A third history, which Benkler
himself tells, is a story not of technical or political necessity, but of network architecture.
According to Benkler, it was the particular and historically contingent business
arrangements of broadcasters and equipment manufacturers that necessitated the
regulatory structure Congress adopted in 1927 and 1934. See Benkler, supra, at 300–13.
35. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
36. The Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615b (2000)).
37. Frank Bartholomew, 14 F.C.C.R. 4046, 4047 (1999); see also Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–77 (1969); NBC, 319 U.S. at 210–13.
38. The FCC and the National Telecommunications Infrastructure Administration
of the Commerce Department (NTIA) each have responsibilities for making spectrum
allocations—the FCC for local government and private use, and the NTIA for federal
government use. Section 305 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 305(a), preserves
for the President the authority to assign frequencies to all federal government owned or
operated radio stations.
39. Existing zones of spectrum use are not as homogeneous as they might ideally
be because of rapidly changing spectrum uses and ossified spectrum allocations. The
FCC has recognized that better zoning would increase spectrum efficiency. See
SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT, ET DOCKET NO. 02-135, at 22 (2002)
[hereinafter FCC REPORT] (proposing a “good neighbor” policy of “group[ing]
technically compatible systems and devices in close spectrum proximity”).
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include communications service provided to the public, like mobile
telephony and broadcasting. They also include private services used
within companies, like utilities or police departments, for their own
communications needs.40 Still other services use the radio spectrum for
noncommunications purposes like radio astronomy or medical telemetry.41
The federal government’s chart of spectrum use, though illegible here
for particular allocations, reveals how numerous and complexly
interrelated the spectrum zones are.
FIGURE 142

Fr e q u e n c y A l l o c a t i o n s

After zoning frequency bands for particular uses, the FCC designs

40.
41.
42.

See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. pt. 90 (2002) (private radio services).
See, e.g., id. § 2.107 (astronomy); id. pt. 95, subpt. H (medical telemetry).
NAT’L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, UNITED
STATES FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS: THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1996), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.
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service and technical rules for each spectrum block. 43 These rules are
akin to the structural requirements, such as lot size and building design,
that zoning boards impose on landowners. In the case of spectrum, the
“structural” requirements may include limits on power emissions,
interference limits, mandatory schedules for providing services, service
definitions, and equipment or system design specifications. After setting
these rules, the FCC then, like a landlord, sells (or, as was more common
in the past, gives away) licenses to individual users to operate in
accordance with the service rules. The assignment of licenses for most
services, once achieved by random selection or administrative decision,
is now effectuated through public auctions.44
Licensees usually have exclusive rights to use the spectrum they have
been assigned, but not always. To draw again on analogies from the
physical world, there are in today’s administrative regime both
easements and limited commons in the spectrum. In some bands,
“secondary” services have an easement to operate in spectrum that has
been allocated to “primary” users so long as these secondary services do
not cause interference to the primary services.45 Beyond easements,
there are analogs to cooperative forms of land use by small, close-knit
groups.46 In certain bands, frequencies are shared by a class of users
whose exploitation of the spectrum is managed by privately appointed
frequency coordinators and industry associations.47 Spectrum is most
43. The FCC is authorized to do the following:
(a) Classify radio stations;
(b) Prescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class of licensed
stations and each station within any class;
(c) Assign bands of frequencies to the various classes of stations, and assign
frequencies for each individual station and determine the power which each
station shall use and the time during which it may operate; [and]
(d) Determine the location of classes of stations or individual stations . . . .
47 U.S.C. § 303.
44. The FCC’s authority to conduct auctions originated with the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312, 387 (1993)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)). The FCC is not permitted to auction licenses for public
safety radio services, for noncommercial educational or public broadcast stations, or for
digital television service provided by incumbent television broadcast licensees. 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(2). The FCC is also prohibited from auctioning licenses to use orbital
slots for satellites or licenses to use spectrum for international or global satellite
communications services. Id. § 765(f).
45. Low-power television service is an example. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.6000–26.
46. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 60–62 (1990) (describing forms of communal
control over property).
47. Although the coordinator may be private, there is often government oversight
of coordination activities. For example, FCC rules for private land mobile radio
services, such as taxi dispatch services and utility industry communications, require that
a private frequency coordinator make a recommendation to the agency for all new
frequency assignments, facilities changes, and temporary operation. See 47 C.F.R. §
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typically allocated in this way for use by private enterprises for their
own internal communications rather than for the provision of service to
the public. Thus, the private radio services, which provide communication
over relatively short distances for petroleum, utility and other industries,
are subject to frequency coordination.48 So too are the frequencies used
by broadcasters, cablecasters, and sports producers to relay live shots
from onsite to production studios.49
3. Uncontrolled Resource: Spectrum as Air
As much as the government’s zoning and leasing of frequencies treats
spectrum as a resource like land, the regulatory structure also recognizes
that spectrum is not like land and that it differs meaningfully as well
from the renewable resources, like trees and fish, that the government
manages as property. As Congress has put it, “[S]pectrum is a nondepletable natural resource and has finite boundaries.”50 Spectrum is
simultaneously finite and renewable, everlasting and degradable. Within
the constraints of technological know-how at any given point in time,
there is only so much usable spectrum, making frequencies, like acres,
valuable for their scarcity.51 But, unlike real property, radio spectrum
cannot be permanently improved. Spectrum can be used more or less
efficiently, but is never other than what it is in its natural state: an aerial
conduit for electrical signals. Nor can spectrum be captured. As a
result, rights to it are necessarily “usufructuary” rather than possessory,
as Blackstone described rights to water.52 Spectrum thus partakes of
90.175. Private coordination and cooperative negotiations to resolve technical problems
are required for many other radio services. See id. §§ 22.907(a), 24.237, 80.513, 87.305,
90.175, 101.103. Other frequency coordination, particularly for the amateur radio
services, is voluntary, but the FCC urges compliance with coordinator plans and puts the
burden of interference control on the noncoordinated station. See id. §§ 97.201(c),
97.205(c). For a discussion of services that share spectrum, see Buck, supra note 4, at ¶¶
22–26; Douglas A. Galbi, Revolutionary Ideas for Radio Regulation 22–25 (June 12, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=316380.
48. 47 C.F.R. pt. 90.
49. Id. §§ 101.801–19.
50. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, 103d Cong. 247 (1993).
51. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 48 (“What is often said of real estate is
also true for spectrum—they are not making any more of it.”).
52. Blackstone observed the following:
[W]ater is a movable, wandering thing, and must of necessity continue
common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a temporary, transient,
usufructuary property therein: wherefore if a body of water runs out of my
pond into another man’s, I have no right to reclaim it.
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very different kinds of natural resources, part land in its scarcity, part
water in its renewability and fluidity, and part air in its plentifulness but
degradability.
The recognition that spectrum is as much air as land is manifest in the
regulatory structure for its management. It is a resource that is unowned
by either the government or its users.53 Unallocated spectrum has been
likened to unappropriated water. It is “government property only in the
special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real ‘owner’ in
any way.”54 Indeed, if spectrum were government property in the way
of forests and grazing lands, then the government could allocate rights to
its use without the administrative rulemakings at the heart of today’s
elaborate regulatory apparatus for spectrum. This is because the
Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to the distribution of
federal property.55 In light of the mixed nature of spectrum, it makes
sense that it is the authority to control the transmission of electrical
signals over radio spectrum, rather than actual ownership of the
spectrum, that the government asserts.56
If spectrum does not belong to the federal government, Congress has
made clear that it does not belong to any radio operator either. The
Communications Act explicitly denies FCC licensees any property rights
in the spectrum they use. Licensees may only “for limited periods of
time, under licenses granted by Federal authority” enjoy “the use of
[radio] channels, but not the ownership thereof”; furthermore, “no such
license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms,
conditions, and periods of the license.”57 The Act goes further by
demanding that each prospective licensee relinquish any claims it may
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (1979). Of
course, riparian systems do allow for ownership rights in water, as Blackstone himself
acknowledged.
53. See Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New
Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 912 (1998); Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications
Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, at 3, 8–12 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). If Justinian were
to assign spectrum to one of his three categories of property—unowned, government
(publicly) owned, or private—it would be to the category of unowned resources that
includes the “air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.” THE
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 2, tit. 1 (J.T. Abdy & Bryan Walker trans., Gaunt, Inc.
2002) (1876); see also Richard A. Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Private and Common
Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 17, 24 (1994) (discussing Justinian’s property theories).
54. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(Williams, J., dissenting).
55. Notice and comment rulemakings are not required for “a matter relating to . . .
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2000).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (providing that a central purpose of the Communications Act
is “to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio
transmission”).
57. Id.
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have to the frequency in question:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant
therefor shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of
the electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United States
because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or otherwise.58

Given the statutory antipathy to spectrum possession, it is not
surprising that spectrum licensees lack most of the perquisites of
ownership. They may not assign or transfer their licenses to other
parties without prior FCC approval;59 they may not stockpile or
warehouse spectrum purchased at auction;60 and very often, they may
not speculate on licenses by acquiring them merely to sell, rather than to
use.61 Finally, perhaps most maddeningly for licensees, the FCC may
modify existing licenses as it likes, subject only to rulemaking
procedures, “if in the judgment of the Commission such action will
promote the public interest.”62
Consistent with the intangible, unpropertied qualities of spectrum, the
FCC has set aside some frequencies as a common pool resource in the
form of unlicensed spectrum. Rather than granting exclusive or even
group rights to such frequencies, the FCC has opened the bands for lowpower transmissions by operators or members of the public without
58. Id. § 304. This provision first appeared in the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44
Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
475 (1940) (holding that “[t]he policy of the Act is clear that no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license”).
59. 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(h)(2), 310(d). See generally Stephen F. Sewell, Assignments
and Transfers of Control of FCC Authorizations Under Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act of 1934, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 277 (1991) (discussing the procedural
and substantive requirements of the FCC’s prior consent rule regarding assignments and
transfers). The FCC must approve all transfers and assignments of station licenses and
permits, as well as any de facto transfers of control. While Commission approval itself
is often pro forma, the approval process gives competitors and other interested parties the
opportunity to file petitions to deny license transfer applications, license renewals, and
initial applications. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1). The petition to deny process can hold up
spectrum transactions for years.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(b).
61. Although more lenient than they once were, antitrafficking provisions exist for
broadcasting, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3597 (2002), cellular, id. § 22.943, fixed microwave, id. §
101.55, and DBS, id. § 100.55, among other services. See also Crowder v. FCC, 399
F.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[A] license granted in reliance on an applicant’s stated
intention to operate should not . . . be bartered away for profit . . . rather than [used] to
operate a station in the public interest.”) (citation omitted).
62. 47 U.S.C. § 316(a)(1); see United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192,
203 (1956) (recognizing the broad public interest rulemaking authority of FCC in
upholding regulations limiting broadcast license ownership).
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mandating licensing or coordination. The only requirement is that the
equipment used in these unlicensed bands must satisfy certain technical
specifications.63 These devices, which include garage door openers, baby
monitors, heart monitors, cordless telephones, and wireless network
devices, are not permitted to cause interference to authorized devices and
must accept any interference they receive from the lawful transmissions
of licensed operators.64 Unlicensed devices may operate on the same
frequencies used by licensed operators, or in some cases, on spectrum
that has been dedicated for unlicensed use.65
B. Spectrum Use Conflicts
The intensifying use of spectrum, combined with an increasing array
of communications architectures within the same licensed or unlicensed
bands, portends more frequent and more challenging spectrum use
conflicts for the future.66 As we will see below, this is true whether or
not the potential to mitigate interference with new technologies keeps
pace or even outpaces the potential for interference among multiplying
users. This is because the mere availability of mitigation measures does
not settle upon any particular party the obligation to mitigate the actual
or potential interference. Thus, however spectrum management evolves,
any management regime will have to cope with more radio signal
interference disputes that are already difficult to resolve.
Radio interference is defined as “[t]he effect of unwanted energy due
to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon
reception in a radio-communication system, manifested by any performance
degradation, misinterpretation, or loss of information which could be
extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy.”67 The premise of
FCC spectrum regulation is that agency planning and enforcement can
largely prevent degradation of services due to the intrusions of unwanted
63. Part 15 of the FCC’s rules permits the operation of authorized low-power
wireless devices without a license. Devices will be authorized if they meet standards
designed to ensure that the devices are unlikely to cause harmful interference to other
users of the spectrum. 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(b). The maximum permitted power for Part 15
transmitters is expressed in terms of field strength at a specific distance, which is a
function of the transmitter output power and the transmit antenna gain. Id.
64. Id. § 15.5.
65. See infra notes 287–95.
66. The interference environment grows more complex with increases in the
density, mobility, and variability of transmitters, and with the increased use of a flexible
use policy that allows users to determine how and where to operate in their assigned
spectrum. See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM
EFFICIENCY WORKING GROUP 26–27 (2002) [hereinafter FCC SEWG REPORT], available
at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SEWGFinalReport_1.pdf.
67. 47 C.F.R. § 2.1(c).
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energy. Like a restrictive zoning ordinance that physically separates
interfering uses, the FCC rules have been fairly successful in preventing
systemic and large scale interference between licensees.68 However, just
as real property zoning does not end interfering land uses, spectrum
zoning does not end interference or its threat.69
The following sections develop a typology of interference conflicts in
order to structure the ensuing discussion on interference dispute resolution.
1. Spectrum as Land
The duality of spectrum—a resource vested with the characteristics of
both land and air—is apparent in the conflicts among spectrum users.
These conflicts sometimes look like in rem trespass or nuisance disputes.
A’s wireless system degrades B’s wireless system, or they degrade each
other’s systems. This might happen because either A or B is operating
outside of its assigned parameters (trespass) or because even lawful uses
of the spectrum may prove incompatible (nuisance). Conflicts in
spectrum use can also look more like complex pollution problems in
which A’s emissions, and B’s, and the hundreds of other emitters in their
neighborhood, are all reducing the quality of the spectrum resource
within the neighborhood and perhaps beyond.
Today’s administrative framework is almost entirely structured to deal
with the first kind of “terrestrial” conflict. Land-like interference
conflicts can be assigned to two categories. First, there may be
“intraservice interference,” in which A and A1 are licensees in the same
service category, such as paging, using the same or similar technologies.
A might interfere with A1, A1 might interfere with A, or, less commonly,
there might be reciprocal interference between the two. Sometimes, the
interference occurs because one or the other licensee is not operating in
accordance with its license. More typically, both A and A1 will be
operating lawfully, but interference occurs unexpectedly because
68. See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT OF THE INTERFERENCE
PROTECTION WORKING GROUP 2, 28–29 (2002) [hereinafter FCC IPWG REPORT], available
at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/IPWGFinalReport.pdf. “The zoning approach leads to
fewer constraints on the systems operating in the exclusive or shared allocations which
provides greater technical flexibility for the services to develop, grow and evolve.” Id. at 23.
69. See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT OF THE SPECTRUM RIGHTS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES WORKING GROUP 79 (2002) [hereinafter FCC SRRWG REPORT]
(recognizing that allegations of interference by incumbents may simply be a tactical
effort to block the entry of competitors), available at http://www.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SRRWG
FinalReport.pdf; infra Part IV.C.
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interference predictions were wrong from the start, were not adjusted to
reflect the introduction of new radio services, or did not properly
account for what would happen when A or A1 modified its system
characteristics.
Second, there may be “interservice interference,” in which A and B are
licensees in different service categories using different technologies.
Again, A might interfere with B, B might interfere with A, or there might
be reciprocal interference. This interference can occur whether or not
both licensees are operating in compliance with the terms of their
licenses. Such interservice interference may be fairly simple, involving
just two licensees or it may be complex, involving many licensees across
different services using different technologies. A special type of
interservice interference is “prospective interference” between existing
licensee A and new entrant C such that C would cause interference to A
or receive interference from A.70
Having categorized possible interference scenarios, let us turn to
possible resolution scenarios. It has been pointed out that radio
interference generally does not take place in the air where two electrical
signals intersect.71 Thus, in the picture below, there is no interference at
the intersection of the two ovals.

70. In addition, two new entrants might battle over access to the same frequencies.
71. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 4, at 39–40; WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM, supra
note 4, at 6.
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FIGURE 2

Fa l se d ep i ct i o n o f i n t er f er en ce

Rather, as illustrated below, interference takes place in the receiver
where the intrusion of undesired signals disrupts or prevents the
acquisition of the desired signal.72
72. There is no agreement on how interference should be measured at the receiver.
The FCC measures interference at hypothetical receivers within the licensee’s predicted
service area rather than at actual receivers that are tuned to the desired signal at any
given time. Thus, even though no receiver may actually be affected by interference, a
reduction in signal availability for that receiver is counted as interference. This approach
has been criticized as overly protective. See, e.g., David P. Reed, Comments for FCC
Spectrum Policy Task Force on Spectrum Policy, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 11, 16, 19
(F.C.C. filed July 15, 2002) (“As long as the regulatory process (including litigation and
lobbying, and even secondary markets) focuses on defining interference without
reference to the actual dynamic uses of systems, . . . there will be no economic means to
gain these reductions in ‘actual’ interference (as opposed to the current measures of
‘imaginary’ interference).”).
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FIGURE 3
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Seen this way, it becomes clear that responsibility for preventing
interference may be assigned either to the emitter of the unwanted signal
or to the receiver of the unwanted signal. Specifically, (1) the interfering
service or the receiving service may stop transmitting, (2) the interfering
service or the receiving service may modify its network architecture, or
(3) the receiving service may improve the immunity of its devices. To
make this more concrete, consider a dispute over interference between a
power plant owner and a neighboring homeowner. If the homeowner is
disturbed by the power plant emissions, the plant can cease operations,
or the homeowner can move away. Alternatively, the plant can install
scrubbers and make other changes to its facilities, or the homeowner can
change her use of the property to avoid the interference. Finally, the
homeowner can wear a facemask, thereby improving her immunity to
the interference without actually reducing exposure. Part IV, in
examining the applicability of the common law to interference, explores
the distinctions among these remedies and their manifestations in
communications law.
A final characteristic of wireless systems is important to understanding
the implications of interference. This is the distinction between “closed”
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and “open” architecture systems. Most radio services, such as cellular
telephony and satellite television, employ closed architectures in that the
operator controls the design of both the transmitters and the receivers in
their systems. The spectrum operators either manufacture their own
receivers or dictate the design to independent manufacturers.
Unlicensed services like cordless phones are inherently integrated in that
the transmitter and the receiver are combined in a single device that
resides in the end-user’s equipment.
By contrast, some services, most notably television and radio
broadcasting, employ an open architecture system in that they do not
control the receivers used within their systems. Although open architecture
operators might exert some informal influence over the design
characteristics of the receivers, they do not specify those characteristics
and do not supply the devices themselves. For the purposes of this
Article, the difference between closed and open architecture services is
that closed architecture services can more easily abate interference to
themselves by changing the design of their receivers to avoid or increase
immunity to interference.
Thus far, we have considered simple interference disputes. Although
many spectrum users may be involved, these are essentially bilateral
affairs between two users or two classes of users. What becomes
evident in the next section is that, just as spectrum is not always like
land, spectrum disputes are not always like disputes over land.
2. Spectrum as Air
In the case of air, as industrial emissions increase, the likelihood that
these emissions will interfere with the functions of living beings
increases. The same is true of spectrum. As the density of signals
increases, some communications systems will be overwhelmed by signal
noise that is the cumulative output of many operators.73 Because most of
73. The amount of ambient radiation in the spectrum is increasing so fast that
some say it could lead to a meltdown of existing service. See, e.g., Comments of
Cingular Wireless LLC, In re the Commission’s Spectrum Policies, ET Docket No. 02135, at 37–38 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002).
[W]e could potentially be entering a period of rapid degradation of the noise
environment. Such degradation would reduce our ability to meet the communications
needs of the country. The principal negative impacts are likely to be reductions in
the performance or reliability of wireless systems or increases in their costs.
Id. at 37 (alteration in original). It may be that digital technologies, which are more
robust and resistant to interference than analog systems, can slow this degradation. Such
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the favored spectrum bands are already in use, future spectrum use will
require more intensive sharing of encumbered frequencies, resulting in
more radiation within a given band. The cumulative amount of energy
in a band of frequencies is known as the “noise floor.”
As illustrated in Figure 4 below, the noise floor rises far above the
permitted power levels of any given operator, increasing over time.74
When a service is licensed, it is usually engineered as cheaply as
possible to function adequately in the existing spectral environment. In
other words, it is engineered to ensure that the signal can be received,
over a given noise floor, throughout the desired service area. As the
signal attenuates and the noise increases in relation to the desired signal,
reception gets worse. As more operators begin to emit signals in the
same or adjacent frequencies, the noise increases even though all
operators might be complying with the relevant power limitations. This
increase in the level of noise that systems must reject could result in
reduced coverage, system capacity, system reliability, and quality of
service. 75

systems use error correction and other coding to mitigate the effects of interference.
Interference Immunity Performance Specifications for Radio Receivers, 18 F.C.C.R.
6039, 6043–44 (2003). Nobody seems to know whether noise-reducing technology will
advance fast enough to keep up with the pace of noise accumulation in the spectral
environment.
74. This picture is modified from a graphic in the FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 29.
75. The impact of cumulative noise from multiple “noninterfering” sources on
communications operation is well-documented. See, e.g., Revision of Part 15 of the
Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R.
7435, 7444 (2002) (discussing the importance of the possible effects of cumulative
interference from multiple ultrawideband devices); Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the
Commission’s Rules to Permit Operation of NGO FSS Systems Co-Frequency with GSO
and Terrestrial Systems in the Ku-Band Frequency Range, 16 F.C.C.R. 4096, 4140
(2000) (establishing aggregate interference limits for satellite systems); Review of the
Technical Assignment Criteria for the AM Broadcast Service, 6 F.C.C.R. 6273, 6293
(1991) (establishing a method for computing responsibility for cumulative interference),
recon. granted in part and denied in part, 8 F.C.C.R. 3250 (1993).
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In the past, the noise floor has increased relatively slowly, and
operators have been able to redesign receivers and system architectures
to respond to new spectral conditions. As increases to the noise floor
outpace product cycles, this becomes harder to do.76 One engineer
speaking at a recent FCC workshop on the future of interference
professed: “I think I can predict the future fairly confidently that we’re
going to see the same that we see today, but we’re going to see a lot
more of it. . . . It may not be so obvious on a day to day basis, but the
interference will increase.”77
76. Software defined radios may be particularly useful in responding to changed
signal-to-noise ratios in that the radios can be upgraded by reconfiguring software rather
than by replacing hardware. See infra note 312.
77. FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at 3 n.13 (quoting the Interference Protection
Workshop remarks of Dr. Andrew Clegg).
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There is no mechanism in today’s administrative regime to allocate
rights and responsibilities in a spectral environment that is being degraded
by cumulative interference.78 In fact, the FCC has acknowledged that it
does not even measure noise levels or know the rate of increase in noise
levels over time.79 Thus, while we know that the ambient level of
energy in the spectrum is increasing, we do not know by exactly how
much or what the implications of rising noise levels for service
reliability and reach might be.
3. Tendencies and Trends
As noted above, mere congestion alone is likely to exacerbate
interference. Moreover, recent innovations in spectrum management
may magnify the impact of spectrum congestion with respect to both
simple and complex interference in ways that are not yet well
understood and certainly have not informed the debate over spectrum
management reform. There are reasons to believe that the more
flexibility spectrum users have in designing wireless services, whether
such flexibility is a product of private property rights, a lightly regulated
commons, or simply a more relaxed administrative regime, the more
complex the interference environment is likely to be.
There is little doubt that increased flexibility in spectrum use is what
we will see. Until the early 1990s, spectrum allocations were both
narrow and static. Licensees were bound to use their assigned spectrum
for a narrow class of uses specified in the license or the applicable rules
and could not change the use even as change was demanded by markets
or technology.80 Several years ago, the FCC announced that allowing
licensees more flexibility to determine what kinds of services to provide,
bounded only by interference limits at the edges of the service area,
would be a key feature of its spectrum policy.81 Even before that
78. FCC rules in some instances do limit the amount of cumulative interference a
particular licensee is expected to bear in cases of intraservice interference. See, e.g., 47
C.F.R. § 73.623(c)(2) (2002) (limiting the amount of new interference a digital television
station is required to bear due to the emissions of other digital television stations to ten
percent of the population).
79. FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at 11–12.
80. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 878 (2d ed.
1999).
81. See Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of
Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,868, 19,870
(1999) (providing that “[f]lexible allocations may result in more efficient spectrum
markets”). Under flexible use policies, restrictions take the form of “limits on signal
strength at the edge of a licensee’s service area and limits on maximum transmitter
power, antenna height and out-of-band emissions.” Interference Immunity Performance
Specifications for Radio Receivers, 18 F.C.C.R. 6039, 6041 (2003).
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announcement, the FCC had begun to loosen usage restrictions on
licensees. It did this prospectively by allowing multiple technologies
and multiple services to operate within a single band of spectrum.82 It
also increased spectrum flexibility retroactively by expanding the range
of services that incumbent users could offer based on their existing
licenses.83 In 1995, the FCC went as far as it dared in the direction of
flexibility by allocating spectrum for varied uses without any clear idea
of what the primary use of the spectrum would be.84 Flexible service
rules have now become the norm in new spectrum allocations.85
82. The first implementation of “flexible use” was in 1993, when the FCC
established service rules for the Personal Communications Service (PCS), allowing the
new service to provide a mix of fixed and mobile services without specifying what
technology operators should deploy. Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to
Establish New Personal Communications Services, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7712 (1993).
83. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 624(c) (allowing broadcasters flexibility in the use of
digital television channels); In re Flexibility for Delivery of Communications by Mobile
Satellite Service Providers in the 2 GHz Band, the L-Band, and the 1.6/2.4 GHz Bands:
Review of the Spectrum Sharing Plan Among Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Mobile
Satellite Service Systems in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Bands, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R 1962, 1964, 1973 (2003) (allowing satellite services
to use spectrum for terrestrial services); Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission’s
Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the
Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,222, 17,234 (2001)
(granting licensees flexibility to use spectrum for mobile purposes). Another way the
FCC provides retroactive flexibility is by authorizing “excess capacity” leasing.
Twenty-five years ago, the FCC first allowed wireline common carrier services to resell
and share capacity. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common
Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 298 (1976). The practice spread into
the wireless services. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(c), (d), (f) (Instructional Television
Fixed Service leasing); id. §§ 73.293, 73.295 (FM subcarrier leasing). A new policy
allowing wireless capacity leasing in many services may render the practice more
widespread. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers
to the Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003) (allowing many
wireless services to lease transmission capacity).
84. See Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal
Government Use, 10 F.C.C.R. 4769, 4800–01 (1995). This move was foreshadowed in
the creation of the General Purpose Mobile Service, which was never actually licensed.
See Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commission’s Rules Relative to Cellular
Communications Systems, 2 F.C.C.R. 1825, 1838, 1841 (1986); see also Implementation
of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 12 F.C.C.R.
11,266, 11,273, 11,288 (1997) (describing the creation of the Wireless Communications
Service, in which licensees may provide any fixed, mobile, or radiolocation service
consistent with international allocations and technical limitations, and the Personal
Communications Service, in which licenses can be used for any mobile or fixed service).
85. See, e.g., Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz and
2.1 GHz Bands, 18 F.C.C.R. 25,162 (2003) (adopting flexible service rules for the 1710–
55 and 2110–55 MHz bands for the provision of “a variety of new and advanced wireless
services, including voice, data, and broadband services . . . using high-speed fixed and
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The FCC’s experiments with flexible use, as well as theoretical work
on the increasing complexity of spectrum applications, suggest that
interference is positively correlated with variety in spectrum use. Thus,
for example, where stationary services might once have been able to
work around the interference constraints of other stationary services,
they will face greater technical difficulties and expense in working
around unpredictable mobile services.86 Stringent regulations governing
the architecture of communications systems reduce conflict in the same
way that stringent regulations governing the architecture of road traffic
reduces accidents. Where identical vehicles are traveling at identical
speeds on an open road, the risk of collision will be fairly small. Once
you begin to introduce bicycles, trucks, and differential speeds, the risk
of collision increases, even assuming compliance with the traffic laws.
The differentiated sets of vehicles have different requirements,
capabilities, and vulnerabilities, making road use less predictable and
collision more likely. When licensees are permitted to change their
service models and technologies, there is an increased likelihood that
they will let loose the wireless equivalents of Hummers and scooters into
each other’s lanes.
One observes this phenomenon in the 800 MHz band when, after the
FCC adopted a flexible use policy, services evolved in ways that were
not originally contemplated when the initial spectrum allocations were
made.87 The 800 MHz band is shared by high-power cellular
transmitters and much lower power public safety operations, such as fire
and police communications. The public safety services are vulnerable to
interference caused by cellular transmissions, and for obvious reasons,
service disruption may impose high costs on the public. These cellular
and public safety services coexisted fairly harmoniously when the
cellular companies used relatively few stations serving wide areas. After
flexible service rules allowed cellular operators to increase the density of
their transmitters, interference overwhelmed the poorly functioning
public safety receivers used in police cars and fire trucks. The technical
mobile networks”); Service Rules for the 746–765 and 776–794 MHz Bands, 15
F.C.C.R. 476, 478 (2000) (reallocating television broadcast channels for a wide range of
fixed and mobile wireless services). Although the FCC’s flexible use policies are
supposed to bring market forces to bear on spectrum allocation decisions, those policies
have been criticized for being insensitive to market realities. In particular, the
competitors of those licensees that would benefit from retroactive grants of flexibility
complain that such flexibility distorts the market by adding value to spectrum that was
purchased (if at all) at prices that did not reflect that added value. See, e.g., Ex Parte
Comments of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Public Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy
Task Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 5–6 (F.C.C. filed July 12, 2002).
86. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 13.
87. See FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at 2 n.5.
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specifications governing cellular emissions that were adequate only a
few years earlier to protect public safety receivers were rendered
inadequate by changes to cellular system architecture.88 Of course, the
FCC could have changed the technical specifications when it allowed
more flexibility within the bounds of those technical rules. Similarly,
property rights might conceivably be developed to constrain owners on
all the relevant margins. This theoretical possibility, however, bumps up
against the realities that engineers responsible for creating technical
rules, or property rights, cannot model interference scenarios for all
signal combinations that may arise in the future under flexible rules.
Modeling challenges are particularly acute in the face of another kind
of flexible use—the experimentation with different signal modulation
techniques even within the same service. These modulation techniques
are known as waveforms.89 Even if a mobile phone company makes no
change to the density of its cellular transmitters or to the amount of
power that they emit into the atmosphere, changes to its waveforms may
significantly affect the amount of interference that other operators will
experience. To understand why this is, one must know something about
how the FCC goes about defining spectrum usage rights.
Typically, the FCC determines the contours of spectrum rights by
modeling interference scenarios in the laboratory. It models what will
happen when a particular spectrum use is introduced into the existing
spectral environment. This type of modeling is a relatively reliable
predictor of actual interference when the types of signals that will be
interacting are few and well-defined. However, according to the FCC,
“[a]s the number of available signal waveforms (and combinations
thereof) continues to rise, [laboratory testing] will become increasingly
unwieldy” and costly.90 As a result, “it will not always be possible to
guarantee well-defined interference protection rights based on
comprehensive predictive analyses.”91 For example, suppose that Sam
88. See Improving Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, 17
F.C.C.R. 4873, 4885 n.40 (2002).
89. Examples of waveforms are GSM and CDMA in the mobile phone industry.
90. FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at 5 n.23.
91. Id. at 11; see also Interference Immunity Performance Specifications for Radio
Receivers, 18 F.C.C.R. 6039, 6041 (2003). “[I]t often is not possible to perform a
reliable, comprehensive analysis to predict the strength of potential signal sources in a
given frequency band and geographic area because licensees have discretion to select
and modify transmitter locations, operating power, antenna directivity and type of
transmissions.” Id.
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and Jane operate broadcast stations on adjacent channels and use the
same transmission technology, which is mandated by the FCC. Now
suppose that the FCC implements flexible use rules or even allocates
property rights in the broadcast spectrum. Jane then decides to switch to
a new waveform, while keeping her power and other relevant
coordinates constant. The modeling that underlies Jane’s spectrum
usage right did not account for this new transmission standard. As a
result, Jane might now interfere with reception of Sam’s signal where
she had not done so before.92
The increased risks of interference that attend flexibility may have
been responsible for one of the FCC’s worst recent experiences in
spectrum allocation. In 1997, the FCC auctioned spectrum for a
multipurpose “wireless communications service.”93 In the midst of a
booming telecommunications market, and not long after the FCC auctioned
other spectrum for billions of dollars, the Wireless Communications
Service (WCS) auction generated little interest and little revenue.94
Many blamed the auction failure on the breadth of the spectrum
allocation, which left potential investors uncertain about the likely
spectrum uses and, therefore, the likely vulnerability of their investments
to interference.95
92. One engineer contributing to the FCC’s inquiry on the future of interference
had this to say about complexity in spectrum use:
Obviously, the number of users and the management of the problem becomes
dramatically enhanced [as spectrum use becomes more complex. Consideration
of interference is] at least a six dimensional problem, meaning spatial, x-y-z,
frequency, time and waveform, and of course since the wave form can be
infinitely complicated, you can make it an n-fold problem, which basically has
more variables than you have numbers.
FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at 5 (quoting the Interference Protection Workshop
remarks of Dr. Paul Steffes).
93. FCC, Auction 14: Wireless Communications Service (WCS) Fact Sheet, at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/14/factsheet.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2004). The WCS
spectrum “may be used for any fixed, mobile, radiolocation or broadcast-satellite (sound)
use consistent with the international agreements concerning spectrum allocations, and
subject to the technical rules of Part 27, Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations.” Id.
94. See WCS Auction Closes: Winning Bidders in the Auction of 128 Wireless
Communications Service Licenses, 12 F.C.C.R. 21,653, 21,658–67 (1997) (listing
auction winners).
95. For examples of industry criticism of the WCS service flexibility, see
Comments of Motorola, Inc. Public Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, ET
Docket No. 02-135, at 9 (F.C.C. filed July 22, 2002); Comments of Nokia Inc., Public
Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 4 (F.C.C. filed
July 8, 2002). For a discussion of the causes of failure of the WCS auction, see WCS
Spectrum Finds a Purpose in Broadband, 12 BROADBAND BUS. REP. (PBI Media,
Potomac, Md.), Aug. 27, 2002. In the wake of this mishap, Congress added section
303(y) to the Communications Act, which permits the FCC to provide for “flexibility of
use” only after determining, upon public notice and comment, that flexibility will further
the public interest, will not deter investment in communications services and systems,
and is consistent with international treaties. 47 U.S.C. § 303(y) (2000). For an analysis
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There is one other possible consequence of flexible service rules that
bears on interference. When there is no constraint on what services may
be offered or who may provide them, and when incumbents are strongly
protected, interference levels must be kept sufficiently low so as to
protect the most sensitive uses along with the more robust ones.
Incumbents that want to fence off their spectrum to potentially
competing or degrading services therefore have an incentive to maintain
or even to introduce hypersensitive uses, newly permitted by flexible
service rules, so as to “draw the foul” in the form of interference from
potential new entrants. Interference thus becomes a tool to bar the entry
of new services unless hypersensitive uses are denied protection.96
Returning to the categories of interference conflict we began with, we
must consider the impact of flexible use, whether it results from
continued regulatory reform or a radical shift in spectrum management
regimes. Flexible use will change the meaning of existing service
categories like satellite radio or television broadcasting. To the extent
that any given service category can be used for multiple consumer
applications, such as data or video, then the characteristics of
interservice and intraservice interference will be different than they are
today. Depending on the degree of flexibility permitted within a set of
spectrum usage rights, the meaningful distinction between interference
scenarios will come to lie not in the definition of service, but in the
of the application of 303(y), see Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Government Doesn’t Always
Know Best: Harnessing Self-Interest to Advance the Public Interest, 1 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 5, 14–18 (2003).
96. See Comments of Jon M. Peha, Public Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy Task
Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 4 (F.C.C. filed July 7, 2002) (noting that if licensees
that will be affected by authorization of new ultrawideband services had had enough
flexibility, they might have been able to block the new services with ultrasensitive
operations); see also Testimony of Dr. Paul Kolodzy Before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 9–10 (Mar. 6, 2003), http://commerce.sentate.
gov/~commerce/press/03/kolodzy030603.pdf (writing that “stakeholders in spectrum
policy debates can subject the standard of ‘harm’ to multiple subjective opinions and use
it to block or delay new services and devices from being introduced into the market”).
There is a possible counterweight to this anticompetitive impulse. In 2003, the FCC
adopted rules to facilitate spectrum trades by relaxing restrictions on the transfer of
control of spectrum. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of
Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003). If
licensees can lease their spectrum, they are likely to make their uses as robust as
possible, thereby freeing spectrum to rent. However, a rental market in spectrum, like a
rental market in housing, is likely to create more evanescent, unpredictable, and varied
spectrum uses. Interference is more difficult to predict and control under these
conditions.
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system architectures and technologies at issue in the interference
conflict. Thus, “intraservice” interference cases will arise between
operators using a similar architecture, such as low-power satellite
transmissions, whatever the end-user service that is provided.
“Interservice” disputes will arise between operators using distinct system
architectures, such as low-power satellite and high-power broadcast
transmissions, again regardless of the associated consumer applications.
As we have seen, because of the predictive modeling that goes into the
setting of initial spectrum entitlements, the migration to flexible use is
likely to exacerbate interservice interference in particular as new and
different technologies share spectrum.
C. Public Interest Principles of Conflict Resolution
Thus far, this Article has shown how difficult it is to categorize
spectrum as either a terrestrial or aerial resource and how complicated
interference conflicts can be depending on the source of the interference
and the types of services affected. It has suggested that those conflicts
may well become more numerous as spectrum becomes more congested
in general and as more varied spectrum applications inhabit the same
bands. Part IV develops a framework for understanding the FCC’s past
attempts to resolve interference and access conflicts between existing
and potential spectrum users—a framework that is meant to illuminate
the challenges and suggest direction for the resolution of spectrum
disputes under a property rights regime. Before turning in that direction,
there is one more element of the administrative regime that requires
attention. That is the public interest standard governing the FCC’s
resolution of spectrum conflicts—conflicts over which it has exclusive
jurisdiction.97
97. The Supreme Court has recognized the FCC’s jurisdiction “over technical
matters” associated with spectrum as “clearly exclusive.” Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs
in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1963). Courts have declined to find any space
between this exclusive jurisdiction and common law tort remedies for signal interference
and have routinely dismissed the occasional nuisance claim for spectral disruption. See,
e.g., Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994, 997–98 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
there was no cause of action for radio signal interference with home electronics); Still v.
Michaels, 791 F. Supp. 248, 252 (D. Ariz. 1992) (holding that interference was not a
valid cause of action for nuisance); Helm v. Louisville Two-Way Radio Corp., 667
S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ky. 1984) (holding that nuisance law was inappropriate for an action
involving radio interference); Blackburn v. Doubleday Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 550, 557
(Minn. 1984) (holding that no cause of action existed for radio signal interference to
consumer’s reception of other stations). At least as to interference that may disrupt
home electronics, Congress has come close to expressly preempting common law
interference claims. A 1982 amendment to the Communications Act gave the FCC
authority to regulate home electronics devices with respect to their susceptibility to, and
creation of, interference. 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a). According to the legislative history, radio
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Eighty years ago, Congress charged the FCC with distributing
spectrum usage rights to the public in the agency’s discretion, limited
only by the requirement that it act “in the public interest.”98 It is a
standard that is without clear meaning and is plagued by controversy.99
While many rightly ridicule the public interest standard, few take pains
to unravel its complexities. Some inquiry into what the FCC means
when it claims to have resolved spectrum disputes in the public interest
frequency interference
shall not be regulated by local or state law, nor shall radio transmitting
apparatus be subject to local or state regulation as part of any effort to resolve
[an interference] complaint. . . . [R]adio transmitter operators should not be
subject to fines, forfeitures or other liability imposed by any local or state
authority as a result of interference appearing in home electronic equipment or
systems.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-765 (1982), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261, 2277 (1982).
This provision has been interpreted as vesting the FCC with exclusive jurisdiction over
spectral interference whether or not home electronics devices are involved. Freeman v.
Burlington Broad., Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 2000).
98. The public interest standard is phrased in different ways in different sections of
the Communications Act. For example, the Act, at 47 U.S.C., instructs the FCC to act in
the “public interest” in sections 201(b), 215(a), 319(c), and 315(a); in the “public
convenience and necessity” in section 214(a) and (c); in the “interest of public
convenience and necessity” in section 214(d); in the “public interest, convenience and
necessity” in sections 307(c), 309(a), and 319(d); in the “public convenience, interest, or
necessity” in section 307(a); and in the “public interest, convenience or necessity” in
sections 311(b) and 311(c)(3). See generally Erwin G. Krasnow & M. Wayne Milstead,
FCC Regulation and Other Oxymorons Revisited, 7 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 7, 10 (1999). So
too, the public interest standard as applied to the spectrum-related aspects of FCC actions
is indefinitely and variously defined. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 302(a) (requiring that the
FCC rulemaking power over broadcasting must be exercised in “the public interest,
convenience, and necessity”); id. § 303 (requiring that the FCC power to classify,
license, and regulate radio must be “as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires”); id. § 303(g) (requiring that the FCC study new uses for radio that are “in the
public interest”); id. § 307(a) (requiring that the FCC grant radio broadcast licenses “if
public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served”); id. § 307(e)(1) (providing that
the FCC may authorize certain types of radio broadcasting without a license if it “serves
the public interest, convenience, and necessity”).
99. See Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or
Necessity as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (writing that
“‘[p]ublic interest, convenience or necessity’ means about as little as any phrase that the
drafters of the [Radio] Act could have used and still comply with the constitutional
requirement that there be some standard to guide the administrative wisdom of the
licensing authority”); Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest”
Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 606–07 (1998);
Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be
Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 429–30 (2001); see also Hazlett, The Wireless
Craze, supra note 3, at 401–03 (criticizing the public interest standard in the spectrum
allocation context).
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is worthwhile, especially because the spectrum management reforms we
are considering themselves depend upon public interest evaluations of
spectrum conflict.
Consideration of the public interest standard must start with the pages
of early railroad regulation, from where the obligation to regulate in the
public interest emerged.100 That standard was then applied to the Federal
Radio Commission in 1927101 and to the FCC in 1934.102 As observed
by Judge Henry Friendly, one of the early critics of administrative public
interest standards, the standard “conveyed a fair degree of meaning
when the issue was whether new or duplicating railroad construction
should be authorized . . . . The standard was almost drained of meaning
under . . . the Communications Act, where the issue was almost never
the need for broadcasting service but rather who should render it.”103
The meaning of the public interest and its relationship to spectrum
disputes does not emerge any more clearly from the courts than it did
from Congress. The Supreme Court has said that the public interest
invests the FCC with significant powers requiring “imaginative
interpretation.”104 While the public interest standard does not grant
agencies a “broad license” to promote public welfare in general, it does
give them wide-ranging discretion to promote the goals that they discern
in their authorizing legislation.105
When it has come time for the FCC to articulate the public interests at
stake in spectrum management, it has tended to restate, without
refinement, the Communications Act’s mandate to “make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States, . . . a rapid,
100. Senator Clarence C. Dill, who played a major role in the passage of the
Communications Act, reportedly attributed the phrase “public interest, convenience and
necessity” to a young lawyer on loan to the Senate from the Interstate Commerce
Commission who proposed the phrase when the Senate was at an impasse as to how to
constrain the FCC’s authority. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 73 (5th ed. 1999).
101. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
102. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§
151–615b).
103. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR
BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 54–55 (1962) (footnote omitted).
104. FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (stating that the public
interest standard “no doubt leaves wide discretion and calls for imaginative interpretation”);
see also Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d
1413, 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress gave the FCC the power to act
according to the agency’s view of the “public interest”); Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 846, 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the public interest
standard grants “elastic powers” to the FCC and “is to be construed so as to secure for
the public the broad aims of the Communications Act”).
105. NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1976) (holding that
the meaning of the public interest depends on “the purposes that Congress had in mind
when it enacted [the authorizing] legislation”).
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efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”106 The problem
is that almost any spectrum decision, by advancing the interests of one
communications provider over another, can be defended as improving
communications service to the public and therefore advancing the public
interest. Services competing for spectrum will claim that they serve
more people, albeit less reliably, or serve fewer people, but for more
critical service, or provide broadband service that is fast, though
expensive, or narrowband service that is slower, but cheap. Because all
of these services can legitimately claim to improve the availability of
radio communication service, decisions about which to favor in the
public interest require more detailed criteria.
In need of such criteria to choose among spectrum uses that may all
serve the Act’s spectrum management goals, the FCC has resorted to the
same measures that nuisance courts use when it comes to resolving
conflicts over land: efficiency in the use of a resource and equity as
between users.107 While the use of efficiency and fairness as surrogates
for the public interest is a reasonable response to statutory vagueness,
such use has even further obscured the agency’s goals in resolving
spectrum disputes.
Take, for example, the efficiency goal for spectrum management.
Only in 2002, for the first time after decades of using the term, did the
FCC attempt to define the word “efficiency.” Efficiency, the FCC
noted, might be defined as “economic efficiency.” An economically
efficient result occurs “when all inputs are deployed in a manner that
generates the most value for consumers.”108 The achievement of
economic efficiency has long been one of the FCC’s highest priorities in
resolving spectrum usage conflicts. As early as 1980, FCC staff
interpreted the public interest requirement of the Communications Act as
“encouragining economic efficiency in the use of the frequency
spectrum” and, therefore, supporting spectrum deregulation.109 Since
then, all of the FCC’s major spectrum policy statements have
106. See 47 U.S.C. § 151.
107. See James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules:
The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 446 (1995) (describing the
“general view” of the nuisance balance); see also infra Part IV.
108. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 21.
109. DOUGLAS W. WEBBINK, FREQUENCY SPECTRUM DEREGULATION ALTERNATIVES
12 (FCC Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, OPP Working Paper No. 2,
1980), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp2.pdf.
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emphasized the desire to facilitate economically efficient use of the
spectrum.110 Most recently, the FCC has used the language of efficiency
in expressing the hope that spectrum reform will give “both licensed
users and unlicensed device operators the maximum possible autonomy
to determine the highest valued use of their spectrum, subject only to
those rules that are necessary to afford reasonable opportunities for
access by other spectrum users and to prevent or limit interference
among multiple spectrum uses.”111
The highest valued use of the spectrum is, of course, difficult to
measure in the absence of a market for spectrum. The winning bids in a
spectrum auction will tell us something about spectrum value. But the
FCC’s spectrum auction results will not necessarily be the most
economically efficient because the decision about how the spectrum will
be used is made before it is auctioned. As a result, auction participants
compete against each other to use the spectrum for roughly the same
purpose and under the same constraints even though some other use of
the spectrum might produce more value.
Lacking a market metric for arriving at economic efficiency, the FCC
often relies on the goal of competition for the same purpose. Thus, it
will privilege those spectrum uses that promise to provide competition to
an existing wireless service.112 Even after the spectrum has been
110. See, e.g., Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by
Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, 24,181
(2000); Principles for Reallocation of Spectrum to Encourage the Development of
Telecommunications Technologies for the New Millennium, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,868, 19,870
(1999); FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 15. The pursuit of economic efficiency is, at
least with respect to the award of initial licenses through competitive bidding, compelled
by the statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)–(D) (specifying that auctions should
promote “economic opportunity and competition”). The same provisions, however,
compel the pursuit of other objectives as well, like public restitution (auctions should
avoid “unjust enrichment” for spectrum users) and opportunities for minorities and other
underrepresented groups (auctions should disseminate “licenses among a wide variety of
applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned
by members of minority groups and women”). Id.
111. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 16. For a definition of efficiency as a choice of
resource allocation that maximizes the value of the resource, see Krier & Schwab, supra
note 107, at 446.
112. See, e.g., Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate
Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, 12 F.C.C.R.
19,079, 19,173 (1997) (stating that the rapid implementation of wide-area licensing in
the SMR service will advance the public interest by fostering economic growth of
competitive new services); Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the
Commission’s Rules to Redesignate the 27.5–29.5 GHz Frequency Band, to Reallocate
the 29.5–30.0 GHz Frequency Band, to Establish Rules and Policies for Local Multipoint
Distribution Service and for Fixed Satellite Services, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,005, 19,018 (1996)
(authorizing the deployment of LMDS to provide a potential source of competition in the
local telephony and multichannel video programming distribution markets); Amendment
of Part 90 of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems
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allocated, we do not know how much licensees in different services
value the rights to be free from interference or to interfere. We know in
many wireless services what a particular licensee has paid at auction for
access to spectrum. But this price was predicated on an interference-free
service area as described by the license. There is currently no market, or
at least no market of any scale, through which licensees trade spectrum
emissions rights. While a licensee might indeed bargain away interference
protection with another licensee, the trades are rare enough and secret
enough to prevent a public valuation of the cost of interference.
A second complication with the FCC’s pursuit of economic efficiency
as a surrogate for the public interest is that economic efficiency may be
defined as static efficiency or dynamic efficiency. A key input to
dynamic efficiency is the pace of technological innovation. As David
Driesen has pointed out in the environmental context, regulatory
decisions that favor short-term economic efficiency may frustrate longterm technological innovation that will in turn produce longer term
consumer welfare.113
In defining efficiency, the FCC did not limit the term to economic
efficiency. Efficiency, it said, might be defined alternatively as “spectrum
efficiency.” A spectrally efficient result “occurs when the maximum
amount of information is transmitted within the least amount of
spectrum.”114 When the FCC makes decisions about reallocating
in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, 11 F.C.C.R. 1463, 1494 (1995) (deciding not to limit
aggregation of 800 MHz spectrum so as to promote potential competitors to broadband
PCS and cellular providers); Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Establish New
Personal Communications Services, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7710 (1993), modified, 9 F.C.C.R.
4957 (1994) (allocating frequencies for PCS services to introduce competition to cellular
providers). The courts have occasionally chastised the FCC for equating competition
with the public interest. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 96–97
(1953) (holding that the FCC, in authorizing duplicate broadcast facilities, must show
that increased competition serves some other public interest goals); Hawaiian Tel. Co. v.
FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ruling that the FCC cannot “automatically
equate the public interest with additional competition”). However, the Communications
Act provides some support for equating competition with the public interest. See 47
U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (providing that spectrum auctions should ensure “that new and
innovative technologies are readily accessible . . . by avoiding excessive concentration of
licenses and by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants”).
113. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
75–93 (2003); David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading
Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 41–46 (1998).
114. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 21. The FCC also defined a third variant of
efficiency as “technical efficiency.” A technically efficient result occurs when “inputs,
such as spectrum, equipment, capital, and labor, are deployed in a manner that generates
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spectrum from an existing use, like paging, to one of several proposed
new and interfering uses, like videophones or satellite television, how
can it assess the efficiency gains each new use might confer or compare
those gains to each other when the uses are so different? As the FCC
has acknowledged, it is “neither possible nor appropriate to select a
single, objective metric for comparing spectrum efficiency across
different radio services.”115
Although spectral efficiency will be a component of economic efficiency,
some spectrum uses will be spectrally efficient but economically
inefficient, and vice versa. If the use of spectrum is economically
efficient when the maximum amount of consumer value is extracted
from a unit of spectrum, the use of spectrum is spectrally efficient when
the maximum amount of communication, regardless of its consumer
value, is extracted from a unit of spectrum. In urban areas, where
spectrum is scarce, economic and spectral efficiency are likely to
coincide.116 But sometimes, such as in rural areas where spectrum
availability far exceeds demand, it may be economically efficient to use
an inefficient technology. In fact, wherever spectrum is either free or
the most output for the least cost.” Id. In other words, a result might be technically
efficient, but not economically efficient, where it results in the output of the greatest
amount, but not the highest value, of communications capacity at least cost. Such a
result would be spectrally efficient only if the high yield of communications capacity
were achieved with the efficient use of spectrum—only one of the inputs considered in
the analysis of technical efficiency.
115. Id.
116. The FCC appeared to have in mind this kind of coincidence when it first
implemented auctions as a means of assigning licenses in 1994. It concluded that the
granting of licenses through a system of competitive bidding was spectrally efficient in
speeding “the development and deployment of new services . . . and encourag[ing]
efficient use of the spectrum” as well as economically efficient in placing licenses in the
hands of “those parties who value them most highly.” Implementation of Section 309(j)
of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 2941, 2944 (1994).
Indeed, both Congress and the FCC frequently conflate spectrum and economic
efficiency in touting the benefits of markets. See, e.g., H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. (1993)
(finding that “a carefully designed system to obtain competitive bids from competing
qualified applicants can speed delivery of services, promote efficient and intensive use of
the electromagnetic spectrum, prevent unjust enrichment, and produce revenues to
compensate the public for the use of the public airwaves”); Principles for Promoting the
Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets, 15
F.C.C.R. 24,178, 24,180 (2000) (stating that “the best way to realize the maximum
benefits from the spectrum is to permit and promote the operation of market forces in
determining how spectrum is used”); Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion,
14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2402 (1999) (stating that the FCC will “rely as much as possible on
free markets and private enterprise”); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 24,014 (1998) (stating
that the FCC’s role “is not to pick winners or losers, or select the ‘best’ technology to
meet consumer demand, but rather to ensure that the marketplace is conducive to
investment, innovation, and meeting the needs of consumers”).
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sufficiently unused to be cheap, there is no reason for operators to invest
in spectral efficiency. Thus, an efficient result in the resolution of a
spectrum dispute might variously be one that drives technical innovation
towards near-term economic gains unrelated to spectrum efficiency, or
one that makes spectrum use more efficient, regardless of the consumer
value created in the near term.
Further complicating the FCC’s use of efficiency goals is the agency’s
desire to foster technological innovation as a means to achieve economic
efficiency or to spur innovation for its own sake. The FCC’s exaltation
of technical innovation reached a high-water mark in the early 1990s
with its now defunct “pioneer’s preference” policy. This was a policy
under which the FCC awarded exclusive use of particular frequencies to
entities that were particularly innovative without regard to the
innovation’s economic viability.117 Sometimes, the FCC has pursued
economic efficiency as a means by which to achieve technological
innovation, and not the reverse. For example, it has said that it seeks to
“[e]ncourage the highest and best use of spectrum domestically and
internationally in order to encourage the growth and rapid deployment
of innovative and efficient communications technologies and
services.”118 The promotion of new technologies for their own sake,
whether or not they further efficiency goals, was encoded in the
Communications Act in 1983, when Congress made it the policy of the
United States “to encourage the provision of new technologies and
services to the public.”119
In forging the public interest in spectrum management, the FCC
sometimes sacrifices its varied efficiency goals for what it determines to
be equitable treatment of incumbent spectrum users. The FCC has
demonstrated a solicitude to the ongoing operations and investmentbacked expectations of incumbent licensees that exceeds the obligations
of due process or the Administrative Procedures Act. As discussed
117. See Establishment of Procedures to Provide a Preference to Applicants
Proposing an Allocation for New Services, 6 F.C.C.R. 3488, 3498 (1991) (codified at 47
C.F.R. § 1.402(a) (1999)) (establishing a preference in favor of a pioneer in technology
that would exclude from consideration for a license all other applications).
118. FCC, STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2003—FY 2008, at 5 (2002), available at
http:/www.fcc.gov/omd/strategicplan/strategicplan2003-2008.pdf (emphasis added).
119. 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000). It should be noted that the FCC believes that
unlicensed communications services, which grew out of this policy, promote both
economic efficiency and technological innovation by allowing users to “channel their
investment exclusively into developing robust technology” that can function in a
congested and loosely managed spectral environment. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 39.
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below, interference disputes between licensees are settled according to a
“first-in-time” principle, whereby the rights of the more established
licensee are privileged over those of the newer entrant, regardless of the
efficiency implications.120 At least until recently, the FCC rarely sided
with a new entrant in an interference dispute at the expense of an existing
operator even where the resulting interference would be efficient.
Particularly when it introduces new services, the FCC is preoccupied
with issues of fairness to the existing services threatened with
displacement.121 The agency, for example, will not simply reclaim
licenses and issue rights to new users even though it probably has the
legal authority to do so.122 Moreover, the agency shows a striking regard
for the embedded base of radio receiving equipment in requiring
backward compatibility with, or the gradual replacement of, existing
devices as new services are introduced into the spectrum. These
policies, which are defended as consumer-friendly, appear to the world
as incumbent-friendly.
The current introduction of new wireless services into the television
broadcast band, along with the commencement of digital broadcasting in
the same band, is a case in point. Because it was not possible to make
digital television transmissions backwards compatible with the embedded
base of approximately 200 million analog sets, consumers will
ultimately have to invest in new television sets, or other receiving
devices, in order to receive off-air digital transmissions. Yet, to preserve
120. See infra Part IV.C.2.
121. To protect incumbent services, for example, the FCC has required new entrants
to pay the costs of relocating the incumbents to new spectrum. See Redevelopment of
Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecommunications
Technologies, 9 F.C.C.R. 7797, 7800 (1994); Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage
Innovation in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, 9 F.C.C.R. 1943, 1947
(1994); Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Telecommunications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589, 6590 (1993); Redevelopment of
Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Technologies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6886,
6890 (1992). The FCC has since applied the same principle to the new entry and
relocation of other services.
See, e.g., Amendment of Section 2.106 of the
Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum at 2 GHz for Use by the Mobile-Satellite
Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,315, 12,322–38 (2000). This principle of compensation is
nowhere more important than in the attempt to free up some of the forty percent of the
spectrum under 3 GHz that is used by the federal government. Congress has considered
legislation that would set aside spectrum auction proceeds for advanced wireless services
to relocate government users. See Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, H.R. 1330,
108th Cong. (2003).
122. It has been suggested that modification of terms of existing licenses to require
increased immunity to interference or reduced production of interference could result in
a regulatory taking, violate section 316 of the Communications Act (requiring the
Commission to comply with certain procedures before modifying license), or constitute a
breach of contract where the licenses were purchased at auction. See, e.g., Comments of
Sprint Corporation, In re Issues Related to the Commission’s Spectrum Policies, ET
Docket No. 02-135, at 10–11 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002).
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the life of those analog sets for as long as possible, the FCC has
steadfastly refused to allow digital broadcasts to interfere with existing
analog broadcasts for the potentially long period of time when the two
technologies will coexist.123 It has also limited the pace of entry and
restricted the operation of new wireless services that will operate in the
television band.124 Because of the FCC’s policy of protecting the
functionality of broadcast receivers, broadcasting partakes of a unique
phenomenon in the electronic media: AM radios that are still useable
after eighty years and antique television sets that function after fifty.
Although consumers may be served in the short term by policies that
protect existing services and embedded equipment, such protection may
ultimately conflict with goals of efficiency or justice among operators.
The FCC has never articulated a way to rank efficiency and equity
considerations or to make choices between short-term sacrifices in one
goal for long-term gains in another.
This then is the mixture of efficiency and equity goals that goes into
the FCC’s determination of which spectrum use entitlements will further
the public interest. This is the mixture that has become a flashpoint for
criticism and focus of reform proposals.

123. See, e.g., Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, and
Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, 16 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2712 (2001). The
protection of the embedded receiver population has animated television and radio policy
from the beginning. For example, in the 1920s, the Federal Radio Commission declined
to allocate additional spectrum for radio broadcasting because it did not want to outmode
existing receivers that were not designed to operate on the additional frequencies. FRC
ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1927), reprinted in HISTORY OF BROADCASTING: RADIO TO
TELEVISION 1, 13 (Christopher Sterling ed., 1971). The FCC has also chosen to protect
existing equipment when considering whether or not to compress broadcasting
operations into a more limited amount of spectrum. For example, the FCC originally
intended for all television broadcasting to operate in the UHF band. 11 FCC ANN. REP.
21–22 (1946). However, when the FCC first opened up the UHF band for television
broadcasting in the 1950s, and it had the opportunity to migrate the entire service into
that band, the agency declined to order the move so as to avoid disrupting investments in
existing sets. See H. Plotkin, TV Networks and the UHF Problems, Report Prepared for
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. Sess. 1 (1955)
(cited in Improvements to UHF Television Reception, 70 F.C.C.2d 1162, 1164 (1978)).
124. Attempting to preserve the “public good” of free over-the-air broadcasting, for
example, the FCC will not allow those stations that provide sole service or sole
noncommercial service to a community to sell their stations to new service entrants who
might value the spectrum more highly. See Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794
MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,845,
20,867 (2000) (providing that the “[l]oss of broadcasting service has been a longrecognized detriment to the public interest”).
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D. Critique of Spectrum Management Status Quo
The system of spectrum management that slowly and haltingly
brought us cellular telephone, satellite broadcasting, and digital
television service has been the subject of withering critique in both
scholarly and policy circles. The changes the FCC has implemented in
its command and control regulation have not been enough to satisfy its
critics.125 The FCC itself recognizes that its incremental efforts to
update its spectrum management techniques cannot meet the demands of
the twenty-first century, and it has posed serious questions about the
administrative management of spectrum.126 In a country in which over
sixty percent of all residents use wireless devices, large institutions are
rapidly migrating from wired to wireless systems,127 and there is an
explosive growth in the variety and complexity of wireless
communications systems, the current spectrum management regime will
face constant pressure for reform.
Critics of the current management regime identify two main targets
for reform: the protection of incumbent services at the expense of new
entrants128 and the reliance on administrative tools to allocate usage
125. See Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 339; see also Gregory L.
Rosston, The Long and Winding Road: The FCC Paves the Path with Good Intentions,
STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (2001) (arguing that the FCC has missed many recent
opportunities to implement a more market-based approach to spectrum management),
available at http://www.calit2.net/events/2002/Spectrum/presentations/Long_Winding_Road
4-20-02.pdf.
126. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to
the Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003) (implementing a
system of spectrum leasing that removes the FCC from decisions about how the
spectrum can be used and proposing more far-reaching changes to the spectrum control
structure); FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 1 (laying out an ambitious program for spectrum
management reform).
127. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, For the Gadget Universe, A Common Tongue,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at G1; Jack Schofield, Radio Ahead, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Mar. 13, 2003; see also JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET PROJECT, CONSUMPTION OF
INFORMATION GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES vi (2003) (noting that sixtytwo percent of Americans are cell phone subscribers), available at http://www.pewinternet.
org/reports/pdfs/PIP_Info_Consumption.pdf.
128. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 4, at 73; Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note
3, at 360. Critics of command and control regulation point to the FCC’s management of
broadcast spectrum as the most striking example of regulatory failure to free spectrum
for its highest and best use in deference to incumbents. See, e.g., Spiller & Cardilli,
supra note 3, at 60. One of the most interesting facets of this criticism is the degree to
which it is packed with unsupported, and perhaps unsupportable, judgments about the
nature of the public interest. If broadcasting is technically inefficient, it is because
signals reach consumers who receive the same content through other means (like cable)
or who do not want the signals. If broadcasting is economically inefficient, it is because
the public would value alternative services more highly than broadcasting if given the
choice. Of course, the magnitude of the tradeoff between broadcasting and rival services
could be reduced if the public were willing to purchase more sensitive receivers that
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rights.129 Any new service provider, unless it uses unlicensed spectrum,
must come to the FCC to obtain access to spectrum.130 As we have seen,
the FCC must then decide what is the best use of a frequency and which
user will best serve the public interest. These decisions require the agency
to do the very thing its critics say it is incapable of doing—balancing
incommensurable interests such as incumbents’ investment-backed
reliance in existing licenses with the promise of new technologies.131 As
one commentator has put it, we operate under “a ‘wise man’ theory of
regulation [which assumes] that the agency is capable of deciding what
is best for the public.”132 The judgments reached by the FCC, which
have been described as both “prophetic and managerial,” are then treated
with uncommon deference by reviewing courts.133
could decode less powerful signals. Each of these valuations is highly speculative.
There have been attempts to document the relative value of broadcasting and other
prospective services that might operate on the same spectrum. See, e.g., EVAN R.
KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMS, CHANGING CHANNELS: VOLUNTARY REALLOCATION OF
UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM (FCC Office of Strategic Planning & Policy Analysis, OPP
Working Paper No. 27, 1992), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_
papers/oppwp27.pdf. I have suggested elsewhere that such valuations tend to have
serious methodological flaws because they rely on rapidly obsolete spectrum auctions or
other sales and equate services with radically different characteristics and operational
needs. See Ellen P. Goodman, Digital Television and the Allure of Auctions: The Birth
and Stillbirth of DTV Legislation, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 517, 533–35 (1997).
129. See, e.g., Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of
Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,203, 24,206 (2000);
see also Principles for Promoting the Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the
Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, 24,182–83 (2000) (stating that
“[a]n effectively functioning system of secondary markets would encourage licensees to
be more spectrum efficient by freely trading their rights to unused spectrum capacity”).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (providing that “[n]o person shall use or operate any
apparatus for the transmission of energy or communications or signals by radio . . .
except under and in accordance with this chapter and with a license in that behalf granted
under the provisions of this chapter”). The allowance of spectrum leasing on a large
scale will effectively loosen this requirement.
131. See, e.g., Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 403–53 (discussing how
the regulatory system suppresses competitive entry, blocks efficient spectrum use, and
protects obsolete technology from innovative challenge).
132. WEBBINK, supra note 109, at 10.
133. See Teledesic LLC v. FCC, 275 F.3d 75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (according the
agency the greatest deference for decisions in which “it must predict the effect and
growth rate of technological newcomers on the spectrum, while striking a balance
between protecting valuable existing uses and making room for these sweeping new
technologies”); see also Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428, 443–45 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (upholding an FCC allocation decision because it was a predictive judgment
of the type historically left to agency discretion); Telocator Network of Am. v. FCC, 691
F.2d 525, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (observing that in its spectrum decisions, the FCC
“functions as a policymaker and, inevitably, a seer—roles in which it will be accorded
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Even if the FCC could be counted on to reach the most efficient and
fair result, a spectrum allocation typically takes several years. The
length of the process alone results in significant consumer welfare
losses.134 Moreover, the process inevitably makes spectrum available to
services that appeared more promising when the FCC began its
rulemaking process than when the first signal is emitted. Because
allocations or reallocations consider only apparent current or
immediately foreseeable demand, “there is no guarantee that there may
not be some other higher value current or future alternative use.”135 For
example, in 1995, when the FCC first began the process of allocating
spectrum to mobile satellite services, terrestrial digital wireless service
was still in its infancy and was not thought to become ubiquitous for
many years. Moreover, much of the world was without mobile
telephone service at all. It was thought that satellite service would fill a
valuable market niche by providing ubiquitous mobile telephony service.
By the time the service was finally authorized in 2000, terrestrial digital
wireless service had become ubiquitous and most of the satellite service
companies were in bankruptcy.136
The combination of public interest decisionmaking, delay, and
inevitable short-sightedness of spectrum decisions has led critics of all
kinds to assail FCC frequency allocations as inconsistent with the needs
of the day. Protection afforded to incumbents and the deferred entry of
new uses render those allocations, in the words of one critic, “a
fossilized record of fading services and technologies.”137
the greatest deference by a reviewing court”).
134. See Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in
Telecommunications, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS
1, 2 (Martin Nell Bailey et al. eds., 1997), available at http://www.nextera.com/pdf/
ValuingTheEffectofRegulation.pdf (estimating, using assumptions and estimates about
consumer demand, pricing, and welfare loss, losses of about $1.27 billion per year in
consumer welfare for voice messaging and about $50 billion per year in consumer
welfare loss for cellular telephone due to regulatory delay in authorizing services);
JEFFREY H. ROHLFS ET AL., NAT’L ECON. RES. ASSOCIATES, INC., ESTIMATE OF THE LOSS
TO THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY THE FCC’S DELAY IN LICENSING CELLULAR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 (1999) (estimating that the delay in rollout of cellular telephone
service by 10 to 15 years reduced economic welfare by at least $86 billion). See
generally Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 445, 477 (discussing costs of
administrative delay).
135. WEBBINK, supra note 109, at 4–5.
136. See Bob Fernandez, Mixed Signals; Satellite Industry Says Its Future Is Still
Sky-High Despite Bankruptcies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, at C1.
137. MICHAEL CALABRESE, BATTLE OVER THE AIRWAVES: PRINCIPLES FOR SPECTRUM
POLICY REFORM 10 (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 1, 2001), available at http://
www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_610_1.pdf.
The problem of
backward-looking allocations is exacerbated by the narrowness of allocations for
particular classes of services. Industry typically wants narrow allocations. As former
Commissioner Ness noted, “[S]pectrum bands are generally most efficient when the
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III. PROPOSED REGIME CHANGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Two radical alternatives have been proposed to correct the failings of
administrative control of spectrum. The first, and most persistently
advanced, is the conversion of administrative licenses to private property
rights. This proposal starts and ends with the conception of spectrum as
land. Over the past half-century, property rights theorists have urged the
conversion of FCC licenses to spectrum deeds. Spectrum itself would
not become property of course.138 What would be owned would be the
exclusive rights to transmit radio signals over the airwaves, to exclude
others from transmitting, and to sell, trade, or reserve exclusive usage
rights. Those advancing a second alternative to the current administrative
regime, discussed in Part V, conceive of spectrum as air, not land, and
urge the dissolution of any kind of exclusive usage rights in spectrum
back into the aerial commons. Both of these proposals have significant
appeal, and each provides an internally coherent approach to spectrum
management. Problematically, neither addresses with specificity what
should be done about spectrum conflicts once the administrative regime
is dismantled or how questions about the relative desirability of
spectrum uses should be resolved. That question—how spectrum
disputes should be handled in a future telecosm and what the public role
should be—will be the focus of the rest of this Article. This Part takes
up this question in the context of the property rights proposal for
spectrum management, which I will now describe.
A. Mediate Scarcity with Fee Simple Deeds
1. The Bundle of Spectrum Rights
The private ownership model of spectrum management accepts the
premise of FCC spectrum regulation that the “radio spectrum is a limited

services within the band are similar. . . . [Broad or flexible allocations mean] [m]ore
insulation is needed to separate incompatible uses, [and] [e]quipment becomes more
expensive . . . .” Susan Ness, Remarks Before CTIA’s Wireless ‘97 (Mar. 3, 1997)
(transcript available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Ness/spsn709.html); see also FCC
REPORT, supra note 39, at 22.
138. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 2, at 25 (writing that spectrum rights are
transmission rights); Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of
Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581, 584 (1998) (defining spectrum
as the capability of transmitting and receiving signals).
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resource.”139 Given this scarcity, it is appropriate to allocate rights to the
resource just as we allocate rights to most other scarce resources:
through market transactions that provide incentives for efficient use and
satisfaction of consumer demand. The underpinnings of this regime
would be unambiguous and perpetual property rights in spectrum.140
Included in such rights would have to be the privilege to operate a wide
range of spectrum-related services and to deploy new technologies
within certain minimal technical constraints.141 Once endowed with
spectrum parcels whose boundaries are clear and utility broad, spectrum
owners would have a bundle of rights with respect to the disposition of
their property much like the privileges of the land owner.142 Most
139. STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547–48
(1999). The more nuanced view of Peter Huber, among others, is that there is no
inherent scarcity of spectrum, [or any] law of physics that limits how much
information can be transported through the air or through any other medium.
Since 1927 we have increased by at least a millionfold the amount of
information moving through the airwaves—and still we have not run out of
space.
HUBER, supra note 6, at 75. However, in Huber’s view, the absence of inherent scarcity
does not mean that there is no practical scarcity, nor that property rights are unnecessary.
Id. To the contrary, “[w]e would have increased the amount [of information transmitted]
ten-million-fold, or a hundred, if the airwaves had been left in private hands all along.” Id.
140. See, e.g., De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1531 (preferring perpetual rights, but
acknowledging the political necessity of starting with a term of years that would allow
any potential investor to recover investment). The United Kingdom is considering
implementing rolling five- to ten-year terms or perpetual licenses with a compulsory
repurchase provision for the government. U.K. RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY,
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF RADIO SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT 20 (Oct. 15, 2002), http://www.ofcom.org.uk.
141. See, e.g., Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, supra note 3, at 5–6
(arguing in the context of spectrum leasing that broadening the usage rights of licensees
would promote efficient transfers of spectrum in secondary markets by reducing
uncertainty and increasing flexibility of use and suggesting that the FCC eliminate all
requirements not related to interference or anticompetitive concerns); Rosston &
Steinberg, supra note 3, at 102 (writing that “[s]o long as a spectrum user’s emissions
comply with objective numerical standards, it should ordinarily be free to offer any
services by using any technologies it wishes”).
142. See, e.g., Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 3, at 68 (describing the basic building
blocks of a market for spectrum as the right to sell or lease the spectrum, the right to use
the spectrum, and the right to exclude from the spectrum); Douglas W. Webbink, Radio
Licenses and Frequency Spectrum Use Property Rights, 9 COMM. & L. 3, 4 (1987)
(defining rights as the right to exclusive use, the right to receive income from the use of
the resource, and the right to transfer the exclusive use right in whole or in part to
others). An earlier definition of spectrum property rights was the constellation of (1)
“emission rights,” which are the entitlements to operate on a particular bandwidth at a
specific time and place, at a particular power level, with rights to a certain amount of
spurious emissions; (2) “admission rights,” which are the rights to exclude others from
using that spectrum; (3) “usage rights,” which are the rights to use the spectrum in any
legally permissible way; and (4) “transfer rights,” which are the rights to transfer
emission, admission, and usage rights freely. See Minasian, supra note 3, at 227–30.
While the rhetoric of the bundle of sticks strongly influences communications policy,
leading property theorists have suggested that the metaphor has lost its usefulness in
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notably, they would be able to trade interference rights and freely
alienate spectrum parcels.143 These rights would be accompanied by
correlative duties not to interfere with other property owners’ rights to
their own frequencies.144
Private spectrum ownership, its proponents claim, will result in both
economic efficiency gains, as spectrum is redistributed from low-value
users to high-value users, and in spectrum efficiency gains, as more
efficient users replace less efficient users. Relatedly, there will be more
competition in the communications sector as exiting from the market
becomes easier, resources are freed up for new entrants, and incumbents
can use existing spectrum in new ways. Finally, spectrum users will
benefit from lower transaction costs resulting from the triumph of
market mechanisms over the glacial administrative process. If there is a
view of the public interest in this model, it is that the public interest is
what emerges from the market choices of spectrum users.
In locating a model for spectrum ownership, scholars needed go no
further than their front yards. The most influential real property model
for spectrum grew out of ideas first presented in Leo Herzel’s student
note about the selection of a color television standard and later
developed by Ronald Coase in the 1950s.145 Coase observed that the
central function of the FCC was to allocate rights to use spectrum in
property law. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
YALE L.J. 1163, 1193–94 (1999) (writing that “[w]hile the modern bundle-of-legal
relations metaphor reflects well the possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it
gives a weak sense of the ‘thingness’ of private property”).
143. See, e.g., HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION
OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 85 (1971); De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1530; EVAN R.
KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMS, A PROPOSAL FOR A RAPID TRANSITION TO MARKET
ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM 5 n.11 (FCC Office of Planning & Policy, OPP Working
Paper No. 38, 2002) (stating that the FCC should “provide for exhaustive, flexible,
exclusive, transferable spectrum-usage rights”), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/ DOC-228552A1.pdf.
144. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 742–45 (1917).
145. See Coase, supra note 2, at 14–15; Comment, “Public Interest” and the Market
in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802, 811–16 (1951) (proposing that
the FCC lease broadcast channels to the highest bidder without making any judgment
about the economic or engineering choices made by the broadcaster). Coase is often
credited with the origination of the private property model for spectrum, but he cites
earlier discussions. See R.H. Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and
Television Broadcasting: Social and Economic Issues, 41 LAND ECON. 161, 167 (1965);
R.H. Coase, The Economics of Broadcasting and Government Policy, 56 AM. ECON.
REV. 440, 440, 444 (1966); Coase, supra note 2, at 31 n.56.
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ways that minimized interference. Private property rights perform
exactly the same function with land. The way to determine whether land
would be used to grow wheat or to park cars, Coase observed, “is to
create property rights (rights, that is, to exclusive use) in land. The
creation of similar rights in the use of frequencies would enable the
problem to be solved in the same way in the radio industry.”146
A modified private ownership approach has emerged from the work of
Gerald Faulhaber and David Farber.147 These scholars, again coming
from outside of legal scholarship, support the migration to a system of
private property rights in spectrum while acknowledging the insight of
the commons theorists that technical advances may allow more than one
transmitter to use the same frequencies at the same time. Where such
sharing is possible, Faulhaber and Farber say that private ownership
rights should be subject to an easement for noninterfering uses.148 In
addition, some spectrum should be set aside, like parks, for use by the
public.149
146. Coase, supra note 2, at 25–26.
147. Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights,
Markets, and the Commons, In re Issues Related to the Commission’s Spectrum Policies,
ET Docket No. 02-135, at 2 (F.C.C. filed July 15, 2002).
148. This idea draws on the “underlay,” once called “overlay,” concept that has
appeared in broadcast spectrum management reform proposals since at least the mid1990s. See, e.g., Spectrum Reform Discussion Draft: The Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act, 142 CONG. REC. 10,672, 10,673,
10,676 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pressler) (proposing that nonbroadcast
services would be allowed to operate in broadcast bands on a noninterfering basis).
Along the same lines, the FCC Spectrum Task Force recently proposed that new users be
able to operate in owned or licensed bands up to a certain level of interference. FCC
REPORT, supra note 39, at 30.
149. Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 147, at 14–18. Eli Noam theorizes yet a third
system of private property rights in spectrum. It is one that partakes of both private and
common property theories in that it accepts the need for a pricing mechanism to deal
with spectrum scarcity, but rejects the use of a fee simple approach to spectrum
ownership. Instead, Noam envisions a commodities market for exclusive transmission
rights in spectrum. Clearinghouses would mete out spectrum usage rights in small
increments. Bandwidth could be aggregated instantaneously for use on a fluid basis and
access charges would vary with congestion. See Eli M. Noam, Spectrum Auctions:
Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism: Taking the Next
Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765, 778–80 (1998); Eli M. Noam,
Taking the Next Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Open Spectrum Access, 33 IEEE
COMM. MAG. 66, 66 (1995). Noam’s program has been criticized as unworkable because
of the “highly complex and massive infrastructure” that would be needed to permit
centralized control of the spectrum, with each device using any one of a variety of
wireless communication interfaces conveying signal measurements to the central
controller. See Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Spectrum Sharing Without Licenses:
Opportunities and Dangers, in INTERCONNECTION AND THE INTERNET: SELECTED PAPERS
FROM THE 1996 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 49, 50–51
(Gregory L. Rosston & David Waterman eds., 1997). Uniform spectrum units, along the
lines that Noam envisions, have been created in Australia, which uses standardized
packets, or cubes, defined by geography and frequency and combinable to increase
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Under the real property model of spectrum property rights, interests in
a parcel of spectrum, unlike a parcel of land, might be difficult to
establish and defend. The metes and bounds of spectrum usage rights
must be described along four dimensions: the time of transmission, the
range of transmission, the power level of transmission, and the
frequency of transmission. Within a particular geographic market or
region, these four dimensions can be collapsed into three because power
levels typically correlate with geographic range in that the stronger the
signal, the farther it travels.150 That is, once a place like the East Coast,
New York City, one of its boroughs, or even one of its neighborhoods,
has been identified, a spectrum parcel would be defined by the right to
achieve a particular signal strength on particular frequencies at particular
times.151 It would be the task of government to define and make initial
allocations of spectrum property rights.152 Private property theorists also
draw on the administrative apparatus of land ownership in proposing a
spectrum rights registry, like the county record of land interests.153 If
ownership in spectrum is based, at least initially, on the contours of
spectrum usage rights delineated in individual licenses, then it will be
almost impossible for the public to determine who owns what.
Prospective spectrum buyers would want a reliable registry that
identified spectrum interests along the relevant dimensions so they could

coverage or bandwidth. See Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 3, at 73–81 (describing the
spectrum market approaches in New Zealand and Guatemala).
150. Arthur De Vany, who first developed a detailed proposal for spectrum trading,
referred to only three technical dimensions of radiation—time, area, and spectrum (or
frequency). He called these TAS units. See De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1512–16;
see also FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 18 (defining spectrum rights parameters as
designated frequency range and bandwidth; geographic scope of right to operate;
maximum power output within the band and outside the band; and interference
protection).
151. Spiller and Cardilli argue that spectrum property owners should be required to
maintain a minimum signal strength as well as restricted to a maximum signal strength at
the boundary of the coverage area. The purpose of the minimum signal strength would
be to prevent property owners from operating services that are hypersensitive to
interference. The purpose of the maximum signal strength is to protect adjacent channel
users in the same area and cochannel users in neighboring areas. Spiller & Cardilli,
supra note 3, at 71–72.
152. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 35; KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 143,
at 4–5 (advocating that the government exhaustively allocate spectrum rights).
153. Such spectrum registries exist in Australia and New Zealand. See Australian
Communications Authority, Register of Radiocommunication Licenses, at http://www.aca.
gov.au/pls/radcom/register_search.main_page (last visited Nov. 9, 2003).
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aggregate suitable spectrum parcels.154 The FCC does not currently
maintain such a registry. Unless government or some sort of accredited
private party were to develop a registry of spectrum ownership interests,
the costs of title searches and related barriers to entry would likely be
high. 155
2. From Licenses to Estates
While the concept of estates in spectrum is relatively straightforward,
the mechanics by which a system of administrative licenses would be
converted to a system of fee simple deeds have not been identified.
Most tangible public assets that are privatized, like land and public
concessions, are in the hands of the government and can simply be
auctioned off. Like such public assets, spectrum usage rights are
controlled by the government. Yet, unlike government property, many
of these rights have already been auctioned off, in many cases for
hundreds of millions of dollars. Where they have not been auctioned,
they may have been purchased as part of the sale of a communications
company.
In this way, most of the prime spectrum (below 3 GHz) is already
occupied by stakeholders or has been made available for unlicensed use.
Although licenses to use spectrum are not in fact property rights and
licensees are denied the privileges of property ownership, courts have
still recognized in FCC licenses some of the attributes of private
property.156 These attributes include the reliance interests licensees may
154. De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1530 (writing that a spectrum registry should
cover “changes in boundaries of [transmission right] areas, sales or leases of
[transmission right] combinations or of any [transmission right] component, and any
other transaction affecting the use of a [transmission right] combination that a potential
purchaser would care to know about”); Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 544;
White, supra note 3, at 31 (writing that “[a] national registry of spectrum ownership
would be maintained, comparable to local land registries”). A similar registry has been
proposed for the United Kingdom. See MARTIN CAVE, REVIEW OF RADIO SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW FOR DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
AND HM TREASURY 13 (2002) (proposing a public “on-line database of spectrum
assignments”), available at http://www.spectrumreview.radio.gov.uk/2002reveiw/2_title-42.pdf
155. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003) (recognizing that intensive
spectrum leasing within the existing administrative regime “would require tradeoffs in
multiple dimensions—e.g., time, space, geography, type of use, and technology—and
that, in the absence of an effective facilitator, search costs would be high”).
156. See, e.g., In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp., 994 F.2d 1069, 1073–74 (3d Cir.
1993) (“The Communications Act itself seems to imply the existence of a limited
property right in an FCC license once it is granted. Section 301 . . . implies the creation
of rights akin to those created by a property interest limited only by the ‘terms,
conditions and periods of the license.’”); Orange Park Fla. T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 811 F.2d
664, 674 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that, while a broadcast license is not a full-
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have in retaining their licenses as well as in maintaining the specific
terms of their licenses.157 The treatment of FCC licenses as property like
any other asset in bankruptcy proceedings demonstrates the same
phenomenon of quasi-propertization.158 Given the existence and recognition
of quasi-property rights in spectrum, it is hard to conceive of a
devolution of spectrum management from public to private spheres that
bypassed these existing stakeholders, who in so many ways already look
like proprietors. In other words, the government is not about to
“repossess” spectrum from licensees in order to auction off spectrum
deeds.
Far more conceivable is a process by which the stakeholders themselves
would become owners. Just as first possession has provided the starting
point for initial property assignments in the real world, so too private
property rights in spectrum would probably grow out of what is. In this
vein, to avoid frustrating the interests of existing licensees, many of
whom paid for their usage rights at auction, it has been proposed that
licenses simply be converted to spectrum deeds in a “big bang”
revolution in spectrum management.159
The transformation of existing licenses into fee simple deeds, whether
it happened in a big bang or a slow drift, would have significant
interference consequences that have not been addressed by private
fledged, indefeasible property interest, “neither is it a non-protected interest, defeasible
at will. Indeed, to suggest as much would, among other things, throw considerable doubt
on the Commission’s well-known recognition of a renewal expectancy that leads
applicants to vie for licenses which, if awarded, will require a significant expenditure of
resources”); Reuters Ltd. v. FCC, 781 F.2d 946, 950 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that a
properly granted radio license is a “vested interest”); L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d
793, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[T]he Communications Act itself . . . recognize[s] that a
broadcasting license confers a private right, although a limited and defeasible one.”).
157. See generally William L. Fishman, Property Rights, Reliance, and
Retroactivity Under the Communications Act of 1934, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 6–9 (1997);
Shelanski & Huber, supra note 138, at 583–95 (analyzing the property rights of
broadcast spectrum licensees based on the scope of their ability to use, alienate,
subdivide, or transfer their spectrum authorizations); see also Krystilyn Corbett, Note,
The Rise of Private Property Rights in the Broadcast Spectrum, 46 DUKE L.J. 611, 634–
36 (1996). These accounts of administrative entitlements as a new form of property owe
much, of course, to Charles Reich’s seminal article on the administrative creation of
property rights. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
158. See FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Communications, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 299, 308
(2003) (holding that the FCC was not permitted under federal bankruptcy law to rescind
a license from a bankrupt bidder for failure to pay auction fees because the license was
an asset in bankruptcy and the FCC an ordinary creditor).
159. See KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 143, at 2 (proposing big-bang auctions);
see also De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1529–34 (supporting this proposal).
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property advocates. As discussed above, with the exception of newly
granted flexible use licenses, existing licenses are service based.160
Licenses not only define spectrum usage rights along three dimensions,
but also dictate what services can be transmitted, perhaps also dictating
what technologies can be used. The power levels designated by existing
service rules are thus premised on the use of a particular architecture,
certain equipment, and specialized service needs. Radio and cellular
phone service, for example, use dramatically different technical
architectures, and these differences are reflected in the rules governing
each service.
If the property rights of licensees, as well as new entrants, were
defined by the terms of existing licenses, these service rules would have
to be eliminated or substantially relaxed. This is because the existing
service rules prevent most of the trades spectrum owners would want to
make. Under existing rules, for example, Jane would not be able to sell
her radio transmission rights to Mike for Mike’s operation of a cellular
phone service, even if Mike agreed to operate according to the same
technical limitations (frequency, time, and power) that bind Jane. A
relaxation of service rules, permitting more flexibility in the use of
spectrum, would be necessary to allow efficient trades. But such
relaxation—a disassociation of technical specifications and service
rules—is likely to engender increased interference even if every operator
kept its power emissions in check. This is true for the same reasons that
increased flexibility in the current regime has increased interference
concerns.161 The technical specifications might be rendered either overor under-protective, meaning that Mike’s cellular system might cause
significantly more interference, or be more sensitive to interference, than
Jane’s radio service. The result would be greater uncertainty about the
integrity of wireless systems and greater conflict over interference.
Given the likelihood of increased conflict in an altered spectral
environment, populated by property owners with substantial flexibility
to change technology and network configurations, an account of private
property rights in spectrum is not complete without an account of
conflict resolution.
B. Common Law Resolution of Spectrum Conflicts
Private property rights theorists, were they to acknowledge the
increased interference conflict that would accompany the propertization
of spectrum, might well dismiss the costs of such conflict as
160.
161.
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insignificant compared with the efficiency gains that a property rights
system promises.162 In fact, proponents of spectrum property tend to
minimize the challenges of conflict resolution by looking to courts to
resolve the disputes of neighboring owners in radio as in land, as if this
kind of adjudication were relatively frictionless.163 Specifically, Coase
suggested that spectrum owners could vindicate rights against
interference through actions like nuisance or trespass and then trade such
rights to the entity that most values the interference-free spectrum.164
This basic vision has been incorporated into the work of almost all those
who advocate private property rights in spectrum, where nuisance and
trespass are invoked as talismans. None of the private property theorists
analyzes with any rigor how these causes of action might be applied to
interference disputes or identifies the costs that might inhere in the
vindication of property rights.
Of all the spectrum property theorists, Arthur De Vany and colleagues,
in their 1969 article, devoted the most attention to interference dispute
resolution. De Vany advocated a strict liability standard for any
transmission within the area that is protected by a spectrum owner’s
property rights. Injunctions, he argued, should be granted as a matter of
right to any complainant who established that his rights had been
violated.165 Although spectrum use has evolved substantially since
162. The early advocates of property rights in spectrum did acknowledge the costs
of a private exchange. See, e.g., De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1507–08 (“Exchanging
rights is a costly process; it includes the costs for both buyers and sellers of searching
out, negotiating, and enforcing mutually beneficial exchange opportunities.”); see also
Minasian, supra note 3, at 269 (“[The proposal has] assumed that emission rights could
be defined in terms of single-valued power levels—that signal levels did not vary—and
that there was no cost associated with enforcing these rights.”).
163. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 6, at 72–76 (proposing that common law courts,
rather than the FCC, adjudicate interference disputes using theories of trespass and
nuisance); Hazlett, supra note 6, at 149 (contending that common law courts can, and
always could have, mediated interference disputes); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 211–12 (1998).
[T]he original device for assigning frequencies imitated the patterns that had
long been used for determining the ownership of unowned land: the first
person who used a frequency [consistently and regularly over a period of time,
with the intention to exclude others] was entitled to keep it in perpetuity. . . .
. . . The basic rights could have been protected by trespass analogies. The
frequencies could be used, sold, leased, or mortgaged like any other physical
asset.
Id. (footnote omitted).
164. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 2, at 26–29.
165. De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1521, 1549.
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1969, the treatment of spectrum-related, common law actions has not.
Pablo Spiller and Carlo Cardilli have recently advocated a property
rights system in which there would be a cause of action under “tort law
to protect . . . broadcast rights against trespassers” with a damages
remedy.166 Faulhaber and Farber have advocated a system of trespass
wherein spectrum owners would be liable for any incursion into the
spectrum of another.167 At the same time, they also suggest a system of
nuisance, implying a system in which liability would lie only where the
signal incursions are unreasonable and the harm substantial.168
The casual treatment of liability and remedies in the interference
context seems to reflect a belief that spectrum is enough like land that
good old nuisance and trespass, no matter how troubled their application
in the real estate context, will rise to the challenge spectrum presents.
Peter Huber, for example, asserts the following:
Had the courts been given time to develop it methodically, this simple idea [of
spectrum ownership] would have created property rights in the ether, much as
the common law had created property rights in the land beneath it—rules of
trespass, easement, nuisance, and the like that define the bounds of ownership in
real estate.169

The apparent source of the private property theorists’ confidence in
common law resolution of spectrum disputes is a 1926 Illinois state
court’s application of trespass law to a case of radio interference. There,
the court enjoined a new broadcaster’s interference with an existing
broadcaster, invoking the time-honored principle of property law that
166. Spiller & Cardilli, supra note 3, at 70, 72.
167. Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 147, at 7–8. “In a property rights regime,
[restrictions on power emissions] would be codified in the property rights of the
frequency owner, who would then be subject to civil penalties should he or she violate
these restrictions.” Id.
168. Id. (comparing potential spectrum use limitations to “my right to use my real
property[, which] is restricted by noise and nuisance statutes of my state, county and
local municipality”).
169. HUBER, supra note 6, at 29. For a critique of Huber’s reliance on the common
law, see Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1770
(1999) (book review) (writing that Huber “too readily embraces a variety of rules that
would both clog common law processes and contradict common law principles”); John
F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and
the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1102–03 (2000) (noting how
difficult it would have been to establish common law adjudication over spectrum
disputes especially given that such disputes were likely to be interstate). Interestingly,
Peter Huber has strongly opposed the substitution of common law remedies for
administrative ones where environmental pollution is at issue, although it is hard to see
why a court would be more capable of resolving conflicts arising from ambient air noise
than it would be of resolving conflicts arising from ambient air contamination. See, e.g.,
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the
Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 330–35 (1985) (asserting that courts do not have the
perspective to make adequate comparisons of risk in complex environmental pollution cases).
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“priority of time creates a superiority in right.”170 Relying on this
decision, private property rights theorists suggest that courts might have
developed a common law based on real property causes of action to
resolve interference claims if Congress had not stepped in to regulate.171
Interestingly, it is not clear how the Illinois court would have resolved
the complaint in the absence of executive agency guidance, since it was
reliance on administratively-determined technical criteria that guided
the judge in assigning liability.172
There is reason to believe that common law courts struggling to sift
through complex issues of causation, thresholds of liability, and
remediation might have had great difficulty in assigning rights. Like
Coase before them, the contemporary property rights theorists neglect
the institutional and legal dimensions of conflict resolution.173
Whether the desired common law system would be administered by
general common law courts, specialized courts, or FCC administrative
law judges is addressed only in passing.174 Whether the law that would
be applied would be state common law, federal common law, or some
mixture of common law and statutory law or regulation is not
addressed at all. Moreover, there is no discussion of why a common
law system should be expected to resolve spectrum disputes,
particularly in cases of complex interference, when the common law
170. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station Inc. (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill.
1926), reprinted in 68 CONG. REC. 215, 215–19, 69th Cong. (2d Sess. 1926).
171. See, e.g., Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 366–73.
Radio developed in an “orderly” fashion under priority-in-use rules. These
rules did not depend on public interest regulation; the rules were enforceable
via common law principles adjudicated by federal regulators lacking public
interest discretion (as demonstrated by the U.S. Department of Commerce up
until July 9, 1926), or by state courts . . . .
Id. at 371; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Is the “Public Interest” in the Public Interest?:
The Broadcast License Bargain of 1927, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: HAVE
REGULATORS DIALED THE WRONG NUMBER? 49–50 (Donald L. Alexander ed., 1997).
172. For this insight, see Charles Jackson, Was a Common Law Solution to Chaos
in the Radio Waves Reasonable in 1927?, Public Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy Task
Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 9 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002).
173. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 908 (1997); Hazlett, supra note 6, at 148–52;
Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 339; see also R.H. Coase, Comment on
Thomas W. Hazlett: Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC
License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 577, 579 (1998).
174. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 30, at 17 (advocating a federal
court system); White, supra note 3, at 31 (same); see also Faulhaber & Farber, supra
note 147, at 9 (suggesting special “spectrum” courts or common law courts); Hazlett,
The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 551–55 (envisioning specialized spectrum courts).
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has been largely abandoned in the air pollution context.175
The failure of private property theorists to grapple with the
implications of their regime change for interference conflicts calls out
for careful inquiry into such conflicts and the way in which a common
law system might or might not be able to improve on FCC resolution.
Such inquiry, and its implications for spectrum rights in the telecosm to
come, follows.
IV. FCC RESOLUTION OF SPECTRUM CONFLICT
THROUGH THE LENS OF NUISANCE
Private property theorists advance an essentially deregulatory agenda.
They envision a telecosm in which markets liberate communications
from government decisionmaking. One of the claimed benefits of this
liberation is that access to spectrum will no longer depend on an opaque
and often ad hoc administrative decisionmaking process. In this Part, I
argue that the characteristics and limitations of nuisance law make it
unlikely that these hopes will be realized. The nuisance law emerging
from contemporary courts will require normative judgments about
preferred communications technologies and consumer applications.
Moreover, these judgments will be made by governmental decisionmakers
facing the kinds of tradeoffs that have bedeviled the FCC in distributing
spectrum usage entitlements. Nuisance law will be unpredictable for
those disputes that look like conflicts over land and unsuitable for those
disputes that do not. In both cases—within the nuisance case and where
nuisance actions will not lie—administrative guidance should play a
meaningful role in spectrum dispute resolution.
To assess whether the common law is equipped to resolve spectrum
disputes, and what the implications of dispute resolution might be for
spectrum management reform, it is necessary to begin with the common
law as it exists in the real world.
A. Nuisance Versus Trespass Law
In positing common law causes of action for wireless interference,
private property theorists use the terms “nuisance” and “trespass”
without precision or clear differentiation.176 At common law, of course,
these doctrines are distinct. Trespass is a physical invasion of property
that interferes with the owner’s interest in exclusive possession of his
property.177 Historically at common law, trespass liability could be
175.
176.
177.
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imposed even for harmless intrusions, so sacred was the right of the
property owner to exclude.178 By contrast, a private nuisance is an
invasion, whether physical or not, of another’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of land.179 Thus, the property right interfered with by a
nuisance is not the possessory right to land, but the right to be free from
the nuisance.180 Today, nuisance liability will lie only for interferences
that are substantial and unreasonable.181 Whether or not an interference
is unreasonable depends on a complex balancing of the economic stakes
for the plaintiff and defendant, as well as consideration of the greater
public impact of proposed remedies and fairness issues.182
In recent years, the distinction between trespass and nuisance has
blurred at the edges. Courts have tried to make nuisance liability more
automatic where harm is substantial and have declined to find trespass
liability where there is no harm, thus bringing the two causes of action
closer together.183 Moreover, many jurisdictions no longer take seriously
the distinction between physical and nonphysical intrusions.184 For
example, the uninvited entry of electronic signals onto a server has been
found to be a trespass to chattels, even though electronic signals are not
the kind of physical invasion traditionally recognized as trespass.185
178. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, § 13, at 67–70; Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 584 (1988).
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
180. For an influential case underscoring the theory that the right to be free of
nuisance is a property right, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to stop the defendant’s
emissions of noxious air pollutants unless the defendant paid the plaintiff permanent damages
to compensate for past, present, and future losses created by the nuisance).
181. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 750–51 (5th ed. 2002).
182. See infra Part IV.B.
183. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 181, at 751–53; see, e.g., Borland v.
Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) (holding that the plaintiff could not
sustain an action for trespass based on airborne pollution because there was no harm).
184. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 793–94 (Or. 1959) (holding
that airborne pollution was a physical intrusion).
185. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069–72 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that an aggregator of auction site data committed trespass to chattels
when it invaded eBay’s servers with hundreds of automated software query agents); see
also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 471–73 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that the electrical signals dispatched by computer hackers were tangible enough to
constitute trespass to personal property). But see Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300
(Cal. 2003) (holding that a former employee’s mass emails to current employees was not
trespass to chattels because there was no harm to server functionality). For a critique of
the application of trespass doctrine to the Internet, see Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with
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Liability for trespass to land has been found in the case of sound
vibrations.186 At the same time, electrical signals have been found to
constitute a nuisance.187
Despite the overlap between the two causes of action, nuisance and
trespass law still differ substantially at their cores. Thus, whereas
nuisance law incorporates standards of reasonableness that make liability
determinations maddenly erratic, trespass law remains the province of
bright-line tests. Whereas damages remedies are common in nuisance
law, injunctive relief is standard in trespass law. The choice between
nuisance and trespass law is therefore not a trivial one for spectrum
conflicts.
There is a way to conceive of radio interference, which results from
the unwanted intrusion of electrical signals into a receiver, as either
trespass or nuisance, but the actual analysis is likely to be much closer to
the nuisance-like standard than to the trespass-like rule, particularly as
the spectral environment grows more complex. To understand why this
is, let us start with the first kind of simple interference conflict that looks
most like trespass. In such a case, Jane emits more power than is
permitted under the terms of her deed such that she “strays” into Mike’s
band. That is, Jane’s deed permits the transmission of x watts, in y area,
at z time, but she transmits 2x watts over 1.5y. In a sense, Jane’s
excessive signal strength invades Mike’s territory. On the surface, this
case might look a lot like trespass in that it seems to implicate Mike’s
right to exclude.188 Particularly if once conceives of interference as it is
depicted in Figure 2, such an intrusion is hardly distinguishable from a
person’s playing soccer on his neighbor’s yard. Spurious emissions into
one’s airspace might be analogized to spurious footfalls onto one’s land.
The problem with such a trespass approach, beyond the incentives it
creates for excessive monitoring and insufficient interference prevention
on the plaintiff’s part, is that interference does not really work this way,
and spectrum property rights are unlikely to be defined this way. We
have assumed that property rights in spectrum, like usage rights in FCC
Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 33 (2000) (writing that courts have
“collaps[ed] the separate doctrines of trespass to land and trespass to chattels back into
their single common law progenitor, the action for trespass”); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace
as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 484–85
(2003) (writing that courts have confused trespass to chattels, which requires a
demonstration of harm, with trespass to real property, which does not require a showing
of harm).
186. McNeill v. Redington, 154 P.2d 428, 429–30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
187. See, e.g., Page County Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d
171, 175–76 (Iowa 1984) (holding that computer radiation from a travel agency that
disrupted television reception in a neighboring appliance store was a nuisance).
188. This is the kind of trespass that De Vany imagined in 1969, when the wireless
world was much simpler. See De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1550.
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licenses, are defined along three dimensions within an identified
geographic area. The property owner will own the rights to transmit on
certain frequencies, but will not own spectral territory (that is, a
particular megahertz). As a result, the owner’s right to exclude will be
the right to keep others from using his transmission rights. Given this
definition of rights, there can be no trespass by Jane onto Mike’s
territory unless Jane’s signal interrupts, or can be predicted to interrupt,
Mike’s ability to transmit signals or Mike’s receivers’ ability to receive
them.189 Something called, or likened to, trespass law could be applied
in these cases. But the cause of action would have none of the
crystalline clarity that it does in the real world. Instead, given the rich
interaction of rights and duties, it would be more like the muddy
nuisance law, requiring proof of causation (did the excess emissions
cause the intrusion or potential intrusion into the signal circuit?), harm
(were transmission rights actually or potentially compromised?), and
reasonableness (should Mike’s receivers have performed better?), much
as nuisance law does.
Now let us turn to the second, and more likely, way in which
interference might occur between Jane and Mike. Suppose that Jane is
transmitting within the contours of her spectral property—that is, at x
power, within y area—but her operations have reduced the reliability or
reach of Mike’s transmissions.190 In this case, Jane’s permissible use of
her property interferes with Mike’s use and enjoyment of his property.
This presents a classic nuisance case. Mike has no right to exclude
Jane’s signal emissions because they are authorized. Nevertheless,
Jane’s use of her property is compromising Mike’s use of his. If
spectrum were land, Mike would have a nuisance claim. As discussed
above, a move to private property rights and the attendant increase in
flexible use of the spectrum are likely to raise the incidence of this kind
of interference case. Clashes between two permissible uses of spectrum
are likely to overwhelm, and be far more difficult to resolve, than
clashes between an impermissible and permissible use. Given the
189. Predicted interference might be proved, for example, if Mike were operating at
less than full power such that Jane’s emissions did not actually interfere with Mike’s
transmissions, but were detected by Mike and would likely interfere with Mike’s full
power transmissions.
190. This might be the case for any number of reasons, such as faulty modeling in
the definition of initial entitlements to the spectrum or the introduction of new
applications, in addition to poorly functioning receivers or atmospheric changes. See
supra Part II.B.
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dominance of the nuisance-like conflicts and the absence of the usual
advantages that trespass law affords, common law in the spectrum
context will rely primarily on a balancing approach typical of nuisance.
The application of nuisance law, of course, will require a standard of
liability for an actionable interference. It will require a menu of
remedies and some hierarchy among them. Most problematically, it will
require a notion of the public interest—a notion not all that dissimilar
from the one the FCC has notoriously applied—that can guide a
decisionmaker to a proper balance of entitlements between vying
communications systems.191 The following sections will show just how
difficult, costly, and value-laden the development of nuisance standards
might be in the domain of spectrum.
B. Nuisance Law
Suppose that satellite and microwave licenses have been converted to
spectrum deeds, and the owner of the satellite frequencies sues the
microwave operator on an adjacent band for interfering with reception of
the satellite signals. What law should a nuisance court apply? In the
absence of any state or federal common law, such a court might well
turn to the FCC’s own precedent. The FCC does not conceive of itself
as an arbiter of nuisance and rarely uses the language of nuisance to
resolve spectrum interference claims. Nevertheless, like a nuisance
court, the FCC is called upon to resolve disputes between “neighboring”
holders of resource usage rights arising out of the disturbing, though
often lawful, exercise of such rights. Sometimes these disputes arise
between the holders of usage rights and prospective holders of such
rights. These prospective interference claims turn on the same questions
as actual intraservice and interservice spectrum disputes: What should be
the respective rights and obligations of the parties who want to use
spectrum in mutually injurious ways? In resolving such disputes over
access to spectrum between existing wireless operators and between
existing and prospective wireless operators, the FCC has used concepts
and techniques that are familiar from nuisance law and that help
elucidate the challenges for future nuisance courts.
After reviewing nuisance law standards of liability and the FCC’s own
approach to “liability,” this section examines the ways in which the
FCC’s choices in resolving spectrum conflicts do and do not diverge
from the conventional wisdom on the efficient assignment of rights. The
aim of this discussion is to illuminate the challenges common law courts
would face in adjudicating spectrum nuisance claims, as well as the
191.
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ways in which administrative decisionmaking might be harnessed by the
courts to reduce the costs of private property in spectrum.
1. Common Law Standard of Liability
The first issue a nuisance court must determine is whether there is an
actionable nuisance. In the real world, according to the widely followed
Restatement (Second) of Torts, only an “intentional and unreasonable”
interference with another’s use and enjoyment of land will result in
nuisance liability.192 The determination of whether an intentional interference
with property is unreasonable requires courts to balance the social utility
of the interference with the gravity of the harm plaintiff has suffered.193
The gravity of the harm will be measured by the extent and character of
the harm, the social value of the plaintiff’s activity, the suitability of the
plaintiff’s activity to the location, and the burden the plaintiff would
bear in avoiding the harm.194 The sum of these factors will then be
balanced against the social value of the defendant’s activity, the
suitability of that activity to the location, and the impracticability of
preventing the harm.195 This balancing, commonly known as a balance
of the utilities, is also known in various jurisdictions as a balance of
the conveniences, a balance of the equities, or a comparative or relative
hardship test.196
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1979). Most courts also add a
requirement that the nuisance be substantial, although they tend to conflate the
substantiality and unreasonableness tests. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 414 (3d ed. 2000).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979). See generally DUKEMINIER
& KRIER, supra note 181, at 751. If, in a damages action, plaintiff can show that “the
harm caused [by the defendant] is serious and the financial burden of compensating for
this and similar harm to others would not” make it infeasible for the defendant to
continue its conduct, the court might not inquire into relative social values of the
competing uses. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979); see, e.g., Crest
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Willemsen, 384 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Wis. 1986).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979). The inquiry into the suitability
of the victimized land use for its location is particularly important in the evaluation of
harm and has resulted in what some commentators have called “judicial zoning,”
whereby courts end up determining the appropriate uses of land based on the kinds of
nuisances they are willing to enjoin or deter. See J.H. Beuscher & Jerry W. Morrison,
Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 WIS. L. REV. 440, 443. For
historical accounts of the development of nuisance law as zoning law, see MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 74–78 (1977).
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1979).
196. See George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an Historical
Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658, 689
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With the “unreasonable” interference test, developed in the early
twentieth century and used regularly after appearing in the 1939
Restatement of Torts, courts sought to stabilize nuisance law between the
early fierce protection of plaintiffs and an emerging solicitude for
industrial defendants. When land uses were fairly uniform and
contained within the boundaries of the property, courts had no trouble
holding defendants liable for disturbing plaintiffs’ quiet enjoyment of
their property.197 Courts tended to rigidly apply the principle of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, roughly translated as an obligation to use
your own property in a way that does not injure that of another, as a rule
of strict liability that made any interference with another’s enjoyment of
his real property an actionable offense.198
Industrial land use created more demand for land and increased both the
negative externalities, such as smoke and smell, and the positive
externalities, generated by jobs and increased productivity, of land use.199
Confronted with these new land use realities, courts became more
sympathetic to industrial defendants whose innovative land uses disturbed
plaintiffs, but provided great economic advantages. The prospect of these
positive externalities challenged the privilege that traditional nuisance
doctrine had afforded to preexisting uses.200 Thus, apace with the
development of industrial technology, courts swung to a defendantcentered approach that dominated in the mid-nineteenth century.201
The Restatement’s unreasonable interference test reflected a new view
of nuisance and property law to emerge later in the nineteenth century.
(1995).
197. See Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 89, 101 (1998). In an agrarian economy, where cross-boundary annoyances are
few, land use conflicts
can be subjected to an “act at your peril” rule of strict liability, without much
damage to the economy. A rule of strict liability in regard to interference with
land use was functional at the inception of the doctrine and for centuries thereafter,
at least insofar as it protected established sources of wealth. Nuisance was thus
not a contested doctrine during the period before the Industrial Revolution.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a fairness-oriented defense of the strict liability, plaintiffcentered approach to nuisance law even under contemporary land use conditions, see
Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 69 (1979).
198. See HORWITZ, supra note 194, at 74–76; see also Morgan v. High Penn Oil
Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (N.C. 1953) (implementing the sic utero doctrine).
199. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present,
and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 197 (1990).
200. See generally Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance
Injunctions—Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 632–33 (1976).
201. See Lewin, supra note 199, at 192–96, 200–04 (discussing swings between
plaintiff-centered and defendant-centered approaches to nuisances). See generally Joel
Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403,
406–07 (1974).
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This was the view that property rights need not be absolute, but rather
that the victim and the interferer might have correlative rights to be
balanced. To accommodate economic development while still honoring
preexisting property rights, courts tried to balance the value of
incumbent and new uses.202 The result was a standard for nuisance
liability, under which a defendant would be liable for substantial
interference with a plaintiff’s property, but only where such interference
was unreasonable.203 Nuisance law thus evolved by the early twentieth
century from a system of absolute protection of property rights
(alternatively the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s) into “a doctrine of tort law,
imbued with concepts of ‘fault’ and ‘reasonableness.’”204 Consistent
with this move from property to tort theories, courts came to prefer
damages to injunctions as the remedy of choice in nuisance actions.205
There are two basic points to note about modern nuisance law’s
balancing of the utilities at the liability stage. First, courts balancing
such factors as the character of the parties’ conduct, their relative
economic costs, and the impact of liability on the community are clearly
trying to maximize the economic utility of land use, but economic
efficiency is not the only goal. Corrective justice or fairness goals also
animate nuisance law. For example, an invasion of plaintiff’s property
interests will be unreasonable if the harm is “severe and greater than the
202. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 826 cmt. b (1939) (providing that
“[d]etermining unreasonableness is essentially a weighing process, involving a
comparative evaluation of conflicting interests in various situations according to
objective legal standards”); Id. § 822 ; see, e.g., Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198,
202 (W. Va. 1989) (finding that “[u]nreasonableness is determined by balancing the
competing landholders’ interests”). See generally Lewin, supra note 199, at 189–201.
Louise Halper associates the emergence of balancing in nuisance law with the
assumption of jurisdiction over nuisance claims by courts of equity, which began to
replace injunctions with damage awards such that “small-scale plaintiffs could have
damages by way of compensation for their injuries, but they were denied the power to
halt large-scale uses.” Halper, supra note 197, at 113.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). Contracting nuisance
liability even further, courts began to hold that liability should not be imposed to
compensate hypersensitive plaintiffs. See id. § 821F cmt. d (holding that a hypersensitive
victim should not be able to recover on a nuisance theory); see also Belmar Drive-In
Theatre Co. v. Ill. State Toll Highway Comm’n, 216 N.E.2d 788, 791–92 (Ill. 1966)
(holding that no nuisance existed in the case of drive-in theater that was hypersensitive to
light pollution). See generally Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
1009, 1018 (1989); see also Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in
American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1151–52 (1986).
204. Lewin, supra note 203, at 1018; see also Bone, supra note 203, at 1159–60.
205. See SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW
746 (3d ed. 1999).
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[plaintiff] should be required to bear without compensation.”206 In other
words, it may simply be unfair to deprive plaintiff of her property rights
even where doing so would be efficient. Moreover, where the plaintiff
has come to the nuisance, it may be unfair to characterize the invasion of
his property interests as unreasonable even where doing so would be
efficient.207 The second thing to note, as we move back to consideration
of the telecosm, is that nuisance law leaves judges wide berth to weigh
the parties’ interests and to balance them against any identified public
interest. Some courts will favor the plaintiff’s rights against the
defendant’s hardships, while others will focus more on the economic
significance of the defendant’s hardships than on the rights of the
plaintiff. As one commentator has noted, “In the final analysis, the
judicial ‘call’ is but a matter of judgment.”208
2. Transaction Cost Theory of Entitlements
The ad hoc nature of nuisance liability in industrialized America
challenged theorists to provide a system for choosing between plaintiffs
and defendants at the liability stage, and between injunctions and
damages at the remedy stage. No such system has had more influence
on subsequent commentary, if not the courts themselves, than the
framework developed in 1972 by Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed.209 In their canonical article, Calabresi and Melamed applied
Coase’s theory of transaction costs to the resolution of nuisance disputes
and came up with four rules of decision that continue to shape the
discussion of resource management through the common law.210
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A (1979).
207. Id. § 840D.
208. Smith, supra note 196, at 703; see also Lewin, supra note 203, at 1029
(discussing various methods for evaluating nuisance claims).
209. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10. The authors advanced their
transaction cost theory for the allocation of entitlements in general and not only in land
use conflicts, but the nuisance conflicts between Marshall and Taney were central to the
article as they have been to the ensuing literature. Id. at 1115–16, 1122–23, 1122 n.62.
But see Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2176 (1997)
(arguing that accidents, not nuisances, provided the inspiration for the work of Calabresi
and Melamed).
210. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1106–17. Important commentary
on this article followed shortly after its publication. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky,
Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule,
and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky, On the
Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 233 (1980); A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). More recently, and particularly
after the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of the original article, a new wave of
commentary has reinvigorated the debate on the proper application of property and
liability rules in the resolution of nuisance disputes. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin,
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Calabresi and Melamed gave us a polluting property owner and his
victim neighbor. The conflict between these two property owners might
generate four possible results, summarized in Table 1 below. Under
Property Rule One, the victim’s entitlement to be free from pollution is
protected by a property rule. The victim may enjoin the pollution.
Under Liability Rule Two, the victim’s entitlement to be free from
pollution is protected by a liability rule. The victim must endure the
pollution so long as he is paid court-assessed damages. Under Property
Rule Three, the polluter’s entitlement to pollute is protected by a property
rule. The polluter may essentially enjoin the victim from complaining,
meaning that a court would find no liability. Finally, Calabresi and
Melamed “discovered” Liability Rule Four, under which the polluter’s
entitlement to pollute is protected by a liability rule. The polluter must
cease polluting so long as he is paid court-assessed damages for the cost
of ceasing or relocating his polluting activity.211

Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE
L.J. 703 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and
Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995); Ian Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean
Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995) [hereinafter Ayres & Talley, Solomonic Bargaining];
Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability
Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 267 (2002); Louis Kaplow
& Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and
Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Reply]; Krier &
Schwab, supra note 107, at 440; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996) [hereinafter
Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules]; Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement
Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997); Rose, supra note 209.
211. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1115–18. As Calabresi and
Melamed were writing their article, a court was actually applying Rule Four for the first
and, as far as anyone seems to know, the last time. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). For details of the case, see infra note 264.
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TABLE 1
RULE
Property
Rule One
Liability
Rule Two
Property
Rule Three
Liability
Rule Four

ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS
Entitlement to victim
Protected by property rule
Entitlement to victim
Protected by liability rule
Entitlement to interferer
Protected by property rule
Entitlement to interferer
Protected by liability rule

RESULT
Interference enjoined
Interference continues;
Damages to victim
Interference continues;
No damages owed
Interference enjoined;
Damages to interferer

Calabresi and Melamed advanced the notion that property rules (Rules
One and Three) should be used when the transaction costs associated with
negotiation are not high enough to deter the parties from negotiating
around an injunction to achieve the most desirable outcome.212 A court
should select between Rules One and Three as the interests of
efficiency require. Rule One is superior on these grounds if the
polluter/interferer is the least-cost avoider of the nuisance, and Rule
Three is superior if the victim is the least-cost avoider. If it is not clear
who is the cheaper cost avoider, the property right (to pollute or to be
free from pollution) should be given to the party who faces higher
transaction costs in negotiating a resolution to the dispute. Liability
rules (Rules Two and Four) should be used when transaction costs are
high enough to deter the parties from negotiating around an injunction to
achieve the most desirable outcome.213 The academic trend in recent
years has been to favor liability rules even where the transaction costs of
bargaining are low, but it is too soon to tell whether this new thrust will
replace the conventional wisdom on the relative merits of property and
liability rules.214
212. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1106–10 (analyzing
how different types of transaction costs affect the choice between property and liability
rules).
213. See id. at 1106–10, 1115–19, 1125–27; see also Kaplow & Shavell, Property
Rules, supra note 210, at 725–27 (arguing that liability rules are better in nonbargaining
contexts where there are externalities because the court can arrive at a damages
assessment more cheaply and accurately than can the parties). But see Krier & Schwab,
supra note 107, at 455–56 (questioning whether courts’ “assessment” costs are any lower
than parties’ transaction costs and any more likely to produce an efficient outcome).
214. See, e.g., Ayres & Balkin, supra note 210, at 706–07; Ayres & Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining, supra note 210, at 1032–33 (noting that liability rules, by
splitting entitlements into a property right subject to an option and exposing private
valuations of these entitlements, facilitate bargaining); see also Kaplow & Shavell,
Reply, supra note 210, at 221. This literature has in turn provoked a defense of property
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For the most part, and perhaps to the same extent as common law
nuisance liability standards, the Calabresi and Melamed menu of remedies
is designed to achieve economic efficiency. As a result, the framework
provides clear direction for efficiency-maximizing resolutions of nuisance
actions. Yet, the Cathedral authors explicitly recognize the pursuit of
other values in the choice of remedies, such as justice and distributional
goals.215 Their decisional framework is less helpful when it comes to
these goals and to tensions between efficiency and other values. As a
result, the elegant lines of the Cathedral are only faintly visible in the
multifactored decisionmaking of nuisance courts.
With this background in nuisance law principles, this Article proceeds
to examine the precedent that communications law might provide for a
common law court hearing a spectrum nuisance case, the special
challenges FCC decisionmaking reveals, and how administrative law
might be incorporated onto a property rights regime to ease dispute
resolution.
C. FCC Resolution of Spectral Nuisance Cases
We saw in Part II that the FCC’s resolution of spectrum conflicts is
guided by the indeterminate public interest standard. To the extent that
this standard is an amalgam of economic efficiency and fairness
concerns, it is similar to the traditional goals of nuisance courts in
resolving property disputes. As might be expected, public interest
considerations inform the FCC’s decisionmaking in unpredictable ways.
It is uncertain in any given spectrum dispute, for example, whether the
rules. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2105–11 (1997) (arguing that property rules should
dominate liability rules, at least when the risk of exploitation by the interferer is greater
than the risk of holdout by the victim, to preserve the stability of possession); Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited:
Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219, 221–22 (2001)
(arguing that negotiation under a property rule regime is likely to lead to more efficient
and fair results than negotiation under a liability rule regime); see also Rose, supra note
209, at 2197–98 (arguing that the economic analysis of property and liability rules may
have limited application in the realm of property law, where property rules should prevail).
215. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1121–22 (considering tradeoffs
between economic efficiency and distributional goals and demonstrating how rules that
further economic efficiency might also further justice goals); see also Edward Rabin,
Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1314–15
(1977) (arguing that Calabresi and Melamed conflated questions of efficiency and
fairness).
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FCC will adopt a preindustrial approach to property rights by protecting
the victim of interference (generally the incumbent), or a modern
balancing of the utilities approach, and split the entitlement between
victim and interferer. In its efforts to facilitate exploitation of the
spectrum resource, the FCC shows the same tendency evident in
nuisance law at the turn of the last century. As discussed above, courts
moved from a property rights approach favoring plaintiffs to a more
nuanced balancing approach as land use pressures increased. Similarly,
as pressures have increased on spectrum use, the FCC has been more
receptive to arguments that interference to incumbents, even if harmful,
should be tolerated.216
This section suggests that the similarity of approach between nuisance
courts and FCC decisionmaking goes even deeper. Like nuisance courts,
the FCC often strays from the economic efficiency ideal celebrated in
the Cathedral literature. In large part, this is because the FCC, like
nuisance courts, defines efficiency more complexly and values it less
absolutely than is typical in the Cathedral literature. The explanation
may also lie in the practical difficulties the FCC and courts face in
accounting for the costs that liability rules require.
1. Administrative Standard of Liability
The FCC has its own standard of liability for spectral interference.217
Interference is of regulatory concern only when it amounts to “harmful
interference,” defined as “[i]nterference which endangers the functioning
of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously
degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication
service.”218 As with land, determinations about what spectrum uses will
substantially and unreasonably interfere with neighboring uses are made
at two stages. They are made first when the agency, acting in its zoning
216. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
217. In the context of spectral nuisances, I am referring to simple interference cases
between two users or two classes of users, and not to the complex interference that can
occur as a result of generally increased signal loading in the atmosphere.
218. 47 C.F.R. § 2.1(c) (2002). This definition of harmful interference is incorporated
into the service rules for many radio services. See, e.g., id. §§ 21.2, 90.7, 101.3
(providing the definitions of harmful interference of the Domestic Public Fixed Radio
Services (Multipoint Distribution Service), Private Land Mobile Radio Services, and
Fixed Microwave Services, respectively). The operation of unlicensed devices is
conditioned on not causing harmful interference to an authorized radio station. Id. §
15.5(b). The same term, “harmful interference,” appears in the Communications Act
without definition. The FCC “may, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity, make reasonable regulations (1) governing the interference potential of
devices which in their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency energy by
radiation, conduction, or other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference
to radio communications.” Id. § 302a(a).
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capacity, specifies the services that are permitted to operate in a given
band. These decisions are premised on judgments about harmful
interference and about which party should bear responsibility for causing
and abating such interference. On the basis of these judgments, the FCC
creates terms of entry for new services.219
Nuisance-like determinations are made again when the FCC comes to
resolve disputes among spectrum users within and between zones.220
Although these disputes are generally articulated in the context of a
rulemaking proceeding rather than in a complaint process, the FCC acts
like a court in determining how much service disruption constitutes
harmful interference on a case-by-case basis.221
2. Transaction Cost Analysis of FCC Dispute Resolution
An efficiency-minded court might well ask how the FCC’s grant of
interference entitlements accords with the conventional wisdom derived
from the Calabresi and Melamed transaction cost thesis of nuisance
remedies. In other words, does FCC law provide precedent that would
propel courts in a direction pleasing to private property theorists?
Answering that question produces a more finely grained assessment of
what common law judges would have to do to improve upon FCC
219. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
220. Conflicts between existing spectrum users are brought to the FCC in the form
of petitions for rulemaking, comments to rulemaking proceedings concerning the
creation of new conflicts, or much more rarely, in complaint proceedings.
221. Harmful interference also goes by the names of “serious degradation” and
“repeated interruptions.” See, e.g., Comments of Sprint, supra note 122, at 13–17
(cataloging FCC definitions of harmful interference); see also Comments of National
Public Radio, Inc., In re Issues Related to the Commission’s Spectrum Policies, ET
Docket No. 02-135, at 14 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002); Comments of XtremeSpectrum,
Inc., In re Spectrum Policy Task Force Seeks Public Comment on Issues Related to
Commission’s Spectrum Policies, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 6–9 (F.C.C. filed July 8,
2002). According to XtremeSpectrum, the uncertain meaning of “harmful interference”
was partly responsible for the controversy over the authorization of the ultra-wideband
service. Id. at 6. In that proceeding, “parties generally concurred on the appropriate
techniques for predicting interference, but differed greatly on what assumptions to
use—and consequently differed on whether interference would or would not occur in
practice.” Id. at 8. FCC Commissioner Martin has expressed concern with the FCC’s
“case-by-case, ad hoc approach” to harmful interference, worrying that not only “does
this approach cause a great deal of uncertainty for spectrum users and markets alike, [but] it
also creates another problem: the appearance of results-oriented decisionmaking.” Aircell,
Inc., Petition, Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, for a Waiver of the Airborne Cellular
Rule, or, in the Alternative, for a Declaratory Ruling, 18 F.C.C.R. 1926, 1940 (2003)
(Commissioner Martin, concurring).
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decisionmaking, for which kinds of conflicts such improvement might or
might not be possible, what kinds of “public interest” judgments such
courts would be required to make, and what the future role of
administrative law might be in a privatized spectrum management
regime.
a. Property Rule One
In the main, with fairly few and recent exceptions, the FCC has
resolved interservice and intraservice disputes by granting the
entitlement not to be interfered with to the incumbent and protecting that
entitlement by a property rule. In its “adjudicatory” capacity in
resolving disputes between license holders, as well as in its zoning
capacity in allocating initial rights to spectrum, the FCC has thus relied
heavily on Rule One to distribute entitlements. 222
The clearest display of Rule One in action is the FCC’s invocation of
the common law maxim “first in time, first in right” to resolve spectrum
disputes in favor of the senior licensee. Under this principle, drawn
from the dawn of property law, “the deployment of new facilities must
protect existing licensees.”223 The agency has reached these decisions,
as preindustrial nuisance courts did, on a finding of harm, without
application of the transaction cost analysis that the Cathedral model
recommends, and without searching inquiry into the relative value of the
resource uses, as modern nuisance law requires. In cases of intraservice
and uncomplicated interservice interference cases, the use of Rule One
can be defended under the transaction cost analysis; in other cases it
cannot.
In intraservice cases, which typically involve two parties using the
spectrum for the same purpose, the use of Rule One would be perfectly
consistent with the conventional wisdom distilled from Calabresi and
222. To the extent that the FCC sees itself as a zoning authority, it is unsurprising
that it would favor absolute over partial entitlements. Municipalities issue orders of
compliance to those who violate zoning orders to stop interfering uses. See Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 692 (1973). In the same way, the FCC enjoins the
transmission of radio signals that will cause harmful interference to existing services.
223. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 16 F.C.C.R. 2101, 2126 n.120 (2001); Deployment of Wireline Services
Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local
Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,912,
21,008–09 & n.498 (1999) (tracing the history of the first-in-time, first-in-right principle
in FCC jurisprudence). For application of this concept in nuisance law, see Helmkamp
v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 214 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1974) (citing Schlotfelt v. Vinton
Farmers’ Supply Co., 109 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 1961)). “Priority of occupation is a
circumstance of considerable weight.” Id.
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Melamed. The interference in these cases can be compared to a
common nuisance, which typically occurs between neighbors and is
repetitive or long-term in nature. Such nuisances demand a permanent
solution like an injunction, which the parties are fairly well-equipped to
negotiate around.224 Like neighbors, licensees in the same service
cannot easily “move away” from each other. Their systems are designed
to operate in the same band, usually using the same or similar
technology.225
It is indeed Rule One that the FCC has applied to intraservice
interference disputes, most frequently between broadcast licensees. The
FCC has consistently held that “the ‘newcomer’ is responsible,
financially and otherwise, for taking whatever steps may be necessary to
eliminate objectionable interference.”226 In these cases, transaction costs
will tend to be fairly low because the parties are identifiable, share a
common technical architecture, and are knowledgeable enough about
abatement strategies that they can easily negotiate around an
injunction.227 Indeed, in many such cases, the FCC permits the parties to
negotiate around the victim’s entitlement just as property owners
might.228
The transaction cost analysis also supports the FCC’s application of its
224. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1118; Brooks, supra note 210, at
305. It is also possible that in a two-party transaction the transaction costs could be
artificially high due to bilateral monopoly. For a discussion of the effect of bilateral
monopolies on transaction costs, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
68–70 (5th ed. 1998). Calabresi and Melamed recommend liability rules even in twoparty transactions if there is a significant risk of hold-out problems. Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 10, at 1106–07.
225. See supra Part II.B.1. The widespread deployment of software defined radios,
still some time away, will increase the mobility of services and therefore reduce the
degree to which parties to an intraservice interference dispute are stuck with each other.
See infra note 312.
226. Sudbrink Broadcasting of Georgia, Inc., Radio Station WIIN, Atlanta, Georgia,
For Construction Permit to Relocate Atenna-Transmitter Site, 65 F.C.C.2d 691, 692
(1977); see also Amendment of Parts 1, 21 and 74 to Enable Multipoint Distribution
Service and Instructional Television Fixed Service Licensees to Engage in Fixed TwoWay Transmissions, 14 F.C.C.R. 12,764, 12,781 (1999) (establishing that interference
protection rights within the “wireless cable” services are based on a first-in-time, first-inright philosophy); 47 C.F.R. § 101.105 (2002) (establishing interference protection
criteria under which fixed microwave services must protect existing or previously
applied for systems).
227. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 24.236 (allowing parties to agree to a higher signal
strength at the border of PCS service areas); id. § 73.623(g) (allowing digital television
broadcasters to agree to accept additional interference from each other).
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first-in-time, first-in-right principle to uncomplicated interservice
interference disputes. In such cases, the parties are few, the interference
easily documented, the harm well-understood, and the interference
effects localized. For example, when a low-power television station
causes interference to the signals carried through a cable system, the
earlier user, whether it is the cable system or the low-power TV station,
“will be given priority on the channel, and the later user will be
responsible for correction of the interference.”229 The transaction costs
involved in the cable system’s negotiation of interference rights with the
interfering broadcaster will tend to be fairly low. In these cases, as in
intraservice interference cases, the use of a liability rule requiring a
damages calculation might well entail more time and effort and might be
more prone to error than would injunctive relief.230
It is when we arrive at more complicated interservice interference
cases involving multiple operators that the FCC’s use of Rule One
becomes problematic. The FCC typically applies Rule One in these
cases too, even though the transaction costs, including the costs of
negotiations and hold-out premiums, are demonstrably high and
negotiation around the entitlement is either not permitted or not efficient.
For example, the FCC typically requires new licensees entering into
encumbered spectrum to provide interference protection to the
incumbents.231 If the new services can share spectrum with incumbent
licensees without causing harmful interference, they may do so. If the
new services are incompatible with existing uses, the newcomers bear
the full burden of mitigation.232 In addition, the FCC has bucked its own
inclinations to make spectrum allocations more flexible when doing so
would obviously increase interference to incumbents.233
229. Id. § 74.703(d).
230. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 107, at 455 n.49. But see Brooks, supra note
210, at 276 n.41 (writing that the “Coase Theorem tells us that in the low-transactioncost cases any damage award (just as any property rule) will achieve the efficient
allocative result, and therefore the damage calculation does not require any more judicial
effort or time than a simple order of injunctive relief”).
231. See, e.g., Auction of Licenses in the Lower 700 MHz Band Scheduled for May
28, 2003, 18 F.C.C.R. 3138, 3146 (2003) (citing interference protection that new
licensees must provide to incumbent licensees); Lower and Upper Paging Bands Auction
Scheduled for June 26, 2001, 16 F.C.C.R. 7657, 7666 (2001) (same); Auction of
Licenses for Fixed Point-to-Point Microwave Services in the 38.6 to 40.0 GHz (39 GHz)
Band, 15 F.C.C.R. 850, 858 (2000) (same); Auction of 800 MHz Specialized Mobile
Radio Service Licenses, 13 F.C.C.R. 1875, 1877 (1997) (same).
232. See, e.g., Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate
Spectrum at 2 GHz for Use by the Mobile-Satellite Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,315, 12,361
(2000).
233. For example, the FCC declined to open up mobile satellite service spectrum to
new users because it thought that doing so would increase the interference caused to
incumbent licensees. Id. at 12,357; see also Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission’s
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A recent and controversial example of the FCC’s application of Rule
One to a complex interference conflict occurred in the television
broadcast spectrum. A sizeable portion (about one quarter) of this
spectrum has been designated by Congress and the FCC for use by new
services.234 These services must coexist with the more than 100
incumbent local broadcast stations until the incumbents have completed
a conversion from analog to digital transmissions and their viewership
has made the associated transition to digital receivers. At the end of this
conversion, the broadcasters have been ordered to vacate the reallocated
portion of the band.235 But until then, the FCC has enjoined new
entrants from interfering with broadcasters.236 These interference
constraints make it very difficult to operate the kind of nationwide
mobile service that most new entrants would want to deploy.237
Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the
Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, 16 F.C.C.R. 17,222, 17,237 (2001)
(holding that “permitting mobile use of the band by new service providers would pose a
very high risk of disrupting important incumbent fixed operations that our decision does
not pose”).
234. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251, 265
(adding new section 309(j)(14) to the Communications Act and establishing a deadline
for broadcasters to cease operations on certain channels); id. § 3004 (adding new section
337(a) to the Communications Act and establishing an initial timetable for conducting
auctions); id. § 3007 (setting the September 30, 2002 deadline for the completion of
certain auctions and deposit of proceeds). Congress subsequently accelerated the initial
auction schedule. District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106113, § 213, 113 Stat. 1501A-289, 295, app. E, § 213; see also Reallocation of Television
Channels 60–69, the 746–806 MHz Band, 12 F.C.C.R. 22,953, 22,953–55 (1997),
recon., 13 F.C.C.R. 21,578, 21,578–79 (1988).
235. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2000); Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz
Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 476, 479 (2000).
236. Auction of Licenses in the Lower 700 MHz Band Scheduled for May 28, 2003,
18 F.C.C.R. 3138, 3146 (2003); Petitions for Reconsideration of the Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 13,985, 13,991 (2002). Congress
required that broadcasters be protected in this way. 47 U.S.C. § 337(e).
237. The interference protection criteria were held responsible for reduced interest
in the reallocated broadcast spectrum and for delaying the auction of one part of the band
and depressing the value of the other part. See, e.g., Howard Buskirk & Paul Kirby,
House Panel Backs 700 MHz Auction Delays; Similar Bill Is Introduced in Senate
Chamber, TELECOMM. REP., May 6, 2002, at 2. According to a representative of
potential bidders, the broadcast bands to be auctioned
are heavily encumbered . . . To date, no relocation plan has been put in place
that would guarantee the timely relocation of incumbent licensees. In the
absence of a relocation plan that would allow prospective bidders to anticipate
their deployment schedules, the value of the spectrum for implementation of
new services is greatly reduced.
Id. Because of the lack of spectrum availability, prospective bidders asked repeatedly
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Recognizing the technical difficulties that incumbent operation created
for new entrants, the FCC adopted rules to make it easier for new
entrants to buy out existing broadcasters—in other words, to negotiate
around the incumbents’ “property rights.”238 Few such negotiations
were successfully concluded. The problem appeared to be that if the
new entrant wanted to provide a national service, it would have to reach
agreement with each of the broadcast stations assigned to the relevant
frequencies. Recognizing the potentially high transaction costs such a
process would impose, brokers stepped in to clear frequencies
nationwide.239 But the number of broadcasters declining to cede their
spectrum rights doomed these band clearing efforts, and potential new
service providers gave up any large scale plans for the spectrum at least
for the near term. It is impossible to know whether the broadcasters who
that the auctions be delayed. See, e.g., Letter of Mr. Thomas E. Wheeler President/CEO
Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association to Chairman Michael Powell, WT
Docket No. 99-168 (F.C.C. filed Apr. 3, 2002) (requesting indefinite delay of Auctions
31 and 44). In light of the disinterest of prospective bidders, auction of the largest chunk
of broadcast spectrum was indefinitely delayed. See Auction of Licenses in the 747–762
and 777–792 MHz Bands (Auction No. 31) is Rescheduled, Public Notice (July 26,
2002), available at 2002 F.C.C. LEXIS 3668 (setting no auction date). Auction of a
smaller chunk went forward in late August and early September of 2002, resulting in net
bids of $88.7 million for 484 licenses. This was widely considered to be a paltry sum for
the spectrum auctioned. See FCC, Auction 44, at http://wireless.fcc.gov/ auctions/44/
(last updated Nov. 4, 2003); Jay Wrolstad, FCC Wireless Spectrum Auction Draws
Meager Interest, WIRELESS NEWSFACTOR.COM (Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.
wirelessnewsfactor.com/perl/story/19218.html.
238. See Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to
Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, 16 F.C.C.R. 21,633 (2001) (setting forth voluntary
band clearing policies by which new services could buy out broadcast stations, provided
that enough television service, defined in the order, would be left in the market); Service
Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the
Commission’s Rules, 16 F.C.C.R. 2703 (2001) (same). The FCC extended the
fundamentals of these voluntary clearing policies to the Lower 700 MHz band.
Reallocation and Service Rules for the 698–746 MHz Spectrum Band (Television
Channels 52–59), 17 F.C.C.R. 1022, 1096 (2002).
239. The most well-developed band clearing effort was that of the Spectrum
Clearing Alliance (run by the Spectrum Exchange Group, LLC and Allen & Company
Inc.) to serve as a broker for Upper 700 MHz band incumbent broadcasters and bidders.
The Alliance, with the help of the broadcaster that owned the most incumbent stations
(Paxson), reported that it had secured agreements with an estimated seventy percent of
the incumbent analog stations. Comments of Spectrum Exchange Group, LLC and Allen
& Company Incorporated, Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 Bands and
Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, WT Docket No. 99-168 (F.C.C. filed
Feb. 6, 2000). For background on the 700 MHz proceeding, see Service Rules for the
746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules,
16 F.C.C.R. 21,633, 21,646 (2001); Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz
Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules, 16 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2719
(2001); Service Rules for the 746–764 and 776–794 MHz Bands, and Revisions to Part
27 of the Commission’s Rules, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,845, 20,882 (2000). For a discussion of the
band clearing attempts, see Ellen Goodman et al., An Overview of Problems and Prospects
in U.S. Spectrum Management, 698 PLI/PAT 327, 368–69 (2002).
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did not participate in the spectrum clearing attempts actually valued the
spectrum most highly or were simply holding out for premium
payments. It does, however, seem likely that at least those licensees
with nonoperational or unprofitable stations were indeed holdouts. To
that extent, transaction costs can be blamed for inhibiting the trade in the
broadcasters’ entitlements—a situation that might in the real world and
under the conventional wisdom have led to the adoption of a liability
rule whereby broadcasters would be compensated for interference
caused by the new entrants.
The transaction costs involved in clearing one or two 6 MHz broadcast
channels nationwide are dwarfed by the costs a new entrant would incur
in clearing several hundred megahertz of spectrum. Take, for example,
the new ultra-wideband devices that use hundreds of MHz of spectrum
at very low power. In a recent decision, the FCC imposed power limits
and design specifications on ultra-wideband devices that are more
stringent than those imposed on other unlicensed devices.240 These
usage restrictions, which one of the FCC Commissioners derided in
dissent as “ultra-conservative,” are designed to prevent the new entrants
from causing harmful interference to existing services.241 The users of
ultra-wideband devices will be unlicensed and manifold, while the
potential victims of interference, such as cellular operators, comprise a
large and varied class of entitlement holders. There is little prospect for
240. Ultra-wideband devices require tiny fragments of spectrum across a very large
range of frequencies and can operate beneath the level of sensitivity of most receivers.
See infra notes 293 –96, 308; see also Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules
Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, 7437 (2002).
Illustrating just how hard it is for decisionmakers to evaluate contests over prospective
harm, PCS operators have argued that even the conservative interference protection
parameters are not conservative enough because UWB operations in a given PCS cell
could decrease coverage by approximately eight to nine percent. See Comments of
Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. on Petitions for Reconsideration, Revision of Part 15 of
the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, ET Docket
No. 98-153, at 7–8 (F.C.C. filed May 2, 2003).
241. Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband
Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, 7551 (2002) (separate statement of
Commissioner Copps). At the same time, the potential victims of interference were
harshly critical of the ultra-wideband decision for not being protective enough of
incumbents. See, e.g., Terry Lane, Wireless Carriers Say FCC UWB Report Isn’t
Adequate, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 26, 2002. Petitions for reconsideration have been filed
by both UWB proponents and incumbents on the grounds that the power limits are too
severe and not severe enough. See, e.g., Petitions for Reconsideration in ET Docket No.
98-153 of Sprint PCS and Ground Penetrating Radar Industry Coalition (F.C.C. filed
June 17, 2002).
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negotiation around the incumbent users’ property rights no matter how
desirable such negotiation might be.242
What we see then if we treat interference disputes as nuisances is that
FCC application of Rule One to “common nuisances” in the form of
intraservice and simple interservice interference cases accords with the
conventional wisdom on the assignment of liability and selection of
remedy. However, resort to Rule One in high transaction cost
interservice disputes is suboptimal, at least from an efficiency
standpoint. With increasing pressure on the spectrum, the privilege that
Rule One affords the incumbent is less and less tolerable. As we will
see below, the FCC has responded to this pressure by attempting to craft
liability rules for complex interference cases. But first, an inquiry into
the FCC’s use of Rule Three—the assignment of an entitlement to the
interferer and the absolute protection of that entitlement by a property
rule—will complete the discussion of property rules.
b. Property Rule Three
According to the conventional wisdom, Rule Three is appropriate in
low-transaction cost contexts where the victim is the least-cost avoider
of the interference. In FCC law, as in early industrial era nuisance law,
the appearance of Rule Three remedies has much less to do with an
analysis of cost avoidance than with a response to increased pressure on
the resource. Courts in the mid-nineteenth century were struggling to
preserve the notion that property rights deserved absolute protection,
while at the same time trying to permit interfering uses of land. Rule
Three allowed courts to protect property rights absolutely by assigning
the right to the defendant instead of to the plaintiff. As a result,
plaintiffs were denied any relief during the onset of industrialization
until courts began to resort to damages remedies, which split the
entitlement.243
In the case of spectrum disputes, we see a similar, although not as
pronounced and perhaps still nascent, response to pressure on the
resource. The Rule Three remedy appears whenever the FCC finds that
even substantial interference will not cause “harmful interference” to the
incumbent. Such a finding allows the FCC to license new interfering
services without expressly abandoning its first-in-time principle or
engaging in the difficult damages assessments that liability rules require.
Intensifying demand for the resource has not yet subverted the primacy
242. The FCC has recognized before how difficult such multiparty negotiations are.
See, e.g., Amendment to the Commission’s Rules Regarding a Plan for Sharing the Costs
of Microwave Relocation, 12 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2710 (1997).
243. See supra notes 199–02.
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of Rule One in FCC decisionmaking, as it did for courts in the early
industrial era, but Rule Three remedies have begun to appear more
frequently in spectrum decisions.
In intraservice broadcast interference disputes, which comprise the
large majority of interference problems that have been brought before
the FCC, the FCC historically identified interference as harmful even
where a very small percentage of a service’s customers risked service
loss.244 In the past several years, however, the FCC has relaxed this
threshold in an attempt to allow more new services into the encumbered
spectrum. For example, in authorizing digital broadcast television
services in the same spectrum that analog television is broadcast, the
FCC allowed interference to reach up to ten percent of any station’s
population. All such interference is classified as de minimis and
nonactionable.245
In other wireless services too, the FCC has relaxed its interference
threshold to foster access by new entrants even when millions of
wireless users may be affected by the interference. For example, the
FCC recently authorized a terrestrial video service in the same spectrum
that satellite television operators use to deliver DirecTV and Dish
Network services.246 The FCC required the new entrants to minimize
the amount of new interference caused to the satellite television
services.247 Even though the new entrant was predicted to increase the
DBS outage rate by ten percent, the agency defined away this
interference as falling below a threshold of concern.248 It concluded that
244. For example, for the entire history of television broadcasting, the FCC has
upheld strict mileage separation limits between stations to minimize interference. It has
been willing in some cases to waive those mileage separations when, for example, a
would-be broadcaster can bring new service to an unserved area or it is impossible to
build a station in a compliant location. Even in these cases, however, the broadcaster
seeking a waiver must show that it causes no new, or only very minimal, interference to
the existing broadcaster. New interference is presumptively not in the public interest.
See, e.g., Application of WSET, Inc. (WSET-TV), Lynchburg, Virginia for Construction
Permit, 80 F.C.C.2d 233, 245 (1980) (citing Hall v. FCC, 237 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1956))
(concluding that “any loss of service to an area is prima facie against the public interest,
absent a substantial showing of offsetting factors”).
245. 47 C.F.R. § 73.623(c)(2) (2002).
246. Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Operation
of NGSO FSS Systems Co-Frequency with GSO and Terrestrial Systems in the Ku-Band
Frequency Range, 17 F.C.C.R. 9614 (2002).
247. Id. at 9628.
248. The FCC order noted that even this increase in outages would probably not be
perceptible to a majority of customers, because “DBS is, on the whole, extremely
reliable with typical service availabilities on the order of 99.8 to 99.9 percent.” Id. at
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the “relatively small theoretical changes” experienced by DBS
customers would not rise to the level of “harmful interference,” and in
any case, such harm was outweighed by the public’s interest in gaining a
new competitor in the video and data distribution market.249
The FCC has made the same “no harmful interference” determination
in the wireline context where spectrum disputes arise.250 One recent
controversy posed the question of whether, where two operators share
telephone lines, the victim of interference from an incompatible
technology should have an entitlement to enjoin the interfering
operation.251 While the FCC adopted a Rule One position that the
“carrier deploying the [interfering] technology shall discontinue
deployment of that technology” if interference developed, it also carved
out a Rule Three exception to the victim’s property right in cases where
the “interfered-with service itself is a known disturber.” In such cases,
the interferer would have the entitlement to continue operation. The
FCC reasoned that “[t]his exception prevents the undue protection of
noisier technologies that are at or near the end of their useful life cycle,
at the same time preventing the undue preclusion of new, more efficient
and spectrally compatible technologies.”252 In other words, where the
factory is creating a nuisance for the farm, which the farm might
reasonably avoid by modernizing, the farm will not have recourse
against the factory.
In the examples just discussed, the FCC’s decision to use Rule Three
was necessary according to the conventional wisdom on transaction
costs only in the wireline interference case, where there was a
determination that the victim service was the least-cost avoider of the
interference. In the broadcast and satellite examples, Rule One might
have been just as appropriate because it was unclear which party could
9640. For a critique of the FCC’s decision in this proceeding because it lacked a
reasoned standard for permissible interference, see R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me
Now? Getting Better Reception from the FCC’s Spectrum Policy, 2003 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 5, at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR_5, ¶¶ 33–41.
249. Amendment of Parts 2 and 25 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Operation
of NGSO FSS Systems Co-Frequency with GSO and Terrestrial Systems in the Ku-Band
Frequency Range, 17 F.C.C.R. 9614, 9628 (2002). In another recent case, the FCC
rejected what the cellular industry had long considered to be the interference threshold
for acceptable call quality. AirCell, Inc., Petition, Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, for a
Waiver of the Airborne Cellular Rule, or, in the Alternative, for a Declaratory Ruling, 18
F.C.C.R. 1926, 1935 (2003) (defining the increase in interference as “objectionable” but
not “harmful”).
250. Wireline services transmit electrical signals over the radio frequencies
contained within the wires of the phone system.
251. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,912, 20,990 (1999).
252. Id. at 21,035.
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most efficiently minimize the harm. The FCC’s choice of Rule Three
reflected a desire, animated by a public interest rationale, to privilege
new entrants.
c. Liability Rule Two
The use of liability rules in the resolution of spectrum conflicts would
allow the FCC to split the difference between the legitimate claims of
two or more interfering operators. Particularly where there are multiple
parties affected by interference, liability rules provide an efficient
alternative to property rules. For this reason, Rule Two, which permits a
nuisance to continue so long as the victim is compensated in the amount
of judicially assessed damages, is the rule most frequently employed by
courts in resolving nuisance disputes in which there are many victims.253
Despite its utility in the real world, Rule Two has not played a major
role in FCC dispute resolution. Indeed, as far as I can tell, the FCC has
never applied Rule Two in its classic form, even though it often deals
with multiple-victim interference disputes for which Rule Two might be
appropriate. That is to say, the FCC has never permitted an existing or
prospective licensee to cause harmful interference to others at the price
of FCC assessed damages. What we do see, however, is the application
of a quasi-Rule Two remedy involving compensation, the amount of
which is negotiated by the parties. In other words, this quasi-Rule Two
remedy serves the function of splitting the entitlement, but does not
effect the shift in costs of multiparty negotiations from the parties to the
decisionmaker that Rule Two ordinarily achieves.
The handling of “blanketing interference” is a prime example of the
FCC’s quasi-Rule Two remedy. Radio transmitters, particularly highpowered ones like radio and television antennae, can blanket their
immediate vicinities with enough energy to interfere with the functioning of
nearby receiving devices like television sets, phones, and other
electronic equipment. It turns out that it is easier for the victims of this
blanketing interference to mitigate the harm than it is for the stations that
cause it. Taking the costs of mitigation into account in accordance with
the conventional wisdom, the FCC has allowed new FM broadcast
stations that would have been enjoined from causing interference under
Rule One, to interfere with neighboring receivers so long as the

253.

See Krier & Schwab, supra note 107, at 460–62.
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operators pay the costs of mitigation.254 The FCC has applied the same
mitigation rule where the “plaintiff” is another licensee complaining on
behalf of its customers who have been harmed by blanketing interference.255
Thus, the party causing the interference compensates the victim, but at
an amount that the parties themselves determine.
This difference between the conventional Rule Two and the FCC’s Rule
Two—that the decisionmaker does not set the damages award—sacrifices
the main benefit of liability rules. In a blanketing interference case,
there may be thousands of victims. This is precisely the type of
multiparty nuisance dispute for which liability rules are recommended.
One of the principal advantages of liability over property rules is that
they substitute the assessment costs of the decisionmaker for the
negotiation costs of multiple parties.256 Lacking this advantage, the
quasi-liability rule differs from a property rule only in its distributional
impact. That is, the interferer’s costs will be less than they would have
been under Rule One, but not so little as they would be under Rule
Three. The transaction costs associated with negotiations, which liability
rules should reduce, remain burdensome.
These negotiations over blanketing interference appear to result in
payments that fall far short of full compensation.257 As a consequence,
the interferer underinvests in interference prevention. The FCC has tried
to address this problem, not by increasing the penalty for interference,

254. 47 C.F.R. § 73.318 (2002).
255. Id. § 27.58 (blanketing interference rules for Wireless Communications
Service (WCS) interference to receiving devices necessary to receive MDS/ITFS
service). Here, the FCC did require the interferer to undertake some interference
abatement measures as well as to pay for mitigation at the receiver end. The FCC has
proposed the same kind of solution to deal with interference caused by new digital
satellite radio (DARS) terrestrial repeaters to WCS licensees. Request for Further
Comment on Selected Issues Regarding the Authorization of Satellite Digital Audio
Radio Service Terrestrial Repeater Networks, 16 F.C.C.R. 19,435, 19,440 (2001)
(proposing the establishment of liability zone within which DARS licensee must pay
“the reasonable costs of eliminating or mitigating” any blanketing interference to a WCS
licensee “that prevents the [licensee’s] provision of commercial service”).
256. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 107, at 460–62; see also Kaplow & Shavell,
Property Rules, supra note 210, at 755–56.
257. The FCC’s rules provide for interference compensation only for a limited
period of time after the interferer begins operation. 47 C.F.R. § 73.318(a)–(d). In 1996,
the FCC recognized that its blanketing interference rules for radio shifted some of the
costs of interference from the victim to the interferer, but that in many cases they did not
result in mitigation of the interference for the victim. This is because, in part, there are
“no criteria for speed of service for correcting blanketing interference,” and months can
pass before a complaint is acted upon, much less finally resolved. Amendment of Parts
73 of the Commission’s Rules to More Effectively Resolve Broadcast Blanketing
Interference, Including Interference to Consumer Electronics and Other Communications
Devices, 11 F.C.C.R. 4750, 4754 (1996). The FCC proposed to clarify and tighten these
rules to further protect victim devices. Id. However, it never completed the rulemaking.
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but by introducing property rule elements into its liability rule.258 In
some cases of blanketing interference, the FCC will grant the interferer
only a partial entitlement to continue the nuisance subject to
compensation. It does this by limiting the interferer’s permissible signal
levels, while also requiring the operator to mitigate any residual damage
resulting from the reduced entitlement.259 Whatever rough justice the
agency may have achieved as between interferers and victims by
splitting the entitlement to spectrum, it did not forestall extensive
negotiations or get the interferer to internalize the costs of the nuisance.
d. Liability Rule Four
Under the Calabresi-Melamed framework, Rule Four is the mirror
image of Rule Two. The protection of a defendant, or interferer, by a
liability rule follows what is essentially a model of eminent domain.260
Where a new use of property would interfere with the existing use, the
existing user is privileged unless the new user pays the court-determined
costs of relocating the incumbent user. In essence, the new user
purchases the incumbent’s entitlement.261 In true eminent domain cases,
258. Scholars have observed that there are many intermediate rules that share
characteristics with two or more of the basic four property and liability rules. See, e.g.,
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25–28
(2002) (suggesting new rules that combine aspects of liability and property rules at
distinct phases of implementation); Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2150–53 (1997) (suggesting
additional rules).
259. Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Establish Part 27, the Wireless
Communications Service (“WCS”), 12 F.C.C.R. 3977, 3983–84 (1997). The FCC
concluded that “the public interest would be best served by setting limits on WCS
operating power” without unnecessarily limiting WCS service offerings. Instead of
adopting even more severe limits on the operating power, the FCC decided to “assign to
WCS licensees certain responsibilities to cure actual interference to existing and soon-tobe-installed MDS/ITFS downconverters.” Id. at 3983–84. In coming to this Solomonic
decision, the FCC rejected the notion that the victim downcoverters were too vulnerable
to the interference and therefore should not be protected. Rather, it concluded that
because it would not be economical to replace existing devices with more robust ones,
“equipment that was designed to operate in a pre-WCS environment should be afforded
some degree of protection from interference.” Id. at 3984. However, the FCC also
wanted to encourage the victim MDS/ITFS industry “to employ equipment in the future
which [would] not require undue power restrictions on users of nearby spectrum.” Id.
To this end, the FCC agreed to sunset the obligation of the interfering WCS service to
remedy interference to MDS/ITFS devices.
260. See Rose, supra note 209, at 2180 (noting that, viewed as a rule of eminent
domain, Rule Four is not as exotic and Calabresi and Melamed suggested).
261. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1121–22.
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the purchase price that the new entrant (the government) must pay is
adjudged to be the fair market value of the incumbent’s property.262 The
damages in the paradigmatic Rule Four case are a little different. There,
the new entrant pays what a court determines to be the costs of
relocating the interfering property owner—in other words, something
more like replacement than fair market value costs.263 There appears to
be only one real world nuisance case to have employed Rule Four—Spur
Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co., decided the same year that
Calabresi and Melamed “discovered” Rule Four.264
Interestingly, whereas the FCC has shied away from the pedestrian
Rule Two, it has experimented heavily with the exotic Rule Four, or
something like it. The agency has used something like Rule Four in a
handful of cases to facilitate services’ use of spectrum that is already
encumbered by existing, and incompatible, communications services.
Here, the use of the terms “victim” and “interferer” can be misleading.
As a technical matter, it may be that the signals of the new entrant will
interfere with the operations of the incumbent service. In that sense, the
question of whether the interferer should have to compensate the
incumbent victim presents much as a Rule Two case. But in other cases,
particularly where the new entrant is a highly sensitive satellite service,
the incumbent will be the interferer, as in Spur Industries, where the
incumbent was the polluting feed lot and the new entrant was the
sensitive residential development.265 For the sake of simplicity, I treat
these two cases alike because the remedies are the same—the incumbent
is relocated at the new entrant’s expense.
The first implementation of the FCC’s quasi-Rule Four remedy came
with the introduction of PCS cellular service in the mid-1990s. Here, for
262. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 192, § 9.5, at 539.
263. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1122 n.62.
264. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). In Spur
Industries, a large feedlot polluted a neighboring housing development with fumes and
odors. The development had “come to the nuisance,” acquiring land after Spur
Industries had been operating for some years. For this reason, the court did not want to
simply enjoin the operation of the feedlot. On the other hand, the court did not want to
leave the residents of the new and growing sunbelt development without a remedy. The
feedlot had to go, but the court required the development to pay the costs of relocating
the feedlot to another property. Id. at 707–08.
265. For example, it is well-known that satellite receivers must
be sensitive enough to receive low-level signals from 22,300 miles in outer
space. This characteristic, coupled with the ability to tune a receiver over the
wide range of frequencies employed by most satellite networks, renders earth
terminal receivers highly susceptible to interference from nearby, highpowered transmitters.
Comments of the Satellite Industry Association, In re Interference Immunity Performance
Specifications for Radio Receivers, ET Docket No. 03-65, at 6 (F.C.C. filed July 21,
2003).
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the first time, the agency authorized a new class of licensees to acquire
the rights to a fairly large swath of spectrum that was already
encumbered by thousands of licensees. These incumbents could not
coexist with the new entrants without suffering significant service losses.
Rather than employing Rule One and simply denying entry to the new
service provider, or employing Rule Three and granting an absolute
entitlement to the new entrant to interfere, the FCC adopted what is
known as its “emerging technologies” policy.266
Under this policy, the FCC entitled the existing licensees—the wouldbe victims—to protection from interference, but protected this right only
with a liability rule. Licensed operators in the new interfering service
would have to pay “relocation damages” to the incumbents.267 The
purpose of this policy was to ensure that the entry of new services did
not disrupt existing services provided by incumbents.268 In the case of
PCS, the relocation of incumbents involved payment from a handful of
PCS companies to approximately 30,000 incumbent microwave users to
fund the incumbents’ move to comparable facilities in a different
spectrum band.269
Specifically, the FCC set a two-year voluntary negotiation period for
PCS entrants to negotiate the terms of relocation, requiring PCS entrants
to pay for building and testing, and to assume all costs for fully
comparable facilities for the incumbents.270 It was the FCC’s hope that
266. Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Technologies, 7 F.C.C.R. 6886, 6890 (1993).
267. Id. at 6591.
268. See id. at 6594; see also Redesignation of the 17.7–19.7 GHz Frequency Band,
15 F.C.C.R. 13,430, 13,431–32 (2000) (applying the same principle); Amendment of
Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum at 2 GHz for Use by the
Mobile-Satellite Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,315, 12,352 (2000) (same).
269. See generally Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging Technologies
and Personal Communications Services: Regulatory Issues, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 3,
8–9 (1993). Some of the PCS band, as noted above, was allocated for unlicensed PCS
(1910–30 MHz). This presented a problem for the relocation of incumbent users because
unlicensed and therefore unidentified operators could not negotiate. The FCC established a
procedure whereby the manufacturers of unlicensed devices would pay to compensate
the 400 or so incumbent operators for relocating by paying a fee into a common pool for
each unlicensed PCS product. 47 C.F.R. § 15.307 (2002). The compensation mechanism
yielded so little money and the development of equipment for use in the unlicensed band
proceeded so slowly that today’s unlicensed PCS service is relatively weak. See FCC
SRRWG REPORT, supra note 69, at 13.
270. Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New
Telecommunications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589, 6595 (1993). A portion of the PCS
band was set aside for unlicensed use. The voluntary negotiation period for incumbents
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this voluntary period would “encourage good faith and fair voluntary
negotiations.”271 However, the FCC proceeded to undermine the
incumbents’ incentive to negotiate by setting a one-year mandatory
negotiation period to commence at the end of the voluntary period, after
which incumbents would be required to relocate, although still at the
expense of the PCS entrants.272 The FCC recognized the pitfalls of its
own procedures: that incumbents might well benefit by dragging out
negotiations “to the degree that aging equipment using older technology
[might] be replaced with new equipment using state-of-the-art
technology.”273
In the case of another new service authorized in 2000, mobile satellite
services, the FCC was faced again with a question of conflicting
spectrum uses. This time, the new entrants were the ones who would be
interfered with by the incumbent users.274 The incumbent service, like
the feedlot that fouled the air of the new housing development in Spur
Industries, would overwhelm the new satellite operators with highpower transmissions. The FCC entitled the would-be victim satellite
operators to freedom from interference, but required them to pay to
relocate the incumbent operators to comparable facilities.275
The FCC’s requirement that PCS and mobile satellite service entrants
compensate incumbent spectrum users was designed to make the
incumbents whole and to make the new entrants internalize the costs of
their operations. In this respect, the FCC’s quasi-Rule Four is similar to
in this portion of the band was one year. Id. at 6598.
271. Id. at 6595.
272. Id.
273. Id. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in the context of a similar relocation
scenario, downplayed the risk of bad faith negotiations, noting that incumbents have an
incentive “to negotiate as advantageous a deal as possible before facing forced
relocation” even though this forced relocation would be at the new entrants’ expense.
See Teledesic LLC v. FCC, 275 F.3d 75, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
274. Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum
at 2 GHz for Use by the Mobile-Satellite Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 12,315, 12,321–22 (2000).
The incumbents are television broadcasters who use this band for what are known as
“broadcast auxiliary services.” These are the transmissions of live action shots from
location back to the studio. Broadcast auxiliary services, unlike ordinary broadcast
services, are licensed to operate on a mobile and nationwide basis, such that a Los
Angeles broadcaster is permitted to use spectrum in New York and to transmit on a
mobile basis “rolling tape” anywhere in the country. See 47 C.F.R. § 74.6. Because of
the itinerant nature of the incumbent service and the need for a nationwide roll-out of the
new service, the PCS market-by-market approach to incumbent relocation could not be
applied in this band, and a much more complicated and administratively staged
relocation scheme was ordered.
275. In a similar context at about the same time, the FCC required satellite operators
in another band to relocate the terrestrial fixed services (which serve utilities and
railroads, as well as provide high speed Internet connections) to comparable
facilities so that such services would not interfere with the entering satellite services.
Redesignation of the 17.7–19.7 GHz Frequency Band, 15 F.C.C.R. 13,430, 13,433 (2000).
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the classic Rule Four, as well as to Rule Two. The conventional wisdom
tells us that Rule Four, like Rule Two, should be applied when
transaction costs are high, and a judge-determined relocation price is
more efficient than a postjudgment negotiated relocation price.276
However, unlike courts applying the classic rules, the FCC did not
assess damages by establishing the price of relocation. Rather, along the
lines of its quasi-Rule Two, the agency simply required the parties to
negotiate a price under the threat of regulatory intervention if they could
not agree. The costs of such negotiations will be significant, particularly
because the FCC declined to define the “comparable facilities” to which
incumbents were entitled, leaving it to the parties to settle on the
replacement costs case by case.277 Unsurprisingly, this process yielded
complaints that the victims were trying to gouge the interferers and hold
them up for state of the art facilities.278
To summarize, FCC resolution of interference disputes has relied
heavily on property rules, historically Rule One, but increasingly Rule
Three. The FCC generally has employed these property rules in
accordance with prevailing transaction cost theory when bargaining
costs are low, particularly in intraservice interference conflicts, but also
where they are high, in multiparty interservice interference cases. In
selecting between Rules One and Three, the FCC has been as influenced
by public interest factors unrelated to economic efficiency as it has by
whether the victim or interferer is the least-cost avoider of the
interference. That is, its selection of property rules appears to be based
on a desire to privilege either incumbents or new entrants depending on
its public interest calculation. The same can be said of its choice of
liability rules. The FCC’s use of liability rules (Rules Two and Four) is
276. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1110.
277. See, e.g., Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of
New Telecommunications Technologies, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589, 6603–04 (1993).
278. See, e.g., Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Remarks at a VIP Luncheon of Phillips
Business Information Inc. (Aug. 25, 1995), available at 1995 F.C.C. LEXIS 5732
(noting PCS entrants’ complaints of “greenmail” by microwave incumbents);
Commissioner Susan Ness, Remarks Before the Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association Special Commissioner’s Forum Wireless ‘96 Convention (Mar. 25, 1996),
available at 1996 F.C.C. LEXIS 1466 (promising to address complaints about
“extortionate demands out of all proportion to the true costs of relocation”). In the MSS
context as well, the FCC’s rules were challenged as being too generous to the
incumbents. The central argument advanced was that the measure of damages should be
the depreciated value of the incumbents’ equipment rather than the replacement value.
See Teledesic LLC v. FCC, 275 F.3d 75, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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rare. When the agency does employ liability rules, it leaves it to the
parties to negotiate the damages that, in the real world, a court would
assess.
3. Measuring and Balancing Nuisance Costs in the Public Interest
We have arrived at this point by asking what might be learned about
common law approaches to spectral conflicts from the administrative
experience. Consideration of which judgments will be required of a
court to resolve conflicts between spectrum property owners gives us a
much more accurate view of the benefits and costs of a property rights
system in spectrum. Examination of FCC nuisance law has shown us
that the agency has failed to arrive at an accurate (or sometimes any)
measurement of the costs relevant to the assignment of interference
entitlements. Courts resolving disputes among spectrum owners, then,
will have to tackle what the FCC has not: placing a value on spectral
nuisances and nuisance prevention. By the same token, courts balancing
the varied interests in spectral nuisance cases will likely do what the
FCC itself has done: consider public interest goals apart from economic
efficiency in the allocation of entitlements.
The costs of making these judicial assessments may be high for a
number of reasons. Even for simple interference cases where the class
of potential interferers is quite limited, determining causation may be
difficult. It is not always obvious, for example, that service disruption
apparently caused by signal interference is not instead caused by
atmospheric fluctuation.279 Even if causation is clear, there will be
significant uncertainty about the effectiveness and expense of
technological advances that either the plaintiff or the defendant might
undertake to prevent the nuisance. As we have seen, the FCC,
notwithstanding the availability of a technical staff to analyze the
feasibility of interference prevention measures and an economic staff to
assess their costs, has refrained from making liability judgments in
reliance on this expertise. There is a similar hesitancy to tally up the
cost of potential harm to the victim service by assessing factors such as
lost revenue due to customer defections and equipment replacements,
after netting out the likely customer churn and equipment upgrades that
would occur anyway. Yet nuisance law, under the rubric of a balancing
of the utilities, if not obeisance to the Cathedral cannon, would require
the courts to consider these facts, dependent as they are on the dynamics
of equipment markets, communications markets, and the currents of
technological advance.
279.
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An example helps to illustrate the difficulty of applying liability rules
to spectral nuisances and to further illuminate why the FCC has not used
true liability rules. Suppose, for example, that a court is asked to resolve
a dispute between an interfering cellular service and some or all of
several hundred victim radio stations operating across the country on
frequencies adjacent to those used by the cellular operator. The court
would need to assess the nuisance costs to the radio stations and relevant
third parties, the nuisance benefits to the cellular operator and relevant
third parties, the prevention costs for the cellular operator and the radio
stations, and the transaction costs of resolving the interference dispute.280
The costs of acquiring this information will be high. Information about
the cost of interference to the radio stations and the benefit of the
nuisance to the cellular operator will be relatively straightforward.
Much harder to obtain will be information about the cost of lost or
increased service to the public. What information the parties generate
will be speculative. Moreover, it is very difficult to compare the utilities
of a subscription telephone service with an advertiser-supported radio
service, particularly when the competitive landscape in each service is
rapidly changing.281
The cost to consumers of interference or loss of service is difficult to
value for any service, dependent as it is on the availability of substitutes,
the costs of replacing equipment, and the network effects of a particular
service, which may increase the costs of service loss. In the case of a
subscription service operating in a competitive environment, the
operator will presumably internalize the costs to consumers. Service
loss is more difficult to value in the case of broadcasting or other
advertising-supported services where advertisers, not consumers, are the
customers. The value broadcasters place on viewer reception of their
signals can be ascertained from advertising rates, but the value of
marginal viewers to advertisers, and hence to broadcasters, may be less
than the value of the service to the viewers themselves.282 It is
280. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 10, at 1106–10 (discussing relevant
costs in nuisance actions); Ellickson, supra note 222, at 724–25 (same).
281. I have illustrated the uncertainty of spectrum valuation, particularly when the
competing uses are very different, in the context of digital television. See Goodman,
supra note 128, at 533, 535.
282. It has been noted many times that television ratings, which are closely related
to the value of television service in the marketplace, do not measure the value that
individual viewers place on television service or, even more so, on individual programs.
See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311,
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extremely difficult, for example, to determine how much value a
consumer places on receiving a radio signal, depending on the amount of
interference ten miles from the transmitter, twenty miles out, or only at
the fringe of the service area.
Information about the costs of interference prevention will be scarce
as well. What would it cost to make radios that were more immune to
interference? Given that radio is an open architecture service, what
transaction costs and, possibly, direct payments would be necessary to
induce manufacturers to produce such radios? All this is information
that the victim service, if anyone, would have, and they are figures the
victim will tend to exaggerate.283 How much would it cost cellular
providers to tweak their systems to prevent the interference? This is
information that only the interferer has and has every incentive to
exaggerate.
Armed with the information it can amass on the costs of nuisance and
nuisance prevention, the court must then make a judgment as to whether
to privilege the victim, and assign the entitlement to freedom from the
interference to it, or to privilege the interferer and assign the entitlement
to be free of the interference to it. The court must, in other words,
balance the value of net service lost with the value of net service gained.
Even if courts were to trim nuisance law’s multifactored analysis to the
single factor of economic efficiency, this will be a difficult and
unpredictable endeavor. More likely, courts would apply spectral
nuisance law using an inexact mix of efficiency and fairness factors just
as they do in real nuisance actions. The result will be a balancing much
like the public interest balancing the FCC makes in resolving spectrum
disputes. Courts will find themselves, as the FCC has, assessing the
relationship between spectrum entitlements on the one hand and various
public interests (including economic efficiency) on the other.
The FCC’s struggle to balance the utilities and make use of
appropriate remedies in resolving spectrum conflicts foreshadows the
difficulties courts will face and the consequences of their allocational
choices. But the FCC’s record casts light as well as shadow on common
319–22 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV.
499, 514–16 (2000); see also De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1543.
283. In evaluating the potential for interference to incumbent FM broadcasters by
the introduction of a low-power radio service in the same spectrum, for example, the
FCC concluded that equipment manufacturers and incumbent broadcasters were
exaggerating the risks of interference in their technical studies and were proposing
protection criteria for existing radios that were more generous than the public seemed to
demand. Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2236–46 (2000).
For a critique of the incumbents’ claims in the low-power radio debate, see Stuart Minor
Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First Amendment Violation, 52
DUKE L.J. 1, 11–13 (2002).
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law dispute resolution in the telecosm. The very steps that the agency
might take to improve its own decisionmaking are steps that might also
assist a court in a hybrid administrative-judicial approach to spectrum
law. It is to these steps that I will turn in Part VI, after first addressing
the common property alternative to private property rights in spectrum.
V. THE COMMONS ALTERNATIVE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
While the complexity of creating a nuisance law for spectrum that is
predictable, efficient, and amenable to judicial decisionmaking is a topic
largely ignored by private property theorists, the basic point that private
property systems are costly to implement and maintain has not been lost
on critics of FCC regulation. In recent years, a small but increasingly
vocal cadre of engineers and legal academics has advocated another kind
of radical regime change from the administrative system of spectrum
management. It is a change built on a conception of spectrum as air, not
land. Like the right to use air, the right to use spectrum would not be
purchased or traded, but would be free for the taking, subject to some
important constraints. The FCC itself has shown interest in this type of
proposal in making more spectrum available as a sort of commons on an
unlicensed basis. Section A outlines the argument for this “commons”
model of spectrum use. Section B returns again to the problem of
spectrum conflict and shows how the commons model, like the property
rights model, fails to grapple with the costs and vagaries of conflict
resolution.
A. The Commons Model
1. Origins
If the idea that the right to use the radio spectrum should be a private
property right originated in pathbreaking economic work, the greatest
rival to that idea has emerged from pathbreaking engineering work.
New, low-power wireless systems that rely heavily on digital processing
and decentralized network architectures have challenged the view that
spectrum rights should be exclusive, perpetual, and auctioned to the
highest bidder. Increasingly inexpensive and fast processing capability
permits the production of radio receivers that operate across frequencies
in ways that cause little interference, at least for some applications. New
network architectures, along the lines of the Internet, allow one radio to

359

GOODMAN.DOC

9/18/2019 1:30 PM

exploit the capabilities of another in routing signals through distributed
radios to their destinations. The argument of the commons theorists is
that exclusive rights to use discrete spectrum bands are not necessary
and, in fact, could impose prohibitive costs on the deployment of these
technologies. Rather, what these technologies need, and what they make
workable, is fairly open access to a spectrum commons.
Unlicensed, or common, use of the spectrum has been a feature of the
administrative regime since 1938, when the FCC first allowed very lowpower devices to operate within the interference tolerances of licensed
services.284 For decades, there was low-level use of unlicensed devices
for garage door openers and heart monitors.285 However, by the 1980s,
it had become apparent that the spectrum available for unlicensed use
was inadequate for the new wireless applications then emerging. The
most promising of these technologies was spread spectrum. Spread
spectrum transmitters, originally designed by the military to withstand
interception, were first used commercially in cordless phones.286 The
transmitters spread their energy over a wide band of spectrum, thereby
increasing resistance to interference and allowing multiple transmitters
to share the same frequencies.
New spread spectrum technologies were not well supported by the
existing unlicensed rules because they required higher power levels.
Nor were exclusive-use licenses appropriate, because short-range spread
spectrum services required access to frequencies over expansive
territory, but only in a very small area at any given moment.
Responding to the particular requirements of this new technology, the
FCC allocated specific bands for unlicensed use in 1989.287 What did
284. See CARTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 6.
285. For most of the history of spectrum regulation, the operation of a radio device
without a license was limited to amateur radio and extremely localized transmissions. 47
C.F.R. § 15.103 (2002).
286. According to FCC rules, “A spread spectrum system is an information bearing
communications system in which: (1) Information is conveyed by modulation of a carrier
by some conventional means, (2) the bandwidth is deliberately widened by means of a
spreading function over that which would be needed to transmit the information alone.”
Id. § 2.1.
287. Revision of Part 15 of the Rules Regarding the Operation of Radio Frequency
Devices Without an Individual License, 4 F.C.C.R. 3493, 3502 (1989). The first bands
allocated for unlicensed use were the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands that
had been dedicated for use by equipment like microwave ovens, welding devices, and
ultrasonic cleaners rather than communications services. 47 C.F.R. § 15.247. In 1994,
the FCC allocated 30 MHz of spectrum in the PCS band for unlicensed PCS use, adding
Part 15, Subpart D of the FCC’s rules. Id. § 15.301–.323. In 1997, the FCC allocated
300 MHz of spectrum for the operation of unlicensed national information infrastructure
(U-NII) devices. Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Provide for Operation of
Unlicensed NII Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576, app. A
(1997) (adding Part 15, Subpart E of the FCC’s rules, 47 C.F.R. § 15.401 to 15.407).
Spread spectrum transmitters may now operate in the 902–28 MHz, 2400–83.5 MHz,
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not change was the requirement that these devices refrain from causing
any harmful interference to licensed services and bear any interference
that the unlicensed devices might receive.288 The FCC later gave
unlicensed transmitters greater ambit by permitting them to operate in
many different bands, provided that they maintained their low power
levels.289
The absence of licensing requirements turned out to be a great boon to
innovation, as demonstrated in recent years by the growth of unlicensed
devices operating according to industry standards like IEEE 802.11b
(popularly known as WiFi),290 Bluetooth,291 and Home RF. These
and 5725–5850 MHz bands. 47 C.F.R. § 15.247; see also Amendment of Part 15 of the
Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 17 F.C.C.R. 10,755, 10,756
(2002) (increasing the class of services that can operate in the unlicensed bands).
288. 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(c).
289. Id. §§ 15.207, 15.209. Unlicensed devices are not allowed in bands designated
for services that use very low received power levels, such as satellite downlinks or radio
astronomy, or in public safety bands. Id. § 15.205. With the exception of remote control
devices and medical telemetry transmitters, they are also prohibited from operating in
TV broadcast bands. Id. §§ 15.209, 15.231, 15.241, 15.242. The FCC is now
considering allowing unlicensed devices in the TV broadcast band on a noninterfering
basis. Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz
Band, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,632, 25,632 (2002).
290. The IEEE 802.11b standard applies to spread spectrum devices operating in the
2 GHz band. Specifically, it applies to direct sequence spread spectrum transmissions,
which is one of two kinds of spread spectrum technology. Frequency hopping, see infra
note 291, is the second kind. In direct sequence spread spectrum, the information is
divided into packets that fan out over a particular frequency channel according to a
spreading ratio. The receiver recombines the packets using the spreading ratio. Devices
operating according to the 802.11b standard can transmit at distances of up to about 150
feet with data rates of up to 11 Mbps. Newer protocols are the 802.11a, which operates
at 5 GHz, and 802.11g, which is an extension of 802.11b and provides higher data rates.
The advantage of the 5 GHz band is that it is relatively interference-free. However, the 5
GHz band is used by licensed services in Japan and Europe, making international
interoperability more difficult. In addition, because the frequency is higher, the expected
range of systems using this band is smaller. For a description of these unlicensed
technologies, see CARTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 26–34.
291. Bluetooth, which provides wireless connectivity between devices, like printers and
computers, in close proximity to each other uses frequency hopping spread spectrum
technology. In this kind of system, a data stream modulates a radio frequency carrier that
hops on either side of the central frequency in concert with a receiver. In a sense, the data
signal and the receiving device together surf frequencies so that the signal is never on any
given frequency for very long. Frequency hopping typically uses less power, but is less
reliable, than direct sequence spread spectrum transmissions. See Amendment of Part 15 of
the Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 17 F.C.C.R. 10,755, 10,756
(2002). Both direct sequence spread spectrum (WiFi) and frequency-hopping (Bluetooth)
technologies reduce the power level of the transmitted signal at any given frequency, thereby
reducing the likelihood of interference with other signals occupying the same frequency.
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devices typically operate alongside cordless phones and microwave
ovens in the same bands. By the end of 2002, about ten million
computers used wireless networking technology operating on unlicensed
spectrum—an industry that is expected to have a value of $5.2 billion by
2005.292
The logical evolution of the FCC’s receptivity to unlicensed radio
operations was the recent authorization of ultra-wideband transmissions
over almost the entire spectrum.293 Ultra-wideband devices, which may
be used for vehicle collision avoidance radar and peer-to-peer
communications, pulse signals at extremely low power levels over
extremely wide swaths of spectrum.294 Because the power is so low,
ultrawideband emissions are designed to appear as background noise to
undesignated receivers.
These new technologies, commons theorists claim, have changed the
whole spectrum management inquiry. According to Yochai Benkler, for
example, “the important question is no longer how to allocate spectrum
among a small number of sophisticated service providers, but rather how
to allow better coordination among a large number of end-users with
sophisticated equipment.”295 Another way of putting this is that the
focus of spectrum management must shift from the allocation of rights to
frequencies to the encouragement of system design choices that increase
communications through those frequencies.296 Prime communications
292. See Comments of Consumer Electronics Association, Public Notice of FCC
Spectrum Policy Task Force, ET Docket No. 02-135, at 2–4 (F.C.C. filed July 7, 2002).
293. Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband
Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435, 7436 (2002). This decision followed on the
FCC’s adoption of a generally pro-wideband policy. See Principles for Reallocation of
Spectrum to Encourage the Development of Telecommunications Technologies for the
New Millenium, 14 F.C.C.R. 19,868, 19,871 (1999) (supporting the development of
wideband technologies).
294. Revision of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband
Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. at 7439. “UWB radio systems typically employ
pulse modulation where extremely narrow (short) bursts of RF energy are modulated and
emitted to convey information. Because of the very short duration of these pulses, the
emission bandwidths from these systems are large and often exceed one gigahertz.” Id.;
see also supra note 240; infra note 308.
295. Benkler, supra note 34, at 314–15; see also Benkler, supra note 4, at 47.
The basic point to see is that “spectrum”—the bandwidth of the frequencies
used to communicate—is not an independent and finite resource whose amount
needed for a communication is fixed prior to the act of communicating, and to
which property rights can be affixed so that it is efficiently allocated among
communications. Bandwidth is one parameter in an equation that includes
radiation power, processing power of receivers and transmitters, bandwidth,
antenna design and network architecture.
Id.
296. These system design choices include data switching architecture, information
coding schemes, modulation schemes, and antenna placement, among others. See Reed,
supra note 72, at 2.
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spectrum, conceived as something akin to physical property, has been
valued at more than three trillion dollars, or more than all the gold,
silver, and gems ever extracted from the earth.297 If the commons
theorists are correct, spectrum reconceptualized as the capacity to transmit,
rather than as frequency parcels, would be worth next to nothing. This is
because the spectrum could be used with minimal rivalry and therefore
without scarcity.298 Under these conditions, a spectrum commons, rather
than exhaustively distributed property rights in spectrum, would be the
cheapest and most efficient mode of spectrum management.299
I should note that commons theorists have more on their minds than
just efficiency gains. Open access to spectrum, they say, could democratize
the use of a critical medium of communications.300 Paralleling the
297. J.H. Snider, Who Owns the Airwaves? Four Theories of Spectrum Property
Rights, 3 NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, SPECTRUM SERIES #3 (2002), available at
http://www.newamerica.net/Download_Docs/pdfs/Pub_File_808_1.pdf. Prime spectrum
is customarily defined as spectrum in bands below 3 GHz. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Snider’s number of $3 trillion is presumably derived, as most
spectrum valuations are, by extrapolating from past spectrum auctions. The problem
with this methodology is that it assumes that the large amount of unauctioned spectrum
will have the same scarcity value as the small amount of auctioned spectrum, and that
spectrum has the same value regardless of what it is used for or how encumbered it may
be by incumbent users.
298. See, e.g., WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM, supra note 4, at 2 (“If multiple users
were allowed to dynamically share frequency bands, and to employ cooperative
techniques to improve efficiency, spectrum could be as abundant as the air in the sky or
the water in the oceans.”); see also Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting
the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52
FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 576–78 (2000); Buck, supra note 4, ¶¶ 26–27; Lawrence Lessig,
Symposium: Keynote Address: Commons and Code, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 405, 415–16 (1999); Noam, supra note 149, at 778–80. But see Comments of
Station Resource Group, Public Notice of FCC Spectrum Policy Task Force, ET Docket
No. 02-135, at 4 (F.C.C. filed July 8, 2002) (arguing that the “more speedily the
Commission moves to making the spectrum a Commons . . . , the more rapidly we will
evolve from the current artificial scarcity construct to real scarcity”); Timothy J.
Brennan, The Spectrum as Commons: Tomorrow’s Vision, Not Today’s Prescription, 41
J.L. & ECON. 791, 791–92 (1998) (critiquing the notion of plentiful spectrum); Thomas
W. Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam’s Proposal for “Open Access” to Radio
Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805, 814–16 (1998) (noting that spectrum subject to open access
would become overly congested).
299. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 4, at 47–48 (refining the efficiency analysis with
reference to optimized wireless network communications capacity rather than optimized
spectrum use). Others have argued that a spectrum commons, or easements for unlicensed
use, will be more efficient when the operators have cleared limited rights to large swaths
of spectrum from exclusive rights holders. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 40.
300. In pursuing notions of personal autonomy and democracy in the context of
spectrum property rights, defenders of the commons subscribe to the larger critique of
the “enclosure” of the digital environment at the expense of the public domain. See, e.g.,
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objection to courts’ attribution of physical characteristics to, and
therefore propertization of, intangibles like electrical signals and server
capacity, commons theorists object to the attribution of physical
properties to and ensuing propertization of spectrum.301 The argument is
that a spectrum commons, like open source software, open Internet
protocols, and limited intellectual property protection, can serve to
enhance democracy.
Greater public access to the means of
communicating wirelessly, commons theorists assert, will result in “a
more diverse set of users, greater diversity of information flow and more
vibrant public dialogue.”302
2. The End of Scarcity
How is it that spectrum, now so precious, might become abundant
in a commons? How is it that innovation in communications
systems—presumably the kind of innovation that is inconsistent with
exclusive rights—can eliminate or substantially reduce spectrum
scarcity?303 The answer, the commons theorists contend, lies in three
spectrum management changes that would allow for more intensive use
JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 134–35 (1996); James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37–49 (2003); see also LESSIG, supra note 4, at 170–71; Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of
the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 394 (1999); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965–69 (1990).
301. For the mounting criticism of the “propertization” of cyberspace due to the use
of inapt real space analogies, see, for example, Hunter, supra note 185, at 500–08; Mark
A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 532–42 (2003).
302. DAVID BOLLIER & TIM WATTS, SAVING THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A NEW
PUBLIC INTEREST AGENDA IN DIGITAL MEDIA 62 (2002), available at http://www.
newamerica.net/download_docs/pdfs/pub_file_866_1.pdf; Benkler, Siren Songs, supra
note 11, at 62–84 (describing how the common ownership of communications infrastructure
enhances human autonomy).
303. One of the premises of commons communications theory is that unlicensed
users are likely to be more innovative and use spectrum more efficiently than are licensed
users. Wireless licensees dispute this assumption, noting their market incentives to make the
most of their spectrum by improving interference immunity. See Comments of Cellular
Telecommunications & Internet Association, Interference Immunity Performance
Specifications for Radio Receivers, Notice of Inquiry, ET Docket No. 03-65, at 2 (F.C.C.
filed July 21, 2003); see also Comments of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., Unlicensed
and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed Devices and Their
Regulatory Issues 5 (F.C.C. filed Aug. 21, 2003).
Because the acquisition of spectrum and network build-out are so capitalintensive . . . the CMRS industry continuously pursues initiatives to ‘squeeze’
more use out of its assigned spectrum. Innovations that result in more efficient
use of spectrum translate directly into greater system capabilities—extended
network coverage, improved service quality . . . and more opportunity for
bandwidth-intensive services.
Id.
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of spectrum.
First, low-power wireless systems could operate
harmlessly on spectrum now used to buffer licensed signals, just as
spread spectrum devices have in the past.304 Second, and more
controversially, even if new technologies operating in the buffer
channels did cause interference, the existing services could respond by
upgrading their “dumb” receivers so that they could more effectively
reject undesirable signals. Finally, if the government allocated entire
spectrum bands (and not just the buffer channels) for new system
architectures, some systems could actually increase the carrying capacity
of spectrum along with the number of participants in ad hoc
decentralized networks.305 If these technological advances resulted in
the forecasted spectrum efficiency gains, exclusive transmission rights
would not be necessary.306 In fact, according to commons theorists,
property rights to spectrum would impede the development of a
commons by forcing operators to clear the rights for large, overlapping
sets of cooperative activities.307 The following subsections flesh out
each of these claims before demonstrating that the commons alternative
shares with the private property proposal many of the same defects when
it comes to conflict resolution in the telecosm.
a. Wideband Transmissions
A conventional radio transmitter emits a signal in a constant electrical
impulse within a relatively narrow band of frequencies (for example, 30
KHz for voice or data traffic) or a relatively broad band of frequencies
(for example, 6 MHz for video traffic). Assuming that the signals have
been transmitted with enough power, they are easy to decode by simple
receivers. Wideband transmitters, the most common of which use
spread spectrum technology, work very differently. They transmit
304. These buffers are necessary in part because poorly performing receivers have
difficulty discerning desired signals from undesired signals when they confront both on
the same frequency. See FCC SRRWG REPORT, supra note 69, at 62. According to
David Reed, the buffer channels are so many and so large that “if you take a spectrogram
of the radio spectrum in any point in the United States, you’ll find that it’s 99.999
percent unused by anybody.” Id.
305. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 44; Reed, supra note 4.
306. See BOLLIER & WATTS, supra note 302, at 61. “It is no longer necessary to
divide the entire spectrum into exclusive, proprietary units of control. Sharing spectrum
as a license-free, open commons resource is now a feasible alternative management
approach.” Id.; see also WERBACH, OPEN SPECTRUM, supra note 4, at 9.
307. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 36.
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signals in periodic impulses rather than in a constant pulse, and they
spread those impulses over hundreds of megahertz to receivers that are
capable of reassembling the impulses into the original signal. In order to
avoid interfering with other services operating in those hundreds of
megahertz, wideband transmissions operate at very low power. In essence,
wideband systems trade power for bandwidth and computational
sophistication.308 That is, the wider the band, the less power is
necessary, but the more complex the receiver needs to be.
Wideband technologies do not coexist easily with either the command
and control regime or a private ownership model. Whether licensed by
the FCC or sold by spectrum owners, exclusive rights to use a 1 MHz
channel do not help an operator that needs little bits of 500 MHz. The
obligation to negotiate leases with the tens or hundreds of rights holders
in order to transmit their low-power signals would quickly subject
wideband operators to a “tragedy of the anticommons” as they encounter
holdouts and excessive transaction costs.309 It is possible for the market,
in the context of a private property system for spectrum, to produce
rights clearinghouses for noninterfering uses, as it has for copyright
clearances.310 Moreover, one could imagine spectrum proprietors
establishing a “commons” in the bands they own and capturing revenue
from user fees or equipment fees.311 Despite these possibilities,
commons theorists insist that a market approach simply cannot support
optimal deployment of wideband technologies.
b. Smart Radios
Most existing radios are dumb. They are specially designed hardware
operating on a narrow range of frequencies and have limited capabilities
to discriminate between desired signals and undesired noise.312 Digital
308. The development of ultra-wideband communications theory owes much to
Claude Shannon’s multiuser information theory, which posited that if communications
transmissions were spread out over sufficiently wide bands of spectrum, they could be
transmitted at lower powers and still received. See generally C.E. Shannon, A
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948), available at
http://cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf; see also Benkler,
supra note 4, at 41; FCC SRRWG REPORT, supra note 69, at 59 (Comments of David P.
Reed) (describing Shannon’s reconceptualization of the communications resource as the
transmission of bits rather than quantities of spectrum).
309. The phenomenon of splintered property rights that frustrate the efforts of
innovators who need to assemble rights from multiple owners has been described as the
tragedy of the anticommons. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 659 (1998).
310. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 31; see also Faulhaber & Farber, supra
note 147, at 15.
311. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 2036–38.
312. See generally Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, 16 F.C.C.R.
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processing permits radios to become much smarter. Instead of relying
on special purpose hardware, systems can use software processing to
decode signals across a wide range of frequencies and to interact more
intelligently with transmitters and the spectral environment at large.313
Commons theorists envision a world of smarter radios that are defined
by their software.
A class of software defined radios, known as “agile” radios, promises
to avoid spectrum congestion by detecting the usage of select
frequencies before transmitting. Like pedestrians on a crowded
sidewalk, the signals these radios emit will be able to weave and dodge
among other signals rather than simply traveling headlong into a lamp
post. The theoretical model suggests that as long as there is some
available frequency within the range of the agile radio, the radio can
operate on a broad range of frequencies. As a result, spectrum within a
commons could be dynamically and automatically allocated to devices
on an as-needed basis.314
Even more sophisticated than agile radios are “cognitive radios.” A
cognitive radio is capable of sensing the type of signal environment it
operates in. It can, for example, sense whether there is significant
congestion in the spectrum band or whether there is rain or heavy foliage
to deflect signals. In these cases, it might sacrifice data rates to spend
more bits on aggressive error correction. Such a radio and associated
system has the capability to learn and adapt automatically to user needs
and the current spectrum environment.315
17,373, 17,374 (2001); William Lehr et al., Software Radio: Implications for Wireless
Services, Industry Structure, and Public Policy 2–4 (2002), available at http://itc.mit.edu.
313. See Lehr et al., supra note 312, at 3–7.
314. See generally Reed, supra note 72 (“By cooperatively sensing and
manipulating their electromagnetic environment, a network of software defined radio
transceivers can adapt to their physical environment to match demand much closer to the
capacity achievable by joint action of a group of radios.”); see also Faulhaber & Farber,
supra note 147, at 12 (contemplating this kind of automatic allocation of capacity to
demand). The FCC has already taken a step to accommodate software defined radios by
permitting manufacturers to make changes to a radio’s operating parameters, including
frequency, radiated power, and modulation type, without any associated change of
hardware that would be certified under the FCC’s Part 15 rules. As a result, the radios
can be reconfigured by a software download to transmit and receive on any frequency in
any format. See Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, 16 F.C.C.R.
17,373, 17,374–75 (2001).
315. See Joseph Mitola III & Gerald Q. Maguire, Jr., Cognitive Radio: Making
Software Radios More Personal, IEEE PERS. COMM. MAG., Aug. 1999, at 13. The FCC
has recently adopted rules to facilitate the operation of cognitive radios and has opened a
proceeding on the possible implications of cognitive radios for spectrum management.
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c. Mesh Networks
More revolutionary than the advent of wideband technologies and
smart radios is the creation of decentralized communications network
architectures. The idea that increasing the number of users of a wireless
communications system could increase the capacity of that system is
counterintuitive but critical to the commons project. With conventional
high-powered technologies like broadcast television and cellular phone
systems, the more transmitters (broadcast antennas and cellular phones)
there are, the more stress there is on the spectrum, and the less capacity
there is for new communication. That is because the transmissions have
preclusive effects on rivalrous transmissions that would use the same
frequencies at the same time in the same place. New networked
architectures, by contrast, promise to increase the utility of the spectrum
by increasing the density of antennas. The way they do this is through
something known as “cooperation gain.”316
The promise of cooperative, rather than interfering, antennas emerged
in the 1990s out of the experience of cellular companies. These
operators were able to increase capacity by adding cell sites, thereby
shortening the distances signals had to travel before being relayed and
enabling the reuse of frequencies for more communications. The
resulting communications networks reduce the likelihood that any two
signals will use the same frequency at the same time at sufficient power
to result in interference.
At the same time, technologists looked to the developing Internet as a
model for wireless communications.317 The Internet’s architecture
Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum Use Employing
Cognitive Radio Technologies, Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, 18
F.C.C.R. 26,859 (2003) (exploring the impact of a cognitive radio’s ability to determine
the location and spectrum use of neighboring devices, change frequency, adjust output
power, and alter transmission parameters and characteristics on the use of spectrum in
the space, time, and frequency dimensions).
316. See Reed, supra note 72.
317. Comparisons of wireless communications and Internet architecture are not
without problems. First, the analogies being drawn are usually to the logical, not to the
physical or content layers of the Internet. While the logical layer, consisting of the
protocols for routing data packets through the networks that comprise the Internet, may
be a common resource, the actual physical infrastructure consisting of phone and cable
lines, as well as licensed wireless connections, fiber, routers, and servers, has always
been owned. In other words, the wireless standards that operate at the logical layer (that
is, software protocols for transmitting and receiving signals) may be open and comply
with the end-to-end principle, but the physical layer is proprietary. Second, the Internet
was built on common standards and a telephone platform that already enjoyed a single
architecture and a highly controlled transmission environment. By contrast, wireless
communications systems use a wide variety of “signal architectures and modulation
types for voice, video, data and interactive services.” FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note
68, at 4. The spectrum commons, in contrast to the Internet, will encompass a wide
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suggested that communications, like computing, did not need to be
controlled at the center of a network or from a mainframe computer.
Rather, the intelligence of a communications network could reside in the
consumer’s home or office at the edge of the network. The idea of the
end-to-end network is that the network itself should not be optimized for
any particular application, but should be open to innovation from the
edges.318 These insights led to experimentation with new wireless
architectures that rely on a dense network of cells composed of personal
communications devices.319 The use of wireless devices in the field to
repeat signals can, in theory, solve interference problems through the
very proliferation of radios that ordinarily exacerbates interference. That
the Internet end-to-end model can be implemented in the radio space is
the basic premise for the commons model.320
One type of end-to-end cooperative telecommunications network is
the mesh network. In most existing networks, communications are
either circulated through closed loops between transmitter and receiver
or collected at key transmission points before being distributed to
receivers. Your wireline phone call goes to a central switch, from which
it is dispatched to its destination. In a mesh network, each communications
node is connected to every other node. Communications are handed off
from transmitter to receiver to transmitter to receiver without any central
diversity of communications architectures that operate in an unpredictable and fragile
transmission environment. Finally, wireless communications may interfere with each
other in ways that Internet transmissions at the logical layer do not.
318. For a good description of the end-to-end principle, see LESSIG, supra note 4, at
36–37; see also Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925,
928 (2001); David P. Reed et al., Commentaries on “Active Networking and End-to-End
Arguments,” IEEE Network, May/June 1998, at 69–70.
319. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 40–47 (discussing the implications of multiuser
information theory).
320. See Benkler, supra note 297, at 564.
Users sometimes receive information and sometimes rework it and send it to
others. They can play the roles of producer and consumer. Their acts of
reception are dialogic in the sense that they can easily be mapped as moves in
a conversation rather than as endpoints for the delivery of a product.
Id.; see also David Reed, Why Spectrum Is Not Property—The Case for an Entirely New
Regime of Wireless Communications Policy (February 27, 2001) (comparing Internet
and wireless architectures focusing largely on technical developments), at http://www.reed.
com/dprframeweb/dprframe.asp?section=paper&fn=openspec.html. Again, these analogies
to the Internet neglect the difference between operation of the end-to-end principle at the
logical layer of the Internet and at both the physical and logical layers of wireless
systems, where commons theory requires such operation. See supra note 317.
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points of control. It is here that the analogy between spectrum and air
has particular credence: Users in a mesh network use spectrum, as
living things use air, without consuming it.
Peer-to-peer networks, akin to mesh networks, have been developed
successfully for the transmission of data over the Internet.321 Kazaa,
which allows users to pass requests for music from one to another
without any central server, is an example.322 When this kind of peer-topeer network is deployed in the wireless space, some engineers think
that the capacity of a cooperative wireless network may be virtually
unlimited because the greater the density of users, the more capacity for
relaying communications.323 David Reed, engineer and architect of the
end-to-end principle, uses the commons image of a sheep’s meadow to
describe the capabilities of mesh networks. The sheep’s meadow
becomes a tragedy of resource use as more sheep are added to the
meadow and over-graze. In a successfully operating mesh network, each
user is like a sheep that brings grass to the meadow, sustaining an
endless green that supports an infinite number of sheep.324
A change in network architecture from closed and highly structured
systems to open and protean systems could have a profound impact on
the organization of wireless communications markets. Commons
theorists predict that mesh networks, in combination with smart radios
and digital processing advances, will shift the value in communications
networks from the service provider to the equipment provider.325 The
321. For an analysis of the economics and characteristics of peer production, see
generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 374–77 (2002).
322. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.
Supp. 2d 1029, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding on summary judgment that KaZaA was
not liable for the copyright infringement of those using its software to exchange copied
digital media via a peer-to-peer transfer network); Stacey L. Dogan, Code Versus the
Common Law, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2004).
323. But see Motorola, Inc., A White Paper on Future Federal Communications
Commission Spectrum Policy, ET Docket No. 02-135 (F.C.C. filed Aug. 30, 2002).
Motorola assumes a system with 1000 users randomly placed in a 10 km square. Under
these conditions, a significant number of users must relay data for ten percent of the total
number of users, suggesting a serious congestion problem associated with the unlimited
growth of a cooperative relay network. Relying on recent technical work by Gupta and
Kumar, Motorola asserts that “the total system capacity grows faster than the number of
users but that the per user capacity decreases as the number of users increases.” Id. at 9.
324. See FCC SRRWG REPORT, supra note 69, at 93–94 (Comments of David P.
Reed). It was the development of telecommunications and the spread of roads in the last
century that conquered space and made physical density a choice rather than a necessity
for human commerce. Might new technological developments in this century, in
telecommunications of all things, revive the importance of physical density for
communication? In this connection, there is some irony in the mesh network evangelists’
illusions to highways, which mastered space in the last century, as models for distributed
communication. See infra note 336.
325. Benkler, supra note 4, at 74.
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value in mobile phone service today resides with the intelligence: in the
network service provider. Equipment is relatively cheap and minutes are
relatively expensive because the consumer is paying for the network
operator’s investment in scarce spectrum and system infrastructure. In a
world of mesh networks, which can reuse frequencies with great
efficiency, spectrum becomes cheap. In a world of networks that rely on
decentralized relays, the system architecture also becomes cheap.326
What becomes more expensive, as in the Internet’s network of
computers, is the end-user equipment, which must now be sophisticated
enough to do the work of a network operator.327
Unanswered questions abound for this utopian vision of cooperative
networks. The comparison of peer-to-peer wireless and Internet networks
must take into account an important difference. Internet applications
take advantage of telecommunications and computing infrastructure that
was built with significant governmental support and is supported now
through private investments. Thus, even if consumer investment could
sustain much of a wireless network, it probably cannot replace the
networks of microwave, satellite, cable, fiber, and copper that carry
communications from end-users to the Internet backbone and other
communications networks. It is unlikely that mesh networks could do
without this kind of heavy infrastructure and unclear how industrial
326. The “price” of the network design is in the performance that users give up as
more users join the network and traffic management becomes more complex. A major
constraint of mesh networks is that, in order to dynamically assign capacity within the
network based on user demand, the network must communicate with itself. This
communication itself uses more information, and as the size of the network increases, the
overhead communications about the communications become denser and more complex.
See Benkler, supra note 34, at 327; Reed, supra note 72, at 8; James B. Speta, A Vision
of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1553, 1572 (2002) (book
review).
[W]here each device controls itself, the best that can be done [to manage
spectrum] is to use protocols that permit the spectrum to be used
approximately sixty percent of the time. This is because there is no centralized
controller for the devices, which must each individually “listen” for free
spectrum.
Id. See generally Jon M. Peha, Wireless Communications and Coexistence for Smart
Environments, 7 IEEE PERS. COMM. MAG. 66 (2000); Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M.
Peha, Etiquette Modification for Unlicensed Spectrum: Approach and Impact, in 1 IEEE
VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE 272, 276 (1998) (writing that an appropriate
etiquette can avoid a tragedy of the commons, at the cost of reduced performance).
327. Benkler, supra note 4, at 49–62 (explaining why distributed networks will
invest more in end-user equipment and less in network infrastructure than will centrally
controlled networks).
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investments in this infrastructure would persist in the absence of enduser fees.328 For the purposes of this Article, the most pressing question
is how, and according to what values, interference and overuse would be
prevented as cooperative networks come to occupy more and more
spectrum.
B. Conflict Resolution in the Commons
In the absence of control by either the service provider or the
government, what will ensure that this abundance of chattering devices
relaying messages from one to the other do not overuse the spectrum and
do not interfere with each other? The amount of resources consumed by
a transmission depends on transmission duration, bandwidth, and power.
Unlicensed devices, if unconstrained, are likely to adopt a greedy
approach to the consumption of these spectrum resources.329
The solution to greed, commons theorists assert, is modeled by the
Internet. Rather than a system of ex post interference resolution like
nuisance law, commons theorists envision a system of ex ante control in
which access to commons spectrum is limited by the enforcement of
technical protocols that are established with some degree of government
oversight.330 Open and universal technical protocols, it is thought, could
govern the use of wireless equipment.331 Consensus spectrum etiquettes
and protocols that prevented greedy use of the spectrum and articulated a
common language to communicate across frequencies could substitute
for any kind of centralized control. According to one etiquette, for
example, a device might have to “listen” to make sure that the spectrum
is unoccupied before it begins transmitting and to limit transmissions to
prevent hogging. The FCC’s rules for unlicensed services rely on just
these kinds of protocols as a control strategy. These include, in different

328. Accord Speta, supra note 326, at 1573 (discussing the costs of setting aside
spectrum for unlicensed uses); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual
Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 573–75 (2003) (writing about the failings of
the commons theory and that the Internet’s success came about with the assistance of the
government).
329. See Satapathy and Peha, supra note 326, at 272; see also Benkler, supra note
34, at 360 (defining spectrum overuse as “using, for a given transmission more spectrum
than necessary to transmit the information it has to transmit, hence increasing its
potential to conflict with other users”).
330. See Benkler, supra note 34, at 362 (noting the need for industry adherence to
technical protocols to safeguard the quality of wireless communications in the
commons); Benkler, supra note 4, at 77–78 (discussing public regulation of the
commons through the instrument of technical protocols); see also Benjamin, supra note
4, at 2045–50 (discussing the need for protocols in abundant networks and comparing the
relative merits of public and private roles in protocol selection).
331. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 39.
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combinations in different unlicensed bands, power limitations,332
controls on technology,333 and spectrum-use etiquettes such as listenbefore-talk.334
The choice of ex ante controls in a future commons will involve
tradeoffs between different technologies and different values.335
Etiquette approaches cannot be agnostic about technical and service
choices, even if they do not restrict the technologies that devices may
use. Inherent in any agreement to abide by certain technical protocols is
a bias towards a set of technical architectures that can be supported. For
example, compare rail to road travel. Access to downtown Washington,
D.C. at rush hour via a highway from Dulles International Airport is a
scarce resource. Replacing that road with a dedicated high-speed rail
line might render access abundant, but only if users are required to
adhere to the limiting architecture of rail travel.336 This choice of
332. 47 C.F.R. § 15.209 (2002).
333. For example, devices in the ISM bands must use spread spectrum or similar
technology. Id. § 15.247. By using this technology, operators employ processing gain to
compensate for increased power. In the U-NII band, operators are not required to have
processing gain. Moreover, they are not limited in total power, so long as they comply
with power density requirements. Id. § 15.407(a).
334. Sections 15.321 and 15.323 specify listen-before-talk etiquette.
The
transmitter must listen to the spectral environment to ensure that there are no signals in
its path before it emits. This existing listen-before-talk etiquette has been criticized
because devices can still improve their performance by causing more interference for
their neighbors than is necessary. See Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Performance
of Unlicensed Devices with a Spectrum Etiquette, in 1 IEEE GLOBAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONFERENCE: CONFERENCE RECORD 414–18 (1997). These
protocols have been blamed for the lack of commercial success in the unlicensed PCS
service. See SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, FCC, REPORT OF THE UNLICENSED DEVICES
AND EXPERIMENTAL LICENSES WORKING GROUP 12 (2002) [hereinafter FCC UDEL
REPORT], available at http://www.fcc. gov/sptf/files/ UDWGFinalReport.pdf .
335. Stuart Benjamin has identified many of these tradeoffs. See Benjamin, supra
note 4, at 2045.
[Technical] limitations entail choices that may benefit some services at the
expense of others. To pick one obvious example, there may be power limits
(as there are in the FCC’s unlicensed bands and as there would be in abundant
networks). These limits may make some services impossible (e.g., traditional
broadcasting) and others difficult (e.g., point-to-point communications over
long distances), while having no effect on, and therefore optimizing on that
network, other forms of communication (e.g., multi-hop packetized transmissions,
as in an abundant network).
Id.
336. Commons theorists have been known to compare unlicensed spectrum to our
highway system in which, once one opts into the technical constraints of the system (for
example, a motorized vehicle and a speed limit), one can travel freely. See, e.g., Benkler,
supra note 34, at 388–89; Benkler, supra note 4, at 7. Indeed, the transformation of our
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architecture confers tremendous benefits on the rail operator and
suppliers, as well as on businesses near the rail stops. It has less
salutary effects on other interests. Thus, extinguishing scarcity of one
resource may create new scarcities, and invest new value, in other
resources.
In the spectrum context, technologists have noted that the services
enjoying the greatest success in the unlicensed bands today may not be
the most efficient or technically superior. The current rules controlling
entry to the unlicensed bands favor services that are less vulnerable to
uncontrollable interference. They disfavor real-time applications that
are more vulnerable to interference and mixed use of the same
spectrum.337 As a general matter, real-time applications cannot sustain
delays in the delivery of the signal and require a high quality of
service.338 Citizen Band (CB) radio—a real time “unlicensed” service—
ultimately failed in large part because it was inefficient and
undependable in crowded regions.339
The construction of spectrum etiquettes, by requiring choices among
communications architectures and uses, forces choices among possible
goals for spectrum management. One possible goal is to maximize
coexistence among as many different kinds of services as possible.
Another goal is to minimize the amount of interference that users cause
each other.340 Privileging coexistence over interference reduction or
transportation system from one built essentially around pedestrian, equestrian, and rail
traffic to one built around the automobile dramatically increased freedom of movement.
But the new freedom imposed negative externalities that were not taken into account in the
early part of the twentieth century as the highway system took shape. We can now look
back at that transformation and see how many values were neglected in the haste to roll out
the automobile. There has been a steep price in urban blight, time lost to traffic and
increased commuting distances, destroyed communities, and air pollution. In the case of
highway development, an understanding of the interplay between technological change and
social costs was not sufficiently well known and, once known, addressed. See generally
RICHARD MOE & CARTER WILKIE, CHANGING PLACES: REBUILDING COMMUNITY IN THE AGE
OF SPRAWL 58–71 (1997). Those sorts of issues must be confronted in the process of
reforming spectrum management.
337. See Satapathy & Peha, supra note 149, at 50.
338. Comments of Motorola, supra note 95, at 20; see also Spectrum Policy Task
Force Seeks Public Comment on Issues Related to Commission’s Spectrum Policies, 17
F.C.C.R. 10,560, 10,562 (2002) (noting that as congestion rises, some uses of unlicensed
spectrum are at a disadvantage).
339. Creation of an Additional Personal Radio Service, 72 F.C.C.2d 453, 455
(1979) (“The CB Radio Service meets a wide variety of personal and business needs, but
there have been complaints that the level of congestion (at least in major urban areas) has
reached the point where reliable communications are becoming increasingly difficult to
achieve.”). CB radio is, technically, not an unlicensed service, but a service that is
licensed by rule. That is, the FCC rule sets forth that eligible operators may operate
without further authorization from the agency. For the purposes of this Article, however,
that distinction is unimportant.
340. The FCC rejected the view of the public interest that the objective of
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vice versa will have a significant impact on what services are developed.
Moreover, fairness to earlier generations of unlicensed users may motivate
a shift over time from an emphasis on coexistence to an emphasis on
incumbent protection. Another goal might be to adopt protocols that
distinguish between low-value and high-value applications. Generally, a
commons that relies on etiquette will be optimized for low-value uses.341
Because Mike’s spam and John’s X-Ray are treated the same way by the
Internet routers and servers through which their communications pass, John’s
X-Ray may be slowed by Mike’s spam. Code may be adopted to tag and
prioritize communications, but not without significant dispute and expense.
The protocols that are ultimately selected, most likely after long
controversy, can be circumvented. For example, a greedy mesh network
user might configure his equipment to refuse to transmit the messages of
others or to use more bandwidth than necessary to speed his
transmissions.342 Some have proposed automatic penalties for such
discourteous behavior.343 The penalty would be in the form of a timeout from operation, the duration of which would increase with the amount
of spectrum resources consumed. Thus, a device that transmitted at high
power or duration might have a larger monitoring time and a smaller
power limit.344 The selection of penalties and relative severity among
different kinds of applications will, like the selection of spectrum
protocols, influence spectrum rights.
Of course, the software required to comply with protocols, or deliver
penalties, can also be changed from time to time. Indeed, one of the
chief advantages of software defined radios is that they are adaptable.345
unlicensed band regulation should be “to maximize co-existence among devices.”
Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices,
17 F.C.C.R. 10,755, 10,765 (2002). Instead, it adopted the view that the primary goal of
unlicensed band regulation was “interference avoidance.” Id. at 10,766.
341. See Satapathy & Peha, supra note 149, at 4.
342. See Benjamin, supra note 4, at 2022–24 (discussing how overuse of the commons
spectrum can degrade the functions of wireless systems).
343. See, e.g., Satapathy & Peha, supra note 327, at 273–76.
344. See id. at 272–76; see also Benkler, supra note 34, at 360–61.
By designing the spectrum sharing protocol so as to reward a device that uses
no more spectrum than necessary to transmit its message by giving it faster
repeated access to the spectrum for each of its transmission bursts, and
penalizing an inefficient device by delaying its access, spectrum utilization
protocols can bring into play the incentives of equipment manufacturers to
design their equipment so that it suffers the least delay.
Id.
345. The FCC has addressed this problem by requiring the original version of the
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The less intensive the certification requirement, the less control there is
over modifications of software that lead to the degradation of the
spectrum. One approach to reduce the risk of software modification for
the purpose of avoiding penalties or compliance with protocols is to
subject the most important and stable software, like operating system
software, to more stringent certification procedures.346 And yet, as the
antitrust litigation over Microsoft’s bundling of its browser with its
operating system proved, it can be difficult to base legal rules on
distinctions between operating systems and other software.347 One can
only imagine the debates that would arise over whether one or another
functionality in a communications device is or is not intrinsically related
to the operating system.
Given the importance of protocol selection and enforcement to the
ecology of a spectrum commons, and to the kinds of systems that will
populate it, disputes over protocols will be vigorous. As with disputes
between spectrum owners, disputes in the commons will implicate the
same kinds of fairness and efficiency issues we have seen in the FCC
context. Will incumbents be privileged? How much equipment churn
will consumers be expected to bear? What kinds of services will be
provided, at what cost, and through what gatekeepers? And as with
disputes between spectrum owners, dispute resolution in the commons
will be neither self-executing nor quick. We know this from seeing the
process of standard setting in the administrative context. For example, it
took three years and two rulemakings for the FCC to change its ex ante
controls for unlicensed operation to allow new, nonconforming
technologies into the unlicensed bands.348 Even when industry groups
software radio to be certified with the equipment on which it will run (making certification the
responsibility of the equipment vendor). The FCC will not certify modifications made by
third party software vendors. All modifications are the responsibility of the manufacturers
whose radio containing both hardware and software was originally certified. Independent
radio software providers must work through equipment manufacturers. Software changes that
affect radio frequency, power, and modulation are subject to a more streamlined
certification process. Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, 16 F.C.C.R.
17,373, 17,383 (2001).
346. See Lehr et al., supra note 312, at 19; see also In re Authorization and Use of
Software Defined Radios, Petition for Clarification or Partial Reconsideration of Vanu,
Inc., ET Docket No. 00-47, at 1–2 (F.C.C. filed Nov. 5, 2001).
347. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding that Microsoft abused its monopoly position in the operating system market by
tying its operating system to its Internet browser), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
remanded by 253 F.3d 34, 53–54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
348. In response to a request from the Home RF working group, the FCC conducted
a rulemaking that resulted in permission for entities to use wider bandwidths and fewer
hops for their frequency hopping technology. Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission’s
Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 15 F.C.C.R. 16,244, 16,245 (2000); Amendment
of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 14 F.C.C.R.
13,046, 13,047 (1999). Then, another entity, Wi-LAN, Inc., came along requesting
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are responsible for agreeing to protocols that the regulator merely
approves, standard setting has often proved to be staggeringly slow and
acrimonious.349
Once we consider the systems of authority that will be necessary to
create and enforce technology controls in the commons, we see that the
distinction between common and private property regimes is not as firm
as it once appeared. What is envisioned by the commons theorists is not
a true commons, like the upper atmosphere or aquatic life in the deep
seas, which are unclaimed and uncontrolled by any community.350
authorization of its digital transmission technology (W-OFDM) under the existing spread
spectrum equipment authorization rules. The FCC denied authorization because the
technology did not comply with the rules, but issued a second rulemaking to amend the
rules so that Wi-LAN could operate. Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules
Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 16 F.C.C.R. 10,036, 10,041 (2001). Finally, the
agency decided to amend its rules to allow a range of digital devices to operate in the
unlicensed band, using system architecture that had the same interference potential as the
previously approved technologies. Amendment of Part 15 of the Commission’s Rules
Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, 17 F.C.C.R. 10,755, 10,760 (2002).
349. The FCC’s selection of a standard for digital television is an example of
acrimony surrounding a technical standard. There, the FCC stepped in to broker a
compromise between broadcasters and the computer industry over the standard that
would govern the new digital television technology. At issue were critical tradeoffs
between the robustness and flexibility of the system for broadcast television versus other
computer-based, digital technologies. See Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact
Upon the Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fourth, 11 F.C.C.R. 17,771, 17,772–73
(1996). An example of a standard setting battle that has been both acrimonious and
extremely lengthy comes from the cable world. The cable and consumer electronics
industries were charged in 1996 with developing technical standards that would allow
consumers to use their digital television sets or retail set-top boxes for digital cable
services without having to use the cable operator’s set-top box. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2000);
47 C.F.R. § 76.1204(a)(1) (2003). Seven years and significant amounts of FCC intervention
later, the standards are still in the process of being completed. Implementation of
Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of
Navigation Devices, 18 F.C.C.R. 7924, 7926 (2003). See generally Richard E. Wiley,
CommLaw Conspectus Preface, 8 COMLCON 189, 190 (2002) (writing that “important
standards issues—like cable compatibility, receiver labeling, interactive services interconnection,
broadcast modulation and copy protection—have remained unsettled for an extended
period of time despite repeated industry promises and government indications that they
would be resolved”).
350. For the distinction between communal property and unowned property, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 749–50
(1998); see also Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 556–57 (2001) (citing JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 143
(1988)); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 (1993); Carol
M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of
Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 479, 480–81 (2000); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental
Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 n.4;
Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
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Rather, it is a commons to which access is limited by compliance with
technological specifications. It is a controlled property regime in which
the many have the right to exclude some, as opposed to a private
property regime in which the one has the right to exclude almost all.
Access to the commons is limited by the community, which exercises
the right to exclude outsiders from the spectrum or to reduce the utility
of the spectrum to users once they transmit in violation of the
community’s norms.351 The type of spectrum property regime the
commons theorists propose is thus a system of limited access in which a
finite number of people manage the resource together (those who use
compliant equipment and system architectures) and exclude outsiders.352
Both commonly controlled and privately controlled spectrum will
require definitions that distinguish one entity’s set of rights as against
others.353
LEGAL STUD. 131, 131–34 (2000). In a true commons, access is virtually unlimited and
no user may exclude any other. See Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the
Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 3, 5, 176 (1982)
(using the vocabulary of duties and privileges developed by Hohfeld to define a
commons property regime as one in which “there are never any exclusionary rights. All
is privilege. People are legally free to do as they wish, and are able to do, with whatever
objects . . . are in the [commons]”); see also Hohfeld, supra note 144, at 746 (writing that
property “consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and
immunities”).
351. Kevin Werbach, recognizing the heavy regulatory component embedded in the
notion of a spectrum commons, has developed the intriguing concept of a “supercommons,”
in which distributed network users would be free to operate largely as they like, subject
to tort-like liability for causing interference unless the accused devices were excused
under a safe harbor approach. See Werbach, Supercommons, supra note 4. As I hope
my exploration of spectral nuisances has shown, the assignment of tort liability and
remediation of torts in the telecosm is bound to be a heavily “regulatory” enterprise
requiring a definition of harmful interference and a system of values by which to assign
liability and contrive remedies. The creation of safe harbors for certain kinds of uses
might well make a tort system function more efficiently, but arriving at categories of
compliant devices is not very different from creating ex ante protocols and raises many
of the same questions.
352. This type of property has also been called a semicommons. See Smith, supra
note 350, at 131–38 (defining a semicommons as a regime in which common and private
property rights are both significant, such as the open-field system of medieval and early
modern northern Europe, in which peasants had private rights to the grain grown on
small plots of land and rights in common to graze animals under a common herdsman on
the collection of plots); see also OSTROM, supra note 46, at 23 (designating such
property a “common property resource”). Carol Rose has called this kind of limited
commons a private “property on the outside, commons on the inside.” Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998). Robert Merges has advocated that limited
commons property be increased in the intellectual property domain. See Robert P. Merges,
Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 145, 162–63 (1996) (arguing that joint rights to scientific research,
combined with group norms that safeguard property rights, further scientific inquiry).
353. See Hohfeld, supra note 144, at 746–47; see also Peter S. Menell & John P.
Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 599, 606 (2002) (explaining how all of
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The selection of access and conflict resolution rules will require
choices that implicate both equity and efficiency interests. Indeed, the
selection and enforcement of technology controls in the commons will
engage some of the very same questions the FCC now faces in spectrum
conflict resolution. As we have seen, these are also some of the very
same questions that nuisance courts would face in a system of private
spectrum property. The unresolved difficulties of mediating among
conflicting demands for spectrum in both private and common property
models of spectrum management suggest a need to think further about
the role of the regulator in the transition to a new regime. The next Part
reflects on this question and claims that regulatory participation in
private and common property regimes in spectrum will be important in
ensuring the efficient and fair allocation of rights in the telecosm to come.
VI. A MIXED REGULATORY, COMMONS, PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS APPROACH
We have seen that the ideas of building a telecosm on private property
rights in spectrum or on cooperative communications are both strongly
utopian. The market utopianism of the first, and the technological
utopianism of the second, put excessive distance between the imagined
new worlds and the administrative regime left behind. The necessity for
resolving disputes between spectrum owners or spectrum users will
require tradeoffs between the parties and among public interest values
that the FCC currently makes.
Because of the complexity of
interference, these tradeoffs will be difficult for common law courts,
even as they have proved difficult for the expert agency. In commons
theory, there has not yet emerged any conceptual framework to guide the
choices of technical standards bodies among competing spectrum uses.
Nor have the theorists tackled the question of public legitimacy for these
private bodies. Clearly much more work needs to be done on both
models of spectrum reform.
The complexity of spectrum conflicts and the dual nature of spectrum
as land and air suggests that administrative law will be a necessary
component of the dispute resolution process whatever the shape of the
telecosm. In section A, this final Part posits that, notwithstanding the
current oppositional posture of property rights and commons theories,
property law, including the law of land ownership and the law of information management,
can be explained as the governing of resources through different institutions).
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there is no conceptual or practical reason for a choice between the two.
Indeed, the most likely outcome of the current policy debate is a mingled
approach to spectrum control in the future. Section B lays out a fruitful
role for regulatory guidance and oversight in a telecosm of both common
and private property rights. The claims of the critics of spectrum
regulation have been so bold that important nuance about spectrum
conflicts and the potential role of regulatory judgment in a future
telecosm has been lost. Recognition that conflict in a private or common
property rights regime will present sometimes as private nuisance,
sometimes as air pollution, and sometimes as a public standards battle
forces reexamination of agency involvement in spectrum conflict.
A. Coexistence of Private Property and Commons Spectrum
Private property and commons theorists have positioned themselves at
the poles of the debate over spectrum management. The private property
theorists are market utopians, who see the path to consumer welfare
running through private spectrum parcels. The commons theorists are
technological utopians, who assert that consumer or citizen welfare will
be achieved through shared access to spectrum, with only consensual
technical protocols to prevent overuse.
The dichotomy between common and exclusive property has been
overdrawn in the current academic debate. Spectrum is both land and
air. At bottom, both private and common property theorists agree that,
to the extent that spectrum is an inherently scarce resource, exclusive
property rights are an efficient method of allocation. The crux of the
disagreement between the two schools concerns the empirical question
of whether technological innovation will effectively render spectrum so
abundant that the costs of a private property regime cannot be defended.
Thus, it is mainly a view of technology, not of economics or law, that
divides private and commons property theorists. Given the theoretical
commonality between the two schools, and the practical appeal of a
strategy that hedges the risk of creating too much or too little property,
combining the private and common property approaches in any new
spectrum management system will be irresistible.354 As the FCC heeds
the criticism of command and control regulation and takes tentative
354. According to its proponents, a private property regime in spectrum is flexible
enough to support common control of segments of the spectrum where technology makes
such control advantageous. The proprietor would simply open up a band to common use,
employing a metered or other easily administered pricing scheme. See, e.g., Benjamin, supra
note 4, at 2036–43, 2055–64; Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 496.
Commons theorists counter that the costs of this kind of privately owned “commons”
would undermine the benefits of a commons. See Benkler, supra note 34, at 362.
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steps to revamp its spectrum management role, it seems to be heeding
the advice of Richard Epstein on the property debate in general: “[N]o
matter how shrill the rhetoric on either side, any responsible search for a
sound system of property rights searches for the net social advantage by
minimizing the sum of the rival inconveniences.”355
The FCC is introducing reforms that increase the amount of spectrum
available for unlicensed use even as it moves to give licensees more
property-like rights in spectrum.356 Congress, having furthered the
private property rights project a decade ago by requiring spectrum
auctions, is now considering changes to the law that would promote a
limited commons.357 Upheavals in the legal regime governing spectrum
use, if there are any, will likely result in the triumph of both common
and private property over the command and control regime.358 Indeed,
buried in the scholarship on either side of the property debate is a
recognition that a dual mode of spectrum management is desirable.359
The almost certain coexistence of the two types of property regime in
the telecosm does not mean that the two will assume equal importance in
the near future. Exclusive rights to the spectrum will probably dwarf
355. Epstein, supra note 53, at 20.
356. See, e.g., Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of
Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003) (allowing
many wireless licensees to lease spectrum without FCC approval); Revision of Parts 2
and 15 of the Commission’s Rules to Permit Unlicensed National Information
Infrastructure (U-NII) Devices in the 5 GHz Band, 18 F.C.C.R. 24,484 (2003) (making
additional spectrum available for unlicensed devices).
357. See, e.g., Spectrum Commons and Digital Dividends Act of 2003, H.R. 1396,
108th Cong. §1 (2003) (Representative Markey) (creating a spectrum commons in some
bands); The Jumpstart Broadband Act, S. 159, 108th Cong. §1 (2003) (Senator Boxer)
(requiring the allocation of additional unlicensed bands).
358. See FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 37. The United Kingdom is undertaking to
implement fairly massive changes in its spectrum management process drawing on each
of the private property rights and commons visions. See U.K. RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS
AGENCY, supra note 140, at 6. This document draws on the work of Professor Martin
Cave. See CAVE, supra note 154, at 1–3; see also Ofcom, Spectrum Trading
Consultation (Nov. 2003) (proposing spectrum trading), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/ current/spectrum_trading. The FCC is watching
the British spectrum reform process closely. Conversation with Peter Tenhula, Director
of the FCC’s Spectrum Policy Task Force (Oct. 22, 2002).
359. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 242 (“We must . . . set off significant bands
at each spectrum level, to assure that innovation for different uses of spectrum would be
possible.”); Benkler, supra note 4, at 76–83 (advocating a trial period in which
significant amounts of spectrum are thrown into the market and significant amounts are
reserved for unlicensed use); Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 147, at 18 (advocating a
property rights system with pockets of spectrum devoted to unlicensed “parks” and with
easements for unlicensed use in some propertized bands).
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common ownership in the most intensively used parts of the spectrum.
The prevailing view in government is that exclusive rights are warranted
“in bands where scarcity is relatively high and transaction costs
associated with market-based negotiation of access rights are relatively
low.”360 The FCC believes that, applying these criteria, the highly
desirable bands below 5 GHz, which are most suitable for long-range
and mobile applications, will be appropriate for exclusive rights. It is
thought that the suitability of the lower frequencies for a variety of uses
will spur the creation of competing network designs.361 Where a
commons approach is used in these lower bands, it will probably be in
the form of low-power public easements in frequencies that are
otherwise “owned.”362 By contrast, the commons model will be
preferred in the upper bands, “where scarcity is low and transaction costs
associated with market mechanisms are high.”363
Underlying these tentative conclusions about the appropriate mix of
private and common property rights to spectrum is uncertainty about the
technologies on which the commons theorists’ arguments are based.
The FCC shares the skepticism of private property theorists that
technology will loosen the strictures of scarcity any time soon. It has not
been proved, at least not to the degree of certainty the government might
demand before reconstituting the rights of thousands of licensees, that
the smart radios which a commons requires will be marketable for many
years to come. For example, software defined radios are currently very
expensive and large.364 One manufacturer in a position to know about
the pace of commercially viable technological change has said that it
“may take a decade or more before [intelligent or cognitive] radios are
available with acceptable size, cost, and battery drain and they may
never be competitive for services where the equipment cost to the enduser is a significant issue.”365
360. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 38.
361. A system of exclusive rights with flexible usage rules will provide “a
mechanism for spectrum users to choose among the full range of technically feasible
spectrum use options based on market forces.” Id.
362. See, e.g., Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in
the 3 GHz Band, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,632, 25,632–33 (2002).
363. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 39. There is a certain circularity to these
generalizations. Scarcity and transaction costs are not inherent characteristics of
particular spectrum bands, but are highly dependent on the management decisions the
government makes and on the state of the art of technology. As the commons theorists
have argued, spectrum is particularly scarce in the lower frequencies because exclusive
licensing has artificially reduced access. For a similar point, see Christopher S. Yoo, The
Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO.
L.J. 245, 272–74 (2003) (arguing that regulatory decisions themselves have been
responsible for the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum).
364. See FCC SRRWG REPORT, supra note 69, at 7.
365. Comments of Motorola, supra note 95, at 20; see also Jon M. Peha, Spectrum
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Furthermore, the functionality of mesh networks and the extent to
which they can dissipate interference is largely unproven. Unlicensed
wireless networks have until very recently been “small, special purpose
appendages to the wired networks.”366 We have little experience with
densely deployed wireless data networks that operate on the commons
model. Moreover, as the commons theorists concede, a network built
according to the end-to-end principle is “not optimized for any particular
existing application.”367 As a result, such a network is less reliable for
urgent or time-sensitive transmissions and cannot guarantee throughput
at any given moment. For many applications, particularly those that
involve time-sensitive communications, an operator will be able to use
the spectrum more efficiently or, at least, to provide better quality of
service on private spectrum property.368
Given these persistent questions about the suitability of commons
spectrum for the full range of spectrum-based services, as well as
questions about the pace and direction of technological development, it
is both unlikely and undesirable for the commons model to become
primary in the reconstitution of spectrum control. At the same time, the
private property model has its own limitations, particularly in the
domain of implementation. As discussed in Part IV, the avoidance and
resolution of interference disputes could add considerably to the cost of
Management Policy Options, 1 IEEE COMM. SURVS. 2, 4 (1998) (“Eventually, inexpensive
receivers may emerge that can easily switch from one frequency band to another and one
transmission standard to another. . . . However, sufficiently inexpensive devices of this
kind are still well beyond our grasp, and any reform of today’s spectrum management
policies cannot depend on this technological progress.”), available at http://www.comsoc.
org/pubs/surveys .
366. Reed, supra note 72, at 8.
367. LESSIG, supra note 4, at 37.
368. James Speta, in criticizing Larry Lessig for failing to take into account the cost
of unlicensed spectrum, noted the following:
[E]ven the most technologically sophisticated protocols for ensuring
coordination in unlicensed spectrum cannot use the spectrum nearly as
efficiently as a private owner can. Where there is a single licensee either
operating its own service or acting as a bandwidth manager, that licensee can
mandate the use of equipment or protocols that fully utilize the spectrum.
Speta, supra note 326, at 1572. Yochai Benkler acknowledges that
these [unlicensed] networks will not supplant absolutely owned wired and
wireless networks in delivering real time communications with assured quality
of services. They will enable, however, a wide range of uses, from Internet
access to online games, overnight (or during dinner) delivery of video on
demand, and, potentially, local nonessential video conferencing among friends
or for town hall meetings.
Benkler, Siren Songs, supra note 11, at 62.
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a private property regime.369 The troubled precedent offered by nuisance
law and by the FCC’s own “nuisance” cases suggests that we are far
from a transparent and predictable method of articulating spectrum
rights in a private property regime.
The challenge for the commentator and policymaker today is the
articulation and perhaps the implementation of dispute resolution
procedures that reduce these imperfections, even in the administrative
regime. One place to begin is with the role of the regulator. In the
proposed revolution to private property rights in spectrum, the regulator
will be deposed; in the communal property revolution, the regulator will
survive with uncertain mandate. The final sections of this Article
propose a role for the regulator in the governance of spectrum access in
the future—a role that will ease the operation of both private and
common property models and take into account both the terrestrial and
aerial characteristics of spectrum. My objective is to begin to sketch out
how the regulator might mitigate some of the more troubling aspects of
regime change in the telecosm to come and implement some aspects of
regime change in the telecosm at hand.
B. The Regulatory Role in a Mixed Regime of
Spectrum Management
Assume a telecosm in which some spectrum bands, particularly the
prime bands below 3 GHz, are treated like land. Existing licenses, or
variants thereof, become something like fee simple deeds. There are
public easements for noninterfering wireless activity, and spectrum
parks are created as preserves for the wireless systems that the spectrum
market will not support. There might even be spectrum condominiums
in which some frequencies in some dimensions are individually owned,
while other parts of the band are held in common by a community of
users. Many higher frequency bands are available for common, or at
least widely-shared, use. In privately owned portions of the spectrum,
and where private and common property rights meet, many spectrum
conflicts will look like nuisances. Others will look like ambient air
pollution. In the commons, or more accurately, the limited access
commons, conflicts will appear as standards battles and controversy over
the design of consumer devices. In the context of all these disputes, a
clear regulatory voice will be important in increasing the transparency,
equity, and efficiency of the public interest determinations that will
inevitably be made in the allocation of spectrum usage rights.

369.
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1. Spectrum as Land: A New Nuisance Law
As spectrum use intensifies, interference disputes will proliferate in
privately held spectrum and at the borders between private and common
spectrum property. As described above, exclusive transmission rights
will probably be based on laboratory predictions that become less
reliable as the density of wireless transmitters increases and radio signals
interact in new ways.370 Put another way, increases in the density and
variety of spectrum use will increase modeling failures, which will in
turn increase the number of spectrum conflicts.
Nuisance-like conflicts may also occur where commons users and
owners interact. Today, the law does not recognize spectrum conflicts
between licensed and unlicensed users because the latter operate at their
own risk, such that any interference to a licensed service is strictly
prohibited and any interference to an unlicensed user is permitted.371
Even if commons users were never protected against interference, the
likelihood that they would be defendants in nuisance disputes increases
as unlicensed uses proliferate and unlicensed and licensed services share
the same bands.372 Suppose, for example, public easements are created
in frequencies that are subject to exclusive transmission rights, as
Faulhaber and Farber propose.373 Spectrum users would have a general
privilege to transmit in these frequencies so long as they caused no
interference to those holding “exclusive” transmission rights. Here, of
course, we have the same problems of defining what degree of
interference will be actionable as we do in a telecosm dedicated only to
exclusive property rights.374 These are essentially nuisance questions.
As unlicensed uses develop, they will not be satisfied to remain
370. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text; see also FCC IPWG REPORT,
supra note 68, at 11.
371. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
372. For example, in a dispute between satellite radio operators and unlicensed
device operators in a neighboring band, the radio operators have argued that while there
is no unlicensed device interference problem yet, over the next few years the cumulative
out-of-band emissions caused by a projected increase in unlicensed devices (like wireless
LANs) will affect their receivers. They claim that the noise could jeopardize their $3
billion technology and spectrum investment. See In re Revision of Part 15 and Part 18 of
the Rules Regarding the Out-of-Band Emissions of Radio Frequency Devices, Petition for
Rulemaking of Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc. 10 (F.C.C. filed Jan. 23, 2002).
373. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
374. There are, in addition, substantial challenges relating to the monitoring and
definition of interference and to the proof of causation and identification of proper
defendants.
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subject to episodic and growing interference from spectrum proprietors
or licensees, or from other unlicensed users.375 They will demand some
degree of interference protection. If such protection is incorporated into
the mixed regime of the future, then commons operators might become
plaintiffs as well as defendants in nuisance-like actions.376 Nuisancelike disputes might arise wholly within the commons as well.377 Even if
technical protocols are successful in controlling interference, one can
imagine a commons user jamming the signal of another or placing
obstructions (either electronic or physical) in the path of a competitor’s
signal.378 Such activity is the equivalent of a nuisance spite fence that
one neighbor erects to block the other neighbor’s view or light.379
Thus, nuisance-like interference actions will arise regardless of the
375. One of the central normative positions of spectrum commons theory is that
unlicensed devices, or commons users, ought not to have to bear all the costs of
interference prevention. The first step in shifting these costs from community to private
property owners is to reduce the degree of protection commons devices must provide to
licensed operators or owners. Commons theorists have proposed such reductions. See,
e.g., Benkler, supra note 4, at 63–64.
376. One possibility would be for common property users to sue private property
users under something akin to a public nuisance cause of action. Whom the private
property owners would sue, however, if many unlicensed users caused interference is a
difficult question because, as we have seen already, once unlicensed devices enter the
marketplace, it is difficult to hold them liable for interference. For example, in 2002 the
FCC found that some radar detectors were causing harmful interference to satellite
terminals. The FCC imposed more severe emission limits on newly marketed radar
detectors, but did not take steps to protect the terminals from interfering detectors that
were already in use. It held that “identifying [these] radar detectors is not practical . . .
because these devices are mobile and therefore interfere intermittently. Further . . . in
most cases it is not possible for the satellite operator to remedy the interference even if
the source could be identified” because the satellite operator does not control the radar
devices and cannot reasonably reconfigure satellite systems to resist the interference.
Review of Part 15 and Other Parts of the Commission’s Rules, 17 F.C.C.R. 14,063,
14,067 (2002); see also FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 58 (noting that “it may be
difficult legally or politically to shut down [the operations of unlicensed devices] even if
they begin to cause interference or otherwise limit the licensed user’s flexibility”).
377. Kevin Werbach contemplates such actions. His proposal that interference
disputes in the supercommons should be handled through tort actions would require
judges to define levels of unacceptable interference for commons users expressed in
liability standards. See Werbach, Supercommons, supra note 4.
378. Signal jamming is illegal under the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. §§ 501–
10 (2000); see also S. Robert Carter III, The Sound of Silence: Why and How the FCC
Should Permit Private Property Owners to Jam Cell Phones, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 343, 351–53 (2002). Physical obstructions to the transmissions of radio
signals, however, are permissible.
379. “Spite fences” are structures erected for the purpose of causing a nuisance to
another, rather than for any utilitarian reason. See Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated
Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775, 804 n.119 (1986)
(noting that the price for purchasing a “rule four” injunction when the nuisance is a spite
fence should be zero because, by definition, it has no market value). For a history of
spite fences in the context of obstructing sunlight, see Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182,
187–91 (Wis. 1982).
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balance between private and common spectrum property. Increased
pressures on the spectrum, combined with rapidly advancing technologies,
will require a nuisance law for the air just as extensive changes in the
use of land remade nuisance law on the ground. It is an interesting
historical question whether, had there never been an FCC, courts might
have developed workable liability standards for spectrum that were at
least as coherent as the nuisance law standards that emerged in the early
twentieth century. Whatever the likelihood of such successful common
law rulemaking in the early days of radio, the chances are much reduced
today after seventy years of administrative control of wireless uses, the
expansion of the usable spectrum, and the proliferation of wireless system
varieties. The baseline of rights that courts or other decisionmakers come to
adjudicate in the telecosm to come will have been established by the
regulator, based on the regulator’s technical predictions, and the
regulator’s definition of harmful interference.
Common law
decisionmaking will be tightly bound to administrative decisionmaking, in
many cases attempting the same kinds of balances based on the same
technical and economic calculations. The role of the regulator in the
construction of liability standards and remedies in the modified command
and control regime, as well as in a partial or complete property regime,
will thus be critical to the allocation of rights through the common law.
a. Structuring Liability Standards
In developing a modern nuisance law for spectrum, courts will have to
struggle, as the FCC has, to define harmful interference. They will also
have to, as the FCC has not, fashion a “reasonableness” standard for
interference, just as real nuisance courts have had to develop notions of
reasonableness with the increased density of resource use. There should
be no question in anyone’s mind about how difficult such determinations
will be, given the vastly different characteristics and applications of
clashing spectrum usages.380 What is unreasonable for a real time data
service may not be unreasonable for an intermittent data service, for
example. Moreover, what is unreasonable for an operator providing a
uniquely valuable service, such as medical device communications, may
380. It has, for example, been proposed that the FCC build a reasonableness
standard into its definition of harmful interference by adopting multiple definitions of the
term depending “on the nature of the victim service and the function it is intended to
serve.” See, e.g., Comments of Sprint, supra note 122, at 15.
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not be unreasonable for a redundant or easily duplicated service, such as
paging. In arriving at reasonableness determinations, judges will find
themselves grappling with highly technical questions of interference
prevention strategies and with highly political questions about consumer
reliance and the relative values of different communications services.
Productive spectrum management reform must accept the inevitability of
public interest determinations.
Given the irreducably political aspect of spectrum disputes, the
regulator can help courts to rationalize dispute resolution by helping to
structure liability standards and remedies in ways that increase
transparency and predictability. The uncertainty of any nuisance law,
particularly one that is developing from scratch in a quickly evolving
technological environment, creates costs for those trying to design
systems that can withstand interference. Engineers must choose between
overinvesting in interference rejection to ensure the functionality of
devices under peak interference conditions or risking intermittent device
failure. Uncertainty about interference entitlements will be particularly
acute where the parties involved operate incomparable services and
know little about each other’s technologies or capabilities. An
especially useful function for the regulator, even in a property rights
regime, would be to reduce this uncertainty about permissible spectrum
uses. A regulator might do this by defining (and redefining over time)
classes of per se nuisances.
At common law, an ordinary nuisance, or a nuisance per accidens, is
an activity or thing that becomes a nuisance because of where or how it
is situated.381 In other words, it is a right thing in the wrong place. By
contrast, a nuisance per se is an activity or thing that is a nuisance by its
nature and regardless of circumstances or location.382 The paradigmatic
per se nuisances are hazardous activities that threaten public health or
unlawful activities or structures.383 What makes a categorical nuisance
so useful is that it takes the “ad hocery” out of nuisance law, at least
once the offending activity has been categorized. It relieves courts of
the multifactored balancing that characterizes the typical nuisance case.
The point to consider now is how the creation of a categorical nuisance
in spectral interference, independent of situational balancing, might
381. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 15 (2002).
382. Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 687 (N.C. 1953) (holding that
“[a] nuisance per se or at law is an act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all
times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings”); 58 AM.
JUR. 2D Nuisances §§ 16, 17, 19, 20 (2002).
383. See, e.g., Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1121–22 (7th
Cir. 1975) (hazardous activities); Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 572
F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir. 1978) (illegal construction).
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improve dispute resolution in the telecosm.
The ability to identify per se nuisances in spectrum will depend
largely on technology. Technologists have suggested that it would be
possible to define a maximum “noise level” for every spectrum band.
Services operating within that band would then know not only what their
permitted signal outputs could be (based on their spectrum deeds), but
what signal level they could actually emit at any given time without
causing interference to operators in adjacent frequencies or within the
same frequencies in neighboring areas. They would also know how
much radiation they would be expected to filter out from other
operators.384 It would be as if a homeowner had information about how
loud her party could be, given the topography, construction of
neighboring homes, and other noise in the environment. With such
information, wireless device engineers could design systems with a fair
degree of certainty that their products would not experience interference
within this noise level and would not cause actionable levels of
interference. Sophisticated monitoring devices, along the lines of
pollution monitoring devices, would have to be developed. If they
functioned well, they could ensure that all operators had timely
information about the spectral environment and could automatically
reduce power when the noise level limit might be exceeded.
Thus, policy debates over noise floor levels currently beginning in the
administrative arena should take into account the way in which the
definition of spectrum entitlements for licensees might advance the

384. The FCC has proposed that it develop an “interference temperature” along these
lines for individual services. A transmitter would need to know the interference
temperature at locations within its signal range either by measuring the temperature directly
(for low-power devices with very small signal ranges) or by picking up the temperature
from a grid of monitoring stations that continuously scan the environment and broadcast
interference data. FCC REPORT, supra note 39, at 31; Establishment of an Interference
Temperature Metric to Quantify and Manage Interference and to Expand Available
Unlicensed Operation in Certain Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Frequency Bands, 18 F.C.C.R.
25,309 (2003). For a discussion of the interference temperature and its limitations, see
Margie, supra note 248, ¶¶ 65–81 (arguing that there must be a legal definition of
permissible interference in order to make the interference temperature useful). Transmitter
responses to a dense spectral environment “could include a reduction in transmitter power,
antenna beam re-shaping, selection of a different transmitting frequency or ‘stand down’
decision to wait” for the environment to change. See FCC IPWG REPORT, supra note 68, at
17, 18. The FCC also notes that there “is no generally accepted methodology for
measuring ambient noise levels and format for recording such information.” FCC UDEL
REPORT, supra note 334, at 13.
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project of defining the property rights for owners.385 An established
noise floor would have particular utility for common law decisionmakers
who do not themselves have expertise in radio frequency radiation and
seek expert determinations about reasonable levels of interference. Even
if property rights were defined by signal level outputs, rather than by
interference protection levels, the noise floor level could demarcate a
category of per se nuisances for which the decisionmaker would not
have to balance the utilities, but could go straight to a consideration of
appropriate remedies. Figure 5 redescribes the picture of complex
interference in the administrative regime set forth in Figure 4 in Part
II.B.2 above. In Figure 5, the signal entitlement is determined by
permissible signal emissions, which fall as the signal attenuates from the
point of transmission. Close to the transmitter, the noise floor is likely
to be far below the signal entitlement. But as the signal fades, the level
of undesired noise approaches the desired signal even though all
operators in the relevant bands might be operating lawfully. It is at this
point that nuisance claims will arise. If operators are capable of sensing
the noise floor and automatically powering down when their devices are
close to established limits, then noise floor caps could become a tool for
establishing categorical nuisances.

385. If the interference temperature is defined with reference to communications
services rather than frequencies, it will be less useful in a property rights regime in which
service definitions fall out of the deeded rights. However, even service-related
interference measures could be worked into a property rights system based on time,
frequency, and power because liability rules could be service-based even if property
rights were not. That is, a spectrum property owner might be permitted to operate any
service in accordance with the time, frequency, and power dimensions of her property,
but would know that, even within those parameters, she will be liable for breaching the
relevant service-defined noise floors of neighboring operators.
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Of course, an operator might well experience interference even where
the noise level cap has not been breached. Such interference might
result from special topographic or atmospheric conditions, substandard
receiving devices, faulty interference predictions, or the clash of
particularly incompatible waveforms, among other reasons. The per se
standard would not bar claims for other nuisances, just as per se
nuisances do not bar claims for nuisances per accidens in the real world.
But a robust system of per se nuisances in the spectrum domain might at
least economize on judicial and private resources in cases that fall within
the per se category and provide a point of reference for actionable
interference in all nuisance cases. Because the noise level rises over
time, the regulator would continue to have responsibility for adjusting
the noise floor cap periodically.
Setting maximum noise levels early, before there is any propertization
of the spectrum, would ensure that the spectrum property right would be
fairly well-defined at the outset. The noise level cap would both qualify
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and protect the metes and bounds of the right, otherwise defined along
the three dimensions of spectrum use and by service constraints that
continued to apply to particular frequencies. Such elaboration would
accomplish two valuable objectives. First, it would allow courts to
resolve nuisance claims in many cases without having to determine what
is a reasonable amount of interference for satellite or broadcast or data
networks to bear. Second, it would reduce the total number of nuisance
claims. By providing headroom for new technologies to operate in ways
that were not originally predicted when the band was first licensed (or
deeded), the incidence of interfering uses would be reduced. Devices
would have to be manufactured or made upgradeable to operate
interference-free even where the potential for interference had increased
because neighboring devices were exploiting the full range of
permissible noise levels.386
b. Menu of Liability and Property Rules
In addition to assisting in the common law development of liability
standards, the regulator might play a useful role in developing and even
implementing prior to the privatization of spectrum a menu of rule
choices for remedying spectral nuisances.387 What follows are some
preliminary observations about what such a menu might look like based
on what we know about interference disputes and what has been
theorized about nuisance liability.
Property rules, which are easier and cheaper to implement than
liability rules, should be the presumptive favorite in the future telecosm,
as they have been for the FCC, wherever common nuisances are at issue.
There is good reason to believe that property rules will be appropriate,
for example, in intraservice disputes and simple interservice interference
disputes. As discussed previously, these kinds of disputes tend to be
characterized by relatively few parties and well-known interference
characteristics and abatement strategies.388 As a result, the transaction
costs involved in negotiating around a property rule will be relatively
386. The identification of interfering signals will always be challenging, no matter
what the regulator’s role in a future telecosm. Such identification could be simplified by
a requirement that all signals be tagged. However, even with immutable tags, liability
for interference might not be clear where multiple signals simultaneously exceeded the
cap or where one operator was primarily responsible for the exceedence but was not the
one to cross the line. In such situations, liability might be joint and several.
387. For a discussion of the virtue of simplicity in the choice of remedies, see
Epstein, supra note 197, at 76 (noting that “[w]hen the errors of individualized decision
making become too great the system may be better off (i.e., make fewer errors) if gross
and imperfect rules of easy application are substituted for perfect rules of difficult
application”).
388. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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low and will not justify deviation from the cheaper mode of resolution.
Recent research on transaction costs in relation to property rules helps
us to unpack further why property rules might be justified for these kinds
of interference disputes. For reasons explained below, intraservice
disputes and simple interservice conflicts share characteristics with
conflicts over tangible, as contrasted with intangible, goods. The work
of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell on liability and property rules
suggests that property rules may be preferable in conflicts over the
possession of tangible items, as opposed to conflicts over usage rights.389
In advancing this argument, Kaplow and Shavell profess that the chief
virtue of liability rules is that they exploit the litigants’ private
information when a court lacks good information about how the parties
value the continuation or discontinuation of the nuisance.390 The extent
and value of private information is likely to be less, and therefore the
utility of liability rules is likely to be less, in disputes about possessory
rights than in disputes about usage rights for two reasons.
First, the value that two contending parties place on a possessory right
tends to be more highly correlated, and thus more easily known, than the
value that two contending parties place on a usage right.391 Suppose, for
example, that Sally has taken Jane’s car. Sally and Jane both value the
utility of the car, even though they might value it to different degrees.
By contrast, in the case of a conflict over air pollution, the polluter
values the entitlement to pollute as a means to enhance the value of an
enterprise, while those adversely affected by pollution value the absence
of pollution. There is likely to be far less correlation between the two
valuations of the air than the two valuations of the car. As a result, Sally
and Jane will have better information, as compared to a court, than will
the factory and homeowner.
Second, in the case of possessory things, the risk of repeated conflict
arising from repeated takings in the wake of damages rulings is far
higher than where usage rights are involved. If Sally takes Jane’s car
and pays Jane damages, Jane might then take the car back from Sally,
paying her damages, and so on, creating a cycle of property incursions
389. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 214, at 2096–97; Kaplow & Shavell, Property
Rules, supra note 210, at 765–67; Krier & Schwab, supra note 107, at 460–62.
390. See Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 210, at 725 (writing that
“the virtue of the liability rule is that it allows the state to harness the information that
the injurer naturally possesses about his prevention cost”).
391. Id. at 771–73. The authors refer to usage rights as “harmful externalities” and
to possessory rights as the “taking of things.” Id.
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that is highly unproductive. By contrast, the homeowner who is paid
damages for a factory’s pollution cannot unilaterally retrieve the
entitlement to be free from pollution.392
All commentators since Coase have written about spectrum rights as
though they were usage rights, not possessory rights.393 Even those who
use the language of “fee simple” interests in spectrum do not believe that
spectrum is a thing. Certainly it is not. And yet there is validity to the
analogy of spectrum as land and, correspondingly, to the equation of
some spectrum disputes with disputes over physical things. Especially
in intraservice interference conflicts, we see that disputes over spectrum
can be more like disputes over possessory rights than like pollution
rights. The values placed on the spectrum by the victim and the
interferer tend to be correlated because both parties are using the same
kind of architecture with the same kind of spectral efficiency. Although
the two operators might place different values on the spectrum they use,
just as Sally and Jane might value Jane’s car differently, it is the utility
of the spectrum for the same kind of use that they value. Moreover,
there is a risk of reciprocal takings. If Mike and John operate devices in
the same service, and Mike’s transmitter interferes with the reception of
John’s signals, in some cases John can dial up his power and interfere
with the reception of Mike’s signals, and so on.394
Turning to the selection among and between liability and property
rules for interference disputes more generally, we should consider the
kinds of ex ante investments we want nuisance law to motivate. The
recent work of Lucian Bebchuk, while supporting the conventional
preference for liability rules in high transaction cost contexts, adds an
important asterisk to that preference. It suggests that the effects of
nuisance rules on ex ante investments in property enhancements and
interference reduction may either reduce or magnify the advantage of
392. Id. at 724–32, 759–63, 767–70, 772. But see IAN AYRES & PAUL M. GOLDBART, A
CRITIQUE OF “TANGIBILITY” AS THE BASIS OF PROBABILITY RULES 45–47 (Yale Law
School, Program for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, Working Paper No.
251, 2000) (arguing that the virtues of liability rules apply even where values are
correlated and there is a risk of multiple takings and that the solution to the multiple
takings problem is simply to increase the damages for the taking of tangible things),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=262185. To be sure, there are
property disputes that evince characteristics of both disputes over things and over usage
rights. Kaplow and Shavell use the example of one hotel’s blocking another hotel’s
ocean view. The ocean view has characteristics of a possessory thing (easy ex ante
negotiating and common value) as well as of a usage right (no reciprocal takings). See
Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 210, at 771–72.
393. Coase, supra note 2, at 25–26; De Vany et al., supra note 3, at 1512; Hazlett,
The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 338–39.
394. It will not always be the case that each party to an intraservice interference
dispute will have symmetrical technical or financial capabilities to cause harm to the
other party.
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liability rules, depending on the desired investment.395 What Bebchuk
has found is that property rules tend to lead to inefficiencies in
investments in both property enhancements and harm reduction.396 By
contrast, liability rules tend to produce optimal investments, but only in
harm reduction or in property enhancements, and only for one or the
other party in any given dispute.
So, for example, Rule Two will create incentives for the victim to
invest optimally in property enhancements, but to underinvest in the
prevention of harm. The interferer will be motivated to invest optimally
in the prevention of harm, but to overinvest in property enhancements.
Rule One will motivate the victim to overinvest in its property and
underinvest in the prevention of harm, while motivating the interferer to
underinvest in both its property and the prevention of harm.397 Thus, for
any given application of liability or property rules, choices must be
made as to what kinds of investments should be encouraged, and by
whom.
In the spectrum context, investments in interference prevention might
take the form of victim investment in more robust receiver technologies
or interferer investment in quieter transmission technologies.398 Property
enhancements in spectrum might include increasing the density of
transmission towers, upgrading system architecture, or investing in
better consumer devices. The relative desirability of such investments
might differ dramatically depending on the service involved.
Some communications systems, because of their technical architecture
395. Bebchuk observes that “total value—that is, the total size of the pie [in a
nuisance dispute]—depends not only on whether a legal rule reaches the efficient
outcome in any given ex post situation, but also on which ex post situation the rule
produces in the first place.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules:
The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601, 613 (2001).
396. In the case of investments in the value of the property, the party receiving the
entitlement invests too much and the other party too little. In the case of investments in
harm reduction, the party receiving the entitlement invests too little and the other party
too much. Id. at 635–36.
397. As applied to the other two basic property and liability rules, Bebchuk’s
method yields the following:
Rule 3: Interferer will overinvest in the value of its property and underinvest in
the prevention of harm. Victim will underinvest in the value of its property and
overinvest in the prevention of harm.
Rule 4: Interferer will invest optimally in the value of its property and underinvest
in prevention of harm. Victim will overinvest in the value of its property and
invest optimally in the prevention of harm.
Id. at 633–34.
398. See supra Part II.B.
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or commercial structure, cannot make ex ante investments in
interference prevention—a feature that a court’s choice of remedies
should take into account. These are, as discussed above, the open
architecture systems like broadcasting. The operators have no control,
either directly or through contractual relations, over the receivers to
which they transmit. As a result, they are ill-equipped to prevent
interference to themselves. By contrast, other systems are closed, in
that they can make the devices that receive their signals more
impervious to interference. Because open services cannot be motivated
to invest in interference prevention when they are the victims, neither
Rule One nor Rule Two, which deter the victim’s investment in
interference prevention, has the disadvantage that it would have if the
victim were an integrated service. These are thus probably the best rules
to use where the victim service is open, to the extent that ex ante
investment in interference prevention and system performance are of
primary concern.
One final consideration in the choice among rules is the most obvious.
The choice as between two possible property or liability rules privileges
the party that gets the entitlement to interfere or not to be interfered
with.399 As we have seen, the FCC’s preference for Rule One over Rule
Three is a product of its first-in-time, first-in-right policy of privileging
incumbents.400 This policy choice might be justified by public interest
rationales, such as the preservation of existing service and consumer
investments, or it might merely reflect incumbent power. Rule Two
might also privilege the incumbent if the damages award is high enough.
By contrast, Rule Three will privilege the new entrant as will Rule Four
if the damages award is low enough. Again, public interest concerns,
such as the promotion of more efficient service and competition, might
supply the rationale for privileging new entrants, or the choice might
merely reflect successful interest group lobbying. Interestingly, the
“exotic” Rule Four might find its most natural application in spectrum
conflicts, where the FCC has already used a Rule Four variant more than
Rule Four has been used in the real world. Table 2 summarizes some of
the major considerations that should go into a choice among rules of
entitlement in spectral nuisance cases.

399.
400.

396

See Rose, supra note 209, at 2177–79.
See supra Part IV.C.2.
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TABLE 2
INTRASERVICE

RULE ONE
X

RULE TWO

RULE THREE
X

RULE FOUR

OR SIMPLE

INTERSERVICE
COMPLEX
INTERSERVICE
CLOSED
SERVICE
OPEN SERVICE
PRIVILEGE
EXISTING
SERVICE
PRIVILEGE
NEW ENTRANT

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
(depends on
level of
damage award)
(depends on
level of
damage
award)401

Given all these considerations in the selection of nuisance rules, what
is the role of the regulator? At a minimum, self-conscious agency
experimentation with different rules before privatization would provide
precedent for common law courts facing the same kinds of disputes.
More ambitiously, courts might draw on administrative expertise on an
ongoing basis in the development and selection of nuisance rules just as
in the development and selection of thresholds of liability. The spectrum
context could provide a laboratory for testing the transaction cost and
investment incentive hypotheses that have developed out of the
Cathedral literature. Moreover, articulation by the agency in the
401. Unless the damage award includes some of the gains of trade of the one who
purchases the entitlement, a liability rule will not be as favorable to the entitlement
holder as a property rule will be. This is because the rights holder will only be
compensated for its damages rather than for an amount that lies somewhere between its
damages and the value of its rights to the defendant.
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administrative regime of what rule it was using and why would reveal
where political power or public interest considerations other than
economic efficiency goals were driving the choice of interference rule.
Certainly, default nuisance rules for the resolution of interference
conflicts in no way make nuisance law self-executing. For any given
conflict, there might be reason to select any of the four rules. What
administrative, and then judicial, implementation of a menu of rules
might achieve, however, is greater transparency, fairness, and efficiency
in dispute resolution. The consideration of the public interest, including
equity and efficiency goals, would come to the surface in the choice
between privileging an existing or a new service, even though other
characteristics of the dispute might argue for a different rule. Moreover,
those engaged in a complex interservice dispute could assume that it
would be resolved with a liability rule, revealing their private valuations
of the nuisance and prevention costs.
2. Spectrum as Air: Ambient Interference and the Commons
Thus far, the continuing role I have described for the regulator is as a
draftsman of deeds and a special master to the courts, providing
technical assistance in the adjudication of common law nuisances among
property owners. But, recalling that spectrum is as much air as it is land,
we can see the regulator’s proper role morphing with the perception of
the resource. Throughout the spectrum, as the density of wireless
transmitters increases, the amount of energy radiated into the radio
frequencies will increase, threatening low-level degradation (like air
pollution) of all services. In the face of this problem, there is a need for
some command and control regulation. In the commons, spectrum will
be shared like the air, subject to compliance with technological controls.
In a world where all can breathe recycled air, provided that they use
particular masks (equipment standards), some regulatory oversight over
the mask selection process is desirable. At the very least, there should
be a minimal degree of transparency and opportunity for participation in
this process.
a. Spectral Pollution
In the discussion of spectrum conflicts and nuisance law, I excluded a
class of conflict that has yet to be addressed by the FCC and is
problematic for the application of nuisance law. These are the conflicts
that result from what was described above as spectral pollution, in which
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cumulative noise interferes with the signals of multiple operators.402
Devices that are particularly sensitive, such as satellite receivers, will be
the canaries in the coal mine, feeling the first effects of ambient noise
pollution. This phenomenon is likely to occur no matter what kind of
spectrum management regime is implemented, although it will probably
be more pronounced in the presence of the high-power services
advantaged by a private property rights system. Grievances resulting
from this kind of ambient interference will be very difficult to address
through the common law.403 Like environmental pollution, spectral
pollution may have far-reaching negative externalities for consumers, as
communication is compromised without obvious cause.
Like
environmental pollution, spectral pollution presents the kind of
polycentric problem that courts have difficulty resolving. Coase, after
all, limited his nuisance examples to two-party conflicts, apparently
assuming that regulation would be needed where there were large
numbers of affected people.404
Quite clearly, there is a role for regulation in the control of ambient
spectral pollution.405 Indeed, it was the advent of scientifically complex,
large impact pollution disputes that propelled environmental law out of the
courts and into administrative procedures.406 The “general conclusion
402. See supra Part II.B.2.
403. See infra notes 406–09 and accompanying text.
404. See Coase, supra note 2, at 29. However, Calabresi and Melamed applied their
theories to cases involving thousands of owners. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
10, at 1106–08. For this insight, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 381–82 (2001).
405. Property rights theorists have at least contemplated a continuing regulatory
role in the new spectrum management system. See, e.g., White, supra note 3, at 31.
In instances where the numbers of interferers and/or the numbers of
encroached-upon parcel holders were large enough that private enforcement
through the courts was considered too costly and burdensome, alternative
mechanisms—government enforcement of the private transmission rights,
administrative methods for dealing with “polluting” transmissions from
multiple incidental sources (such as high voltage lines, motors, etc.), perhaps
even “zoning” of bands or areas—might be developed.
Id.
406. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 114–16, 464 (2d ed. 1996) (documenting the shift from tort to statutory law
as a means of environmental regulation); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 317 (1981) (stating that “Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate
federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate
nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency”). In an intriguing new piece, Daniel Esty has argued that
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[was] that nuisance litigation is ill-suited to other than small-scale,
incidental, localized, scientifically uncomplicated pollution problems.”407
Legal scholars and courts appear to have reached the conclusion that
nuisance law is a fairly poor way to resolve modern environmental
problems for at least five reasons, all of which apply to spectral pollution
as well: (1) The diffusion of a pollution problem may deter victims from
bringing suit because the costs exceed the benefits of injunctive or
monetary relief, (2) the ability of some victims to free ride on others will
also deter suits, (3) proof of causation is often difficult, (4) the
assessment of damages is difficult where there are multiple effects on
multiple victims, and (5) judges may not be technically competent to
assess the costs of the nuisance.408 Notwithstanding the efforts in the
past several decades to introduce market mechanisms into the federal
pollution control system, it is in the administrative arena that environmental
disputes have largely remained.409
In discussing the relative merits of tort law and regulation as
mechanisms for controlling environmental pollution, Steven Shavell
argues that common law liability and regulation should not be mutually
exclusive solutions. A combination of the two systems of law exploits
the benefits of each.410 The coexistence of common law with federal
new information technologies will enable a return, at least in part, to private law to
control environmental harms. DANIEL C. ESTY, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (Yale Law School, Working Paper No. 58, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=429580.
407. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 181, at 777; see also Joseph L. Sax, Using
Property Rights to Attack Environmental Protection, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 715, 719
(2002) (arguing that “[n]uisance law is poorly suited both to cumulative harms and
to those matters that involve sophisticated science, and difficult decisions about
risk—precisely the reason that common law nuisance has largely given way to statutory
regulation across the spectrum of environmental matters”); see also Christopher H.
Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does That Tort
Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 584–601 (2002) (comparing environmental
administrative and tort law).
408. See, e.g., Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs out of Parlors: Using
Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 414–15 (1997). On
the competence of courts to resolve environmental disputes, see Steven Shavell, Liability
for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 369 (1984) (writing that
“in dealing with many health-related and environmental risks, a regulatory agency may
have better access to, or a superior ability to evaluate, relevant medical, epidemiological,
and ecological knowledge”); see also Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 330–35
(1985) (arguing that courts do not have the perspective to make adequate comparisons of
risk in the environmental context).
409. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
275, 278–86.
410. See Shavell, supra note 408, at 365 (writing that administrative costs and knowledge
disparities favor the use of tort law, but polluters’ inability to pay and insufficient threat
of suit favor regulation).
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regulation is not new.411 Indeed, we can find precedent for such coexistence
in both nuisance law412 and FCC law.413 It is not hard then to envision
the coexistence of a federal regulatory apparatus for the control of
ambient spectral pollution alongside a common law regime for the
control of spectral nuisances.
One of the nice features of the per se nuisance standard proposed
above is that it could serve a function in both common law and federal
regulatory regimes. As discussed above, the maximum noise level,
adjusted periodically through notice and comment rulemakings, might
establish a threshold of liability for many nuisance actions.414 It could
also serve to control the total amount of spectral pollution, in the form of
background noise, in the atmosphere.
b. Regulatory Oversight of Technology Controls
As in the resolution of spectrum conflicts in a private property rights
regime, the design and enforcement of ex ante controls on spectrum use
in a commons regime will implicate tradeoffs among efficiency,
fairness, and public service values.415 These are tradeoffs in which the
public, through a regulatory agency, ought to be involved. Commons
theory is premised on the notion that, by agreeing to be bound by
particular etiquettes and protocols, wireless operators can increase the
supply of spectrum. But who will judge the competing demands for
spectrum and pick the winners, defined through technical standards, in
the commons? Commons theorists have been vague about the
government’s role in developing, endorsing, and enforcing new and
411. See generally Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism,
and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1717–20 (2001).
412. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 483, 500 (1987) (allowing
common law nuisance suits to proceed in federal court as a supplement to the Clean
Water Act). For criticism of this case, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the
Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 875, 894 (1991) (arguing that nuisance actions for environmental harms
pose a risk of fifty separate versions of nuisance doctrines). But see Weiser, supra note
411, at 1719 n.142 (arguing that the supplementation of federal statutory law by state
common law is “a hallmark of cooperative federalism” and “state tort law is likely to
cohere with federal regulation”).
413. See, e.g., Ivy Broad. Co. v. AT&T, 391 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1968) (creating
federal common law pursuant to the Communications Act, authorizing the FCC to set
terms for the provision of telephone service by common carriers).
414. See supra Part VI.B.1.a.
415. See supra Part V.B.
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evolving industry protocols and etiquettes, although they clearly
contemplate some public role.416
To the extent that the spectrum protocols of the commons were
encoded in FCC rules, the equipment certification or standard setting
process would simply recreate the inefficiencies and unpredictability of
the current command and control regime.417 This cannot be what the
commons theorists have in mind. And yet, to the extent that the
government has nothing to do with the design and enforcement of
technical controls, there may well be problems of access to the standard
setting process, particularly by new innovators, as well as competitive
abuse and industry capture of the process.418 There is also a risk, as has
been recognized in other contexts by property rights skeptics, that the
self-help enforcement mechanisms adopted by technical protocol could
compromise public interest objectives.419 A robustly competitive market
in consumer devices would help to ensure that consumer welfare was not
sacrificed to technical control, except that the range of devices on the
market will be only as wide as industry adopted standards permit. Thus,
it might well be in the interest of all manufacturers to promote some
technologies over others, to design for some (particularly urban)
populations over rural ones, and to trade longevity in communications
devices for rapid obsolescence. This is all to say that, depending on the
regulator’s role in the commons, interference control and the resolution
of spectral conflict could endow private standard setting bodies with
416. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 34, at 361–62.
[A]n important area of study into unlicensed spectrum is to identify which
rules will reward efficient devices with better access to the shared spectrum
and penalize inefficient devices—whether such rules take the form of
administrative regulations by the FCC or protocols and standards set by the
industry to prevent defection and degradation of the quality of performance all
industry members can deliver to their customers.
Id. One approach is to utilize the FCC as a facilitator, assisting local spectrum groups
with management and conflict resolution. Buck, supra note 4, at 76.
417. See Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, supra note 3, at 506–07.
418. The FCC has considered an approach that combines property rights with the
commons in the establishment of protocols. Under this approach, a band or protocol
manager would purchase spectrum at auction and manage the band as a commons. The
manager would prescribe the protocols to be used by the unlicensed devices in the band
and approve the manufacture and sale of all such devices for a period of time. FCC
UDEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 17. While this approach would allocate responsibilities for
standard setting, it would also change the economics of the commons model by imposing
a cost on users for spectrum access. Moreover, a managed commons allocated by
auction would result in commons of limited size, rather than the very wideband spectrum
access that commons theorists believe is required.
419. Julie Cohen in particular has documented the dangers of self-help in the
copyright context. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of SelfHelp, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1090–92 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 586–88 (2003); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 531–32 (1998).
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quasi-public power in the regulation of communications devices and
systems.
The best antidote to this threat is an injection of public scrutiny into
the critical stages of standard setting and standards enforcement. At a
minimum, assuming that the government relinquished its current role in
the certification of equipment for unlicensed bands, it should establish
requirements of openness and participation for private entities that take
effective control of access to commons spectrum through their standard
setting activities. Such openness and participation might assuage
concerns about fairness and access to spectrum among equipment
providers, but do very little to address public concerns about the
particular technologies that are allowed to flourish and the segments of
the population being served. Thus, it is conceivable that more
significant government oversight would be desirable in the operation of
a commons. One could imagine, for example, a set of substantive
criteria that technical standards, protocols, and etiquettes would be
required to meet. In conjunction with these criteria, there might be an
administrative forum to which consumers or competing spectrum users
could bring complaints about standards being adopted or enforced in the
commons. The regulator would then have the authority to enjoin or
order alterations to the development and implementation of such
standards.
VII. CONCLUSION
The spectrum of electromagnetic frequencies will increasingly
structure the way we communicate with each other and with the
electronic devices that populate our bodies, homes, businesses, and
public spaces. How we communicate through those devices, at what
speed, with how much security and reliability, through what gatekeeper,
and at what cost will all be influenced by the law and policy choices that
are now the focus of intense debate. It is a debate that goes beyond the
question of spectrum management to the underlying values of the
telecosm to come.
Two profoundly different visions have shaped the current discussion
about reforming the governance of spectrum. One envisions spectrum as
a common resource that should be accessible to all with minimal
restrictions, so long as technology cooperates. Another envisions
frequencies as fenced plots that should belong to individual owners and
then aggregated or sold, abandoned or reserved, as the market demands.

403

GOODMAN.DOC

9/18/2019 1:30 PM

These visions can and probably will coexist in any radical alteration of
the current spectrum management regime. What is important to grapple
with now is how conflict over the spectrum resource, whether it is
fenced or not, will be resolved and how such resolution can be
rationalized, made more transparent, and fairer in the construction of a
new management model.
The regulatory agency must play a continuing role in the resolution of
spectrum conflict. In this Article, I have outlined desirable regulatory
functions in systems of private and commonly owned spectrum rights,
including the development of “common law” rules for the allocation of
entitlements to cause or be free from interference and overseeing the
selection of standards and enforcement tools for the commons. Perhaps
most importantly in the most congested portions of the spectrum, the
regulator should control ambient interference levels that could degrade
the ability of all spectrum users to communicate. The precise relationship
between the regulator and courts in a private property rights regime, or
between the regulator and private standards bodies in the commons,
must be articulated with greater refinement and must be allowed to
evolve. It is time to begin this articulation with a frank recognition that
there is no spectrum utopia in which disputes disappear or can be
resolved through value-neutral and self-executing processes. There is no
escape from the calls of the public interest on the allocation of spectrum
usage rights. There is no way around the privileging of some
communications technologies over others in the resolution of spectral
conflict.
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